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ABSTRACT

Collins, Hannah Elisabeth. M.A. Department of Political Science, Wright State
University, 2016. An Unrelenting Past: Historical Memory in Japan and South Korea.

Every population maintains collective memories which provide meaning and
identity for members (Langenbache, 2003). Elites have exerted influence on what is
being remembered and the interpretation of the remembrances for specific objects,
through the concept of historical memory. Wang (2012) has shown that authoritarian
governments leverage historical memory to increase legitimacy. Similarly, Bernhard and
Kubik (2014) have demonstrated that transitioning democracies also benefit from elite
use of historical memory for consolidation. The lack of studies concerning consolidated
democracies’ use of historical memory raises many questions, including whether
consolidated democracies manipulate historical memory for the purpose of legitimacy? I
contend that, similar to Wang’s findings, elites within consolidated democracies
manipulate historical memory for the purpose of enhancing party legitimacy and that the
concept of historical memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites after
consolidation. Japan and South Korea constitute the case studies for this examination.
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I.

Introduction: The Influence of Historical Memory and Nationalism
In his book, Never Forget National Humiliation, Zheng Wang states, “The past is

not solid, immutable, or even measureable; rather, it is a fluid set of ideas, able to be
shaped by time, emotion, and the political savvy” (2012, 17). In his case study focusing
on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1989-2011, Wang demonstrates the power
of an authoritarian state in manipulating the collective memories of the past for the
purpose of legitimacy. The PRC influences historical memories by controlling messages
within textbooks, monuments, and political statements with the purpose of increasing
nationalism within the population. The development of nationalism in turn increases the
legitimacy of the regime (Wang, 2012). I contend that similar to Wang’s study of an
authoritarian government, democratic governments also manipulate historical memory
with a goal of increasing nationalism to bolster political parties’ legitimacy. This
exploitation of historical memory by democratic governments also provides an avenue in
which to understand the state’s democracy, and worldview of the public.
Historical memory is a focused awareness that repeats certain significance and
current relevance about the past in close connection to the present and the future, without
holding to the accurate retelling of history (Toshechenko, 2011, 3). This concept is often
created or manipulated by elites for specific purposes. Thus it does not follow factual
aspects of history but uses history instrumentally to have the collective purposely
remember or forget specific events to achieve the manipulators goals, such as increasing
the legitimacy of government (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).
1

Historical memory also aids in the development of other concepts such as
collective identity, national identity, nation building and nationalism as it provides
members with a past, and an additional way to define the group. Historical memory’s
potential depth in defining the collective also impacts the worldview of the population.
Scholars of history, psychology, political science, and sociology have demonstrated that
history can be a powerful tool in which to bring a population together and that the control
of such an influence can also mobilize a population (Wang, 2012; Hutchinson & Smith,
1994; Johnston, 2012).
Historical memory is a relatively new concept, emerging nearly 30 years ago, and
has centered on traumatic events that occurred within the 20th century; such as the World
Wars, the Holocaust, and the fall of the Soviet Union (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Such
events created vast amounts of disturbing memories for many populations, changed how
people defined themselves, and their view of the world (Tolvaisis, 2013). Generally, the
study of historical memory provides descriptive information with which to understand
how the public views the past and the present in relation to those traumatic events.
However, there is a growing area within the study of this concept in providing new or
better understanding of government through the analysis of the manipulation that elites
are engaging (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Ghodsee, 2014; Paabo, 2014).
Historical memory has also been identified as a tool in creating internal and
international conflicts. Conflicts in relation to this concept have been recognized as
disagreements between two populations over the remembrance of specific events and the
way in which past events are remembered (Wang, 2012; Cui, 2012). Historical memory’s
support of identity within the collective and the othering of the out group also aids in the
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prevalence of violent struggles. Such case studies on conflicts and tense relationships
related to historical memory include Serbia where historical memory crystalized two
distinct groups and “othering” based on ethnicity that quickly led to a violent conflict
(Tolvaisis, 2013), Israel where the historical memories of the Palestinian 1948 exodus
changed over the years, and how the new Israeli state used historical memory to aid in the
creation of a new nation (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Gabel, 2013), Japan, China, and South
Korea currently demonstrate active historical memories on events surrounding World
War II (WWII) causing tense international relations (Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka,
2011), and Estonia in creating a new identity as an individual nation after the fall of the
Soviet Union (Lanko, 2011).
As illustrated in the above mentioned cases, an important trait of historical
memory is its link to nation building by providing the ability for elites to construct a past
and influence the identity of a population. A noticeable feature of state formation is the
development of nationalism. Nationalism can be utilized as a way in which to promote
unity among a population by creating an accepted in-group and out-group with a strong
loyalty to the in-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). Nationalism is defined as a positive,
emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a mentality of loyalty coupled with a
negative view of the out-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). The Soviet successor states
have exemplified the relationship of historical memory and nationalism as many of the
new state governments work to reframe history in a way that supports the emergence of
new states such as in creating new individual democracies while developing space to
understand the past (Hewer & Roberts, 2012).
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The message of historical memory is commonly dispersed through history
textbooks, memorials, museums, and statues, and can ignite tense relationships between
states. Such tense disagreements have been demonstrated through the relationship
between Germany and its neighbors, such as Poland, in the remembrances of events from
WWII (Wang, 2012; Kucia, Duch-Dyngosz, & Magierowski, 2013). The idea of correct
remembrances through these items has also caused stressed international relations
throughout the Asian region, most notably between China, South Korea, and Japan
(Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka, 2010). Struggles stemming from how the past is being
remembered continue to illicit strong public responses which are commonly displayed in
the form of protests (Lawson & Tannaka, 2010; Yoshida, 2014 f).
While every nation has a form of historical memory, Europe and Asia have been
common areas where this concept has been studied. Such studies have frequently focused
on how nations’ worldviews have changed since the impact of the specific historical
event (Watson, 2012; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Nets-Zehngut, 2011), in understanding
how specific events are being remembered and for what purpose (Wang, 2012;
Unger,1993; Selling ,2011) as well as understanding how populations are choosing to
understand and carryout reconciliation between groups and or other states (Wang, 2012;
Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Hovland, 2013).
The concept of historical memory has the ability to provide greater understanding
of a population and its respective government. As such there is a growing emphasis on
the analysis of government manipulation of historical memory to achieve specific
purposes such as authoritarian regimes’ use to influence or repress a population as well as
its use in the transition to democracy, and what such manipulation illustrates of the
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regime type, the specific government, and the government and populations relationship
(Wang, 2012; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Crenzel, 2015; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).
Democracies are an under analyzed field within this area of study. Given the limited
scope of scholarship involving democracies involvement with historical memory
questions arise, such as do consolidated democratic governments utilize historical
memory? What do democratic governments gain from manipulating historical memory?
Can historical memory be used by consolidated democratic governments for legitimacy?
In this research I will explore how consolidated democracies utilize historical
memory through a detailed analysis of two prominent historical events; state visits to
Yasukuni Shrine and Comfort Women.
II.

Literature Review
The literature demonstrates a strong relationship between historical memory and

nationalism. Many scholars have illustrated how state builders and elites utilize historical
memory as a way to unify a population in an effort to create a new state, to gain support
for specific policies, or to uphold government legitimacy; as exemplified by case studies
on Israel (Shelef, 2010), Belarus (Marples, 2012), Slovenia (Luthar, 2013), and South
Korea (Park, 2010) among others. Along with governmental actors’ involvement with
history, three core concepts emerged within the literature: historical memory,
nationalism, and identity. Identity and historical memory have been widely agreed upon
as interdisciplinary concepts with continued influence by such fields as history,
psychology, political science, and sociology (Toshechenko, 2011; Hewer & Roberts,
2012; Cui, 2012).
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Historical Memory
Historical memory is part of collective memory. Collective memories are built on
the personal memories that each member carries, personal interpretation or not, and are
shared understandings of selected, commonly experienced historical events with framing
values entangled with the memories. These memories of the past are not necessarily
historically accurate (Langenbacher, 2003; Gabel, 2013). Collective memory provides a
member with an understandable, coherent story which gives the collective a past as well
as defining who they are today (Paabo, 2014). Memories of the collective also allow the
population to remember together, such as the traumatic events that have occured to the
group. Such remembering as a collective is typically stifled under oppressive
governments (Hewer & Roberts, 2012). Langenbacher (2003) claims, “Memory is a way
of packaging and operationalizing shared history and becomes the means by which
history becomes an influential attitudinal force within a political culture.” As illustrated,
memory is a personal and often an emotional portion of a person’s identity.
Historical memory is instrumentally crafted to create a specific vision within a
population through selective remembering and forgetting of history that shapes a
population’s memory of the past to achieve the crafters’ goals. The writing of history has
been associated with power as the manipulation of the past and the collective’s historical
memory have been a source of legitimacy for “mass-incorporating regimes” (Bernhard &
Kubik, 2014). Thus elites have utilized historical memory as a way to support the
legitimacy of their government or political policies (Selling, 2011). But elites are also
constrained by the history they are manipulating through the collective memories of the
population. There are limits to the manipulation of history as the collective has
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constructed a history that they deem true. Thus, influence of this history works within the
constraints of what the population will regard as true; once elites cross the unstated
threshold of what is acceptably believable in historical memory they lose the trust of the
population and are not able to achieve their goals (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).
Nationalism
Nationalism is a positive emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a
mentality of loyalty. Group members’ become loyal to a defined group through the
development of affection for the homeland and receive a form of identity and self-esteem
from group membership. Nationalism aids in the definition of the ‘in-group’ or ‘we’
through the development of group loyalty as well as creating an ‘out-group’ or ‘other’
that is counter to the in-group. The out-group is often portrayed as the aggressor or source
of contention toward the in-group. With nationalism’s development of a strong sense of
love for the in-group, often an aggressive dislike for the outside group also develops
(Druckman, 1994). Patriotism is very similar to the concept of nationalism, as they both
have a love for the nation but, according to scholar Elie Kedourie, nationalism also
contains a sense of xenophobia against the outside group along with the intense love for
the ingroup. This conglomeration of patriotism with xenophobia gives nationalism a
distinct style of politics (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 49).
There are two major schools of thought in regards to how nationalism develops
within a population: the instrumentalist and primordialist. The primordial scholars
believe that nationalism is a natural development that occurs through commonalities
among a population such as through language, ethnicity, region, religion, and customs,
among others, which aids in uniting a people (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 29). The
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instrumentalists, like Eric Hobsbawm and Paul Brass, contend that nationalism is not a
natural development but that it is purposefully crafted by elites to achieve goals such as
political objectives and legitimacy of power (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). While the
instrumentalist theory differs from primordialism, it does not refute primordial elements
but utilizes them to promote the development of nationalism such as through
manipulating history, culture, and education and at times can be constrained due to
primordial elements (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 83).
Identity
Identity is defined as, “A deeply held sense of who a person is, where he or she
fits in the political and social world” (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, & Preston, 2010).
Individual identities make up the collective which aids in forming what a group is and
what it stands for which in turn also shapes the identity of the individual (Brewer, 2001).
This concept forms the worldview of a person, how they see themselves and their
connection with others, including the state (Klandermans, 2014). The concept of identity
not only provides understanding on how citizens define themselves individually and as a
collective but also provides the ability to gain information on the worldview held by a
collective (Enjelvin & Korac-Kakabadse, 2012).
The identities of a person and the collective are prone to multiple influences
(Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006). As such, elites have used this permeable
concept as a tool to shape the collective’s identity and in turn their worldview for specific
ends. History textbooks have been a common medium in which elites have crafted
identity as the texts are commonly presented as legitimate forms of information (Ghosh,
2014). In the study of historical memory, identity illustrates the way in which the
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population is crafted to be connected to the past as well as provides understanding of the
influences on the population’s worldview.
Trends in the Literature
History textbooks and newspapers are the largest area in which historical memory
and nationalism have been studied. Through this channel, clear and concise messages are
able to be distributed throughout the public. In the setting of education, history textbooks
have a captive audience to receive the approved top down message. National education
is a powerful institution that employs cultural and collective memory to share
governmentally sanctioned knowledge to the collective and new members for
internalization (Paabo, 2014). “Textbooks are inherently political” as the country’s image
of itself, of others, and of its past are presented within their pages and offered as
legitimate knowledge to the public (Schneider, 2008). Commonly, textbooks have
utilized and developed historical memory to achieve a national narrative, an identity
within the nation, and creating an out-group to the nation’s in-group, thus aiding in the
growth of nationalism (Paabo, 2014). Textbooks also play a “dual role” in that they
bridge the gap between the past and the present through historical narratives and
collective memory, and are thus employed to suit “contemporary needs” (Paabo, 2014).
When history textbooks are approved by the state, such as in Japan and South Korea, they
gain a “quasi-official character” and thus represent the voice of the state (Schneider,
2008).
Studies concerning history textbooks have been conducted in Norway, looking at
the government’s objective of changing the populous’ negative view of Sweden
(Hovland, 2013). Similar studies on the type of history being manipulated to encourage a
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specific national narrative or myth has been done on South Korea (So, Kim, & Lee, 2012)
Belarus (Marples, 2012) Slovenia (Luthar, 2013) Japan (Lawson & Tannaka, 2011), and
China (Cui, 2012). Benedict Anderson (1991) utilized newspapers as a channel in which
to study a population. Anderson found that a population can be united through common
language often found in newspapers that are widely distributed. Newspapers have also
been utilized by elites and governments as another way to achieve the elements similar to
those of textbooks such as demonstrated in studies on Israel’s historical memory and
nationalism (Gabel, 2013; Shelef, 2010).
Historical memory and nationalism have also been studied as channels for
memory reconciliation through history textbooks. Europe and Asia have been analyzed in
the area of reconciliation with focuses on Germany and Japan in their relations with
regional neighbors (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Wang,
2012).
Monuments and museums are also a common area of study in historical memory
and nationalism. Manipulation of history occurs in museums through what events are
being displayed or not displayed as well as the type of objects being exhibited to
remember specific events (Evans, 2011; Han, 2012; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014). Museums
that are owned or supported by governmental agencies provide a second avenue in
promoting specific identities or political messages beyond that of text (Wang, 2012;
Emre Ates, 2014; Han, 2012). Nationalism is reinforced within the population by how
the group and the other are portrayed through these mediums. Statues are very similar to
museums with physical representation being made of a piece of history or of a person
commonly dubbed a “national hero” or icon which can reinforce specific messages or a
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sense of strong loyalty to the population (Tolvaisis, 2013). The location of statues and
“memory sites” can also be a point of significance in regards to the manipulation or how
an event is being remembered (Paabo, 2014). For much of Europe and Asia, the study of
museums and statues has focused on traumatic events from the 20th century, similar to the
memory that is manipulated by elites.
In Asia, the most common museum under study is the Yasukuni Shrine, as the
shrine also maintains a museum as part of its structure as a memorial (Inuzuka & Fuchs,
2014). The Shrine continues to illicit criticism and intense response from governments
throughout Asia as well as around the world. Many studies on this site have focused on
populations’ identity, remembrance, governmental manipulation, and reconciliation
(Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014; Fukuoka, 2013; Deans, 2007; Ryu, 2014; O’Dwyer, 2010).
Given technological advancements, mass media, including television, radio and
film, have become another channel in which historical memory and nationalism are
studied. Elites and independent organizations have utilized this technology as a way to
easily spread their message to a majority of the public and the world. Mass media has
been analyzed for the portrayal of the past, of the in and out group, and of the
representation of the state and nation. Recent studies have looked at popular icons, such
as pop singers, and their influence on the growth of nationalism for instance with South
Korea’s pop singer Psy and the ‘Korean Wave’ that followed with a growth of Korean
nationalism (Joo, 2011).
Trends in the literature have shown common ways in which historical memory
and nationalism are studied, but as previously mentioned there is a trend in the type of
government examined. The transition of oppressive governments, such as authoritarian
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regimes and dictatorships, to democracy is prevalent throughout the literature. Oppresive
governments commonly inflict tramatic experiences on a population and repress the
collective from understanding the events through collective remembering (Crenzel, 2015;
Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). New democracies allow for the collective to remember and
frame this remembering to support the new government by typically blaming the old
regime. This framing has been studied to forecast whether a new democracy will
consolidate and become stable (Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Brewer, 2008; Pridham, 2014).
Elites have also used historical memory to propagate pro-democratic values to support
and legitimize the new democratic state. The creation of pro-democratic values has been
studied in transiting, unstable democracies to estimate the ability of the new state to
survive (Langenbacher, 2003).
Consolidated democracies have also been studied in their use of historical
memory, although to a lesser extent compared to that of transitional democracies. Such
studies have focused on democracies’ use of historical memory to retain legitimacy of
political parties and to gain support for specific governmental legislation (Selling, 2011;
Ghodsee, 2014) However, studies such as those done by Selling and Ghodsee, on Sweden
and former communist states, fail to demonstrate the rise or fall in legitimacy through
analysis of public approval ratings. The literature also illustrated a lack of studies
concerning democracies use of historical memory in the Asian region as a majority
focuses on former Soviet Union states. Many journalists have asserted that democratic
states, such as South Korea, manipulate historical memory for the purpose of nationalism
to increase legitimacy (Fackler, 2012) but it seems the claims are not supported by
academic studies.
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III.

Background Information
Historical memory has been prominently displayed in East Asia, including South

Korea and Japan. The memory of past events has been cited in newspapers, mass media
coverage, and by political actors as the cause for the current strained relationship between
the two states and as a mobilizer of the population. A study of public opinion toward
Japan within the Asia-Pacific region conducted by Pew Data in 2013 illustrates a low
public opinion of Japan within the South Korean public. The unfavorable opinion held by
the total population rates at 77%, which is higher by 25% since 2008 when the study was
first administered. Pew relates this unfavorable public opinion to the South Korean
population’s belief that Japan has inefficiently apologized for past actions that took place
in the 1930s and 1940s (Pew Data Research, 2013). While there is currently no Pew Data
on the view of South Korea within the Japanese public, such strong opinions toward
another state due to actions that occurred more than 70 years ago highlights an active
historical memory in which South Korea and Japan are engaged.
Wang (2012) states, “Political leaders often use historical memory to bolster their
own legitimacy, promote their own interests, encourage a nationalistic spirit, and
mobilize mass support for social conflicts” (p. 26). South Korean political parties have
been driven by personalities since the transition to democracy in 1988. Party candidates
have typically been chosen for their strength in pulling votes during the general election.
Such tactics has led the political party system in South Korea to be seen as unstable with
multiple political parties emerging and dissolving due to their centered nature around one
particular candidate (Lee, 2014). President Park Geun-hye’s party, the Grand National
Party (GNP), now known as the Saenuri or New Frontier Party, underwent a rebranding
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campaign in 2012 to change the party’s image in an effort to revitalize it after multiple
personal factions threatened to break up the GNP (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012).
In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) has held political power since the
transition to democracy in 1952, only losing power twice in 60 years. The Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) overwhelmingly defeated the LDP in the general elections in 2009,
which was the second loss for the LDP. With the restoration of power in the 2012 general
elections, it has been speculated that the LDP is facing a lack of faith from the public.
This may be affecting their claim to power as the economy continues to stagnate with
ongoing deflation and growing trade deficit coupled with a large aging population. It is
also important to note that while the LDP returned to power in the 2012 election, it
hosted 1,504 candidates which is the largest pool of candidates ever in Japan’s general
election, even though there was only a 59% voter turnout which is claimed to be one of
the lowest voter turnouts on record by the New York Times (Fackler, 2012).
Specific events have been cited by political actors, nongovernmental organizations,
and news agencies as reasons for the poor public opinion and cold relations between
South Korea and Japan to include the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery,
commonly referred to as “Comfort Women,” the content and revisions of history
textbooks as well as other government sanctioned literature, and the Yasukuni Shrine.
Each event demonstrates government involvement with the remembrance of the past,
which continually elicits public outcries against the offending state. In this research, I
plan a detailed analysis of two historical events that impact international relations
between South Korea and Japan; Comfort Women and state visits to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine, to examine the use of historical memory by democratic leaders.
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The largest issue of contention between South Korea and Japan is the history of
Comfort Women. The plight of the Comfort Women was brought to international
attention in 1991 when three South Korean women filed a class action lawsuit against the
Japanese government seeking reparations for the violence incurred against them as sexual
slaves in the state led campaign of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery during
WWII (Tanaka, 2002). As of late 2015 there are 53 known Comfort Women alive. Cho
Yoon-sun, a former Korean Minister of Gender Equality and Family, attempted to meet
each South Korean Comfort Woman individually during her term (Fantz & Armstrong,
2014). President Park Geun-hye has also made the issue of Comfort Women a prominent
concern for her administration through repeated public demands for the Japanese
government to issue an official apology. President Park has also refused to meet with
Prime Minister Abe, citing his “incorrect” view of history (Xinhua, 2014).
The Japanese government has responded to these accusations from Seoul. In 1993,
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei gave a statement apologizing on behalf of the
Japanese government for the actions that brought about the Military Mobilization of
Sexual Slavery. This apology has not been accepted by the former Comfort Women,
South Korean Women’s organizations, or the South Korean government as it was not
issued by the Prime Minister himself, is not deemed sincere, and does not compensate the
former Comfort Women. Prime Minster Abe has publicly refused to issue a new apology
and stands behind the current Kono Statement (Richards, 2014).
But Prime Minister Abe has not always stood behind the Kono Statement in his
current administration.1 In 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for a governmental review of

1

Prime Minster Shinzo Abe was previously elected to the position of Prime Minister in 2006 and served
until 2007. He left office before he was required to call an election which would have occurred no later
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the Kono Statement for its reliability on factual information which ignited public
demonstrations and governmental outbursts in South Korea and China. After the study
Abe ultimately chose to stand by the statement (Richards, 2014). Other governmental
entities, such as mayors and Diet members, in Japan have also questioned the authenticity
of Comfort Women and commonly claim that the Comfort Women system was a
necessity during the war, not an evil (Tabuchi, 2013).
Similar to the Kono Statement, the Japanese government under Abe has also pushed
for a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special rapporteur’s report which details
the plight of the Comfort Women at the hands of the Japanese military. The report
recommends a governmental apology from the Japanese government to the women who
were victimized as well as pay reparations (Panda, 2014). While neither statement nor
report was edited, the public retraction of a series of stories concerning the plight of
Comfort Women by the popular Japanese newspaper the Asahi Shimbun, due to false
personal accounts, has fueled Abe’s Administration’s doubt on the Comfort Women
issues as a whole (Yoshida, 2014 b).
History textbooks and other governmentally sanctioned publications have also caused
public reactions and tense international relations between South Korea and Japan. Texts
are approved by the Japanese and South Korean government before use in the educational
system, which connotes governmental approval of the information contained within the
publication. History textbook “incidents” against Japan occurred in 1982, 1986, 2001,
2005, and 2009 where the South Korean and Chinese governments, and outcries from the
respective public, claimed that the Japanese government was “down playing” past

than 2010. In Japan elections must occur no later than every four years after the Prime Minister is elected to
office but the Prime Minister may be called them earlier (Honda, 2012; Harlan, 2014).
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atrocities by changing the words used to describe Japanese military aggression and the
military use of sexual slavery (Yi, 2009).
In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe expressed the mission of “restoring the
country’s self,” which he contends has been stifled due to the explicitly negative views of
Japanese action in past wars within educational texts. To achieve this “restoration of self”
Abe aims to increase patriotism and a positive view of the past among the population
through the revision of texts used within the educational system. Abe created a
governmental committee to review possible changes to the textbook approval process,
which suggested putting mayors in charge of their local school districts instead of the
current national approval process. An advisory committee to the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) also proposed new standards
requiring textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. Such actions are nothing
new for Abe as during his first term as Prime Minister, he also vehemently pushed for
educational textbook revisions to change books that cast Japan’s war time actions in an
unfavorable light (Fackler, 2013).
The South Korean government, under current President Park, has also been pushing
for textbook revisions that restore pride in the nation’s past. Hwang Woo-yea, current
Minister of Education, has begun pushing for the inclusion of Yu Kwan-sun, a young
female martyr who resisted Japanese colonialization, into history textbooks. Hwang
claims he is concerned of Yu Kwan-sun’s absence, and is contemplating government
involvement in the publication of historical texts in an effort to address this oversight
(Kim, 2014).
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The publication of texts overseas has also become a point of contention between
South Korea and Japan. In 2015, Prime Minister Abe publicly criticized an American
textbook published by McGraw-Hill for producing a chapter that he claims depicts Japan
as the sole aggressor during WWII and the portrayal of the Military Mobilization of
Sexual Slavery. The Japanese Consulate General Office in New York met with McGraw–
Hill officials and demanded revisions to the text. McGraw-Hill rejected the proposed
changes citing factual evidence for the claims. The rejection prompted the criticism made
by Abe (Fackler, 2015).
The South Korean government has engaged the United States in a different way
compared to the Japanese government. In 2015, Media Joha, a South Korean online
media company located in Palisades Park, New Jersey, announced that it would be
distributing 20,000 copies of the book Can You Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of
Comfort Women to U.S. politicians and public libraries for free in an effort to increase
knowledge and awareness of the plight of victims in the Japanese Military Mobilization
of Sexual Slavery campaign. The testimonies that make up the book were compiled and
published by the South Korean Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims
of Forced Mobilization Under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission). The
book was first published in Korean and distributed by the Commission to the South
Korean public in 2013 (Alvarado, 2015).
The Yasukuni Shrine is also a medium of historical memory in contention
between South Korea and Japan. The Shrine was fist established in 1869 to
commemorate the fallen supporters of the emperor in the Boshin War (Ryu, 2007). The
enshrinement of Japan’s war dead within the Yasukuni Shine was later expanded to
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include all of Japan’s fallen military members. The ritual of the Japanese emperor visiting
Yasukuni Shrine was also established by the Meiji government with the justification of
ensuring the nation would continue to receive blessings from the divine spirits of the
fallen which helped to institutionalize the Shrine in society (Breen, 2008).
At the end of WWII, the International War Tribunals and the U.S. occupation of
Japan changed the government’s association with the Yasukuni Shrine and the country’s
relationship with the WWII war dead. With the commencement of Japan’s new
constitution in May, 1947, the separation of church and state was instituted in Article 20.
Due to this division, Yasukuni Shrine became a private religious institution (O’Dwyer,
2010). The privatization of Yasukuni Shrine as well as the classification of war criminals
created new difficulties in enshrining military members. The International War Tribunals
found numerous Japanese military personnel, including top leaders, guilty of war crimes
and classified them as class A, B, and C war criminals2 with varying punishments such as
jail time or execution. The classification of Japanese military personnel as war criminals
went against the ideology that had been promoted within Japan during WWII of fighting
a righteous war in the name of the emperor (Higurashi, 2013).
WWII war criminals were not immediately enshrined within Yasukuni Shrine.
With the transition of the Yasukuni Shrine to a private religious institution, the Shrine
was no longer able to access governmental records on military service in which to
identify persons for enshrinement. This was a problem for hundreds of survivors who
wanted to see their loved one memorialized within Yasukuni Shrine. In response, a new
2

Class A war crimes refer to crimes against peace. The Class A war criminals were more widely known
from the Tokyo Trials as they are comprised mostly of prominent leaders who are widely believed to have
led the war throughout Asia and due to the publicity of these trials. Class B war criminals refer to
conventional war crimes. Class C war crimes refer to crimes against humanity (Higurashi, 2013).
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process for enshrinement was set up with the Yasukuni Shrine petitioning the Health and
Welfare Ministry for information on the war dead. Once approval of the petition is
granted, the Ministry gathers the needed information from the population and nominates
persons from the gathered data for enshrinement at the Shrine. Yasukuni Shrine leaders
then make the final decision on who will be memorialized (Higurashi, 2013).
The process of enshrinement for the WWII war dead was completed in 1959; war
criminals were excluded from this large enshrinement. After occupation, survivors of
convicted war criminals began petitioning the government to have their loved one’s
honored at Yasukuni Shrine. In response, the government reinstated convicted war
criminals civil rights and made their survivors eligible for survivor benefits in 1953,
similar to other military personnel who had died while serving. In 1959 the Health and
Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief Bureau began sending the Shrine nominations of
B and C war criminals for enshrinement. By 1967, 984 B and C war criminals had been
honored, mostly without notice to the public. In 1970, the process of enshrining Class A
war criminals began quietly. The complete honoring of this population at Yasukuni
Shrine did not occur until 1978 due to the controversial issue of venerating class A war
criminals. The public did not know about this commemoration until 1979, a year after the
ceremony had already occurred (Higurashi, 2013).
The emperor stopped his ritual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine at the news of the
completed enshrinement of the Class A war criminals (Ryu, 2007). Regular visits by
Prime Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, which had been a tradition since 1945, stopped
briefly after the enshrinement of all war criminals in 1979, although it temporarily
resumed again in 1985 (Deans, 2007).
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In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone was the first Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni
Shrine since the enshrinement of war criminals. In 1996, Japanese Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto made one visit to Yasukuni Shrine during his term. The visit
coincided with a tense period of Japanese relations with China and the quick return of the
LDP to power after its first defeat in public elections (Deans, 2007). Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichiro visited the Shrine every year during his term from 2001-2006.
Koizumi’s visits, while opposed outside of Japan, fulfilled a campaign promise of visiting
Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th3 every year and he enjoyed considerable high levels of
public support throughout his term (Deans, 2007). While he avoided the Yasukuni Shrine
during his first term, current Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December,
2013 which provided additional reasons for South Korean President Park not to meet
with Abe during her first term and elicited public demonstrations in South Korea (Payne
& Wakatsuki, 2013).
Manipulation of facts is common within historical memory as elites use history to
fit their needs (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). South Korea and Japan have had a long
tenuous relationship, the history of the specific events being remembered have the
potential to illustrate the importance of Comfort Women, history textbooks and
governmental sanctioned publications, and the Yasukuni Shrine in relation to the
populations’ collective identity and nationalism.

3

August 15th is a significant date to both South Korea and Japan and is honored very differently in each
country due to how each had been involved during WWII. In Japan August 15 th is remembered as
Surrender Day, the day in which the Japanese government formally surrendered to Allied Forces which
ended WWII (“Three ministers visit Yasukuni,” 2014). In South Korea August 15 th is celebrated as
National Liberation Day, as with the surrender by the Japanese government in WWII, Japan lost control of
the Korean peninsula which it had governed as its colony from 1910 to 1945 (Lee, 2008).
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Post WWII, relations between South Korea and Japan normalized in 1965 under
President Park Chung-hee and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. The normalization of
relations was a benefit to both economies but caused mass public protests in South Korea.
The South Korean public was against the normalization due to the lack of reparations and
acknowledgement of past wrongs by Japan, which the public demanded before the
normalization was signed (Seth, 2011). Given the dictatorship of President Park Chunghee, public protests were forcefully put down and the normalization proceeded. However,
with the settlement of normalization, Japan agreed to pay $800 million in aid to South
Korea. Once the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed the issue of
reparations and past wrongs were agreed to be closed (Seth, 2011 pg. 387). While the act
of normalization was not government manipulation of historical memory, this event has
continued in present day discussions of reparations in relation to the past.
The Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery was a campaign of state
approved human trafficking to appease Japanese soldiers who were given little to no
leave during WWII. Stations of captured women were set up for soldiers to visit during
their free time (Tanaka, 2002). The campaign was very popular among soldiers,
everywhere the Japanese military was present so were Comfort Stations. These stations
drew upon invaded states’ native women and Korean women to fill the “women’s
positions;” these women were commonly referred to as Comfort Women (Chung, 1997).
It is estimated that 200,000 women were enslaved in this system, with 80% being Korean
(Lie, 1997). The exact number of women enslaved during this time period is unknown as
soldiers would commonly murder the women when evacuating the area, as the soldiers
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committed suicide themselves, or were causalities of war as Allied forces advanced and
Japanese forces withdrew (Chung, 1997).
During and after WWII, forced sexual slavery had been rumored among the
public, especially in Korea. If a Comfort Woman had survived sexual slavery and been
able to return home she typically suffered from severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), and many women had become sterile because of their ordeal. Survivors typically
never spoke about the violence against them due to the public shame they would incur to
their family and themselves. The Japanese government also kept the campaign secret by
destroying documents related to Comfort Stations and Women at the end of WWII
(Tanaka, 2002).
The three South Korean women who had filed the reparations lawsuit against
Japan had been supported by the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual
Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council). The Korean Council is made up of 35 different,
independent women’s organizations that came together to bring awareness to the specific
issue of Comfort Women along with seeking compensation and an official apology on
behalf of these women from the Japanese government (Pyong, 2005). Additionally, this
issue had not been tried at the Tokyo War Trial at the end of WWII even though
provisions in international law had made legal action for sexual violence possible
(“Memory of an Injustice,” 2013). The Korean Council utilized government involvement
for their cause by petitioning the South Korean government for support of the women
identified as former Comfort Women and also in petitioning the Japanese state on their
behalf (Pyong, 2005).
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After the normalization of relations, history textbooks in both South Korea and
Japan reflected the political tension surrounding the normalization. South Korean
textbooks placed strong emphasis on the victimization of the Korean population by the
Japanese during the colonialization period from 1910-1945 and events during WWII. A
number of Japanese textbooks have commonly downplayed Japanese atrocities during the
same time period, reflecting the government’s stance against apologizing and reparations
for the Korean population (Seth, 2011).
Today, history textbooks within each state gain a “quasi-political character”
reflecting state opinion since educational textbooks in Japan and South Korea are
approved by the state before use in the education system (Schneider, 2008). Given this
claim, it warrants a look at how texts are approved for education in each state.
Japan has followed a governmental approval system of textbooks since 1947;
before this time the government authored all educational texts. According to Japan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the process of textbook approval begins with
nongovernmental publishers creating an academic text that fits the requirements of the
Curriculum Guideline and educational standards set forth by the MEXT. Once the
publisher’s book is complete it is then submitted to the Research Council who examines
the text for compliance to the Textbook Examination Standards. From this review the
MEXT can suggest changes, approve or reject the text. The final decision of approval lies
with the MEXT. Upon approval of a textbook, sanctioned texts are presented as options
for specific areas of study for the various local boards of education. Each board of
education choses a text from the approved list to adopt for their own curriculum. The
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MEXT bares all costs for publication of the chosen text for each institution (Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, 2014).
The publication of educational texts in South Korea is similar to the process found
in Japan. The Ministry of Education (MOE) classifies textbooks into three types; type one
being texts whose copyright is held by the Ministry of Education, type two are textbooks
authorized by the MOE and written by private publishers and type three are textbooks
recognized by the Minister of Education as being relevant and useful. The MOE utilizes
bureaus and review committees to scrutinize and create textbooks that follow the national
guidelines and curriculum. The approved textbooks are presented to the local educational
boards as texts from which they may choose when implementing the national curriculum
(South Korea Ministry of Education, 2008).
History textbooks first gained international attention within the Asia-Pacific in
1982. During this year it was alleged that the MEXT ordered textbook authors to make
changes to the wording of history texts; such as replacing the terms “aggression” and
“invasion” to “advancement” when referring to Japanese action during WWII. This
action incited public and government outcry from China and South Korea. While this
event does not fall within a democratic South Korea, it spurred the creation of the
“Neighboring Country Clause” which specified the consideration of neighboring
countries perspectives in the creation and editing of Japanese texts (Yi, 2009).
The contents of educational texts are also under scrutiny in South Korea. Since
democratization in 1988, conservatives and more ‘left-of-center’ political groups have
struggled against each other on how to present the past in history textbooks. Since her
election to office in 2013, current president Park Geun-hye has been suspected of
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working to reinterpret her father’s, former President Park Cheung-hee who lead South
Korea for twenty years, legacy in history texts more positively (Kim, 2014).
IV.

Methodology
This research is based on Wang’s work (2012) and as such will follow closely his

methodology. Similar to Wang, the independent variable in this study is historical
memory. The dependent variables are nationalism and legitimacy, as it is hypothesized
that democratic governments purposely manipulate historical memory for the growth of
nationalism and thus legitimacy of political parties (Malici & Smith, 2013).
Comparative methodology provides the most beneficial framework in which to
study historical memory in relation to the growth of nationalism and legitimacy. This
methodology focuses on the internal pressures of a country, allowing a researcher to take
into account multiple influences on the independent and dependent variables (Lim, 2010).
I will conduct two case studies on Japan and South Korea and review the topics of the
Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks as these historical events have
been found to be the largest issues of the past with government involvement in South
Korea and Japan. The most similar case study method provides the ability to employ
process tracing and content analysis which aids in drawing connections between the
dependent and independent variables throughout multiple sources of data. Wang also
used case studies and is the dominant process within the comparative methodology which
provides credence to its utility.
The most similar case design has been selected as this approach offers the most
control of variation between cases which allows for the influences to be identified in
relation to the independent variable (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990). South Korea and Japan
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both demonstrate the use of active historical memory within each state which has
influenced public opinion and internationals relations (Yoshida, 2014 f.) These two
countries were also selected due to their similar regional location within Asia, their
shared history, and democratic regime type as well as similar controversy over the
amount of democratic consolidation within each state (George & Bennett, 2005).
I will analyze the cases from 1988 to 2015. The starting point of 1988 was
selected as this was the first point in time that both states were democratic; South Korea
began free elections at the national level in 1988. Data collection from this time period
will be gathered through public newspapers, government personnel speeches and press
releases, as well as history textbooks or literature publications supported by the
government. Newspaper sources will include The Japan Times and The Korean Herald.
Google Alerts will also be utilized in retrieving newspaper sources from the internet from
a wide variety of newspaper sources like CNN, Reuters, Yonhap News, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal as well as other popular domestic and international news
agencies. Key phrases such as “Comfort Women,” “Yasukuni Shrine,” and “history
textbooks” will be screened in the sources to determine their usefulness to the research as
well as any government involvement with the remembrance of the past. Information on
history textbooks and government supported literature will be gained through official
government websites. Government officials’ speeches will be accessed through news
agencies, including those previously mentioned and official government websites.
Statistical data will be gathered through Pew Research Center, The Genron Nonprofit Organization (NPO), and East Asia Institute as well as other potential
nongovernmental organizations to aid in determining public opinion and attitudes toward
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governmental actions and of the populations’ “other” group. Statistical data will also be
gathered on election results, in relation to election years or seasons, and the voter
population as well as public support of candidates throughout their term in office. Such
figures will be gathered from nongovernmental organizations and news agencies.
While multiple tense events related to the remembrance of the past fall within this
time period, the time frame does pose a challenge for the scope of this research. Process
tracing and content analysis rely on careful review of multiple sources of data. Twenty
seven years is a vast time frame for review. To aid in further limiting the amount of time
under review, years of when specific events occurred, such as official visits to Yasukuni
Shrine or the governmental release of literature, will be identified and reviewed.
Language also poses a difficulty to the research as dominantly English sources
will be utilized due to a language barrier. Sources only in English have the potential to
have biases due to the material being written for a more “western” audience, therefore
missing conceptual meanings or importance found within the original language.
Additionally, popular English news agencies which present information that fit within the
scope of research also present the data with a cultural bias. I will work with Wright State
University (WSU) Japanese language students, WSU Asian Association as well as friends
and family members who are fluent in Japanese or Korean to locate and translate Korean
and Japanese source material such as newspaper articles and governmental documents to
help offset the dominant English language sources. This form of data collection with
translation has the bias of human error through the incorrect translation of meaning or of
words and is also constrained by time and the ability to reimburse translators for their
time.
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There are four expected findings in this research;
1. Elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when faced
with challenges to the state or population, such as an economic crisis;
2. Historical memory is used similarly during elections in South Korea and
Japan, even though both countries hold a different type of democracy;
3. When historical memory is promoted by elites, public protests against the
outside group will increase; and
4. Similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will manipulate
historical memory through textbooks, political speeches, and monuments.
The subsequent chapters will proceed by first presenting the factual history of the
issue involved within the historical memory of the Japanese and South Korean
population. After the history is presented the chapters will review the governmental
involvement of Japan within the specific topic of historical memory along with the South
Korean government’s response to such action through the organization of a case study.
Likewise, the case study will then review the South Korean government’s involvement
with the specific topic and the response of the Japanese government. The chapters will
conclude with analysis over the events discussed. Three case studies will be presented on
the historical memory issues of the Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history
textbooks.
Chapter two will examine the historical memory of Comfort Women by first
presenting the Comfort Women history and the events that led up to the exploitation of
women within the Asian region during WWII. The case study will progress into a
discussion of events where the Japanese government was involved with the remembrance
of this population and the South Korean response to such actions. In turn the case study
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will then delve into the events where the South Korean government was involved in the
historical memory of Comfort Women and the response by the Japanese government. The
chapter will close with an analysis of the governmental actions.
Chapter three will begin by exploring the history and significance of the
Yasukuni Shrine. Once the history of the Shrine is presented, the case study will show the
Japanese governmental involvement with the historical memory of the Shrine and the
South Korean government’s response to Japan’s actions. The South Korean governmental
action will then be detailed as well as the response by the Japanese government toward
the South Korean government’s action. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the
governmental actions.
Chapter four will present the importance of history textbooks within a population
and the history of the textbook conflict between Japan and South Korea. After the history
and importance are discussed, the case study will review the government of Japan’s
involvement with history textbooks and the South Korean elite’s response. Likewise, the
government of South Korea’s involvement with history textbooks will be discussed along
with the response by the Japanese government to the South Korean governmental action.
Chapter 5 will provide a general analysis of the three case studies focusing on the
trends in governmental action and the populations’ response, along with the tendencies in
the growth and decline of public support of the respective government during the
presence of historical memory. Since historical memory is a concept that is created by the
population with unspoken boundaries, the constraints of elites will also be discussed.
Additionally, since Japan and South Korea had distinctly different experiences within in
WWII, an examination of the influence of their unique involvement in this dramatic
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period of time will also be included within the final analysis. The chapter will close with
final conclusions and suggestions for further research.
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I.

“Comfort Women” in Historical Memory
Rape has been used as a weapon of war since the beginning of war itself.

According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High commissioner, the
intent of rape as a weapon is to, “humiliate, dominate, instill fear, disperse and/or forcibly
relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group” (United Nations Human
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2008). The Japanese Military Mobilization of
Sexual Slavery was a campaigned of human trafficking that mercilessly exploited the
women of occupied territories during WWII. This large enterprise clearly represents the
definition of a weapon used in war as multiple societies lived in humiliation and fear of
this specific act by Japanese Imperial forces.
Japan had been involved in military altercations with China that began in 1911,
which stemmed from the Japanese seizer of Manchuria (Drea, 2009). As the war with
China prolonged and became stalled, the Japanese military came to view military brothels
or “comfort stations” as a necessity since soldiers were not given leave to return home
from war during this period of time. Comfort stations were provided to military members
as a leisure experience while on deployment. The idea that comfort stations were a
requirement of military forces led to the expansion of stations throughout all Japanese
occupied territories, and further, wherever the Japanese military was present from 1932
until 1945 (Tanaka, 2002). Accurate numbers of the amount of women victimized
through the system of comfort stations, known as the Military Mobilization of Sexual
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Slavery, are not available due to the destruction of evidence by Japanese forces at the
conclusion of WWII (Tanaka, 1998). However, historians and human rights scholars
estimate that 200,000 women had been brutalized through this system of government
sectioned and supported human trafficking (Henry, 2013).
The earliest record of comfort stations identified in the Pacific region was found
in a letter of request from Japanese Army Lieutenant Okamura Yasuji, dated 1932, who
was stationed in Shanghai, China. The letter was sent to the governor of Nagasaki
Prefecture to petition for the acquisition of women for comfort stations, commonly
referred to as Comfort Women, for the Japanese troops fighting in the Shanghai War.
Within the request Okamura stated that he found the idea of comfort stations from the
Japanese Navy which was stationed in the same area during that time. His letter further
suggests that Japanese overseas military brothels had been created prior to 1932 (Chung,
1997).
As expansion progressed, Japanese leaders’ had rising concerns over the
increasing anti-Japanese sentiment throughout occupied areas, which they attributed to
the rape of occupied citizens by military members. Supporters of military brothels
asserted that repressing sexual desires of military men would lead to the escalation of
rape and other sexual crimes (Garon, 1993; Lie, 1997). Okamura claimed after the
establishment of military brothels in his region that “he was pleased to see that soldiers’
rapes of Chinese women decreased after the arrival of women from Japan” (Chung, 1997,
223).
Early military brothels were made available exclusively to officers and only
contained prostitutes from Japan. The prostitutes dedicated to war time brothels had to
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undergo medical examinations from military doctors, which mimicked the standard
examination process of prostitutes enforced within Japan. Along with controlling sexual
crimes committed by military members, brothels dedicated to military use were also
justified as being an effective way to control venereal diseases among soldiers since
women without sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were being supplied to troops (Lie,
1997; Tanaka, 2002). A Ministry of Army survey conducted in 1938 found that 11 out of
1,000 soldiers had a venereal disease (Lie, 1997).
In 1938, Japan created a full scale system of Military Mobilization of Sexual
Slavery. The war in China was lasting longer than anticipated which increased calls by
Japanese leaders for the mobilization of human resources. The mobilization of women for
sex slaves occurred in war efforts throughout Japan, in the colony of Korea, and later
throughout occupied territory. This mobilization effort increased the number of women
being recruited and brought to places like China for comfort stations (Chung, 1997).
Recruiters were employed by the Japanese military to find women to fill the
comfort stations, often by any means necessary. Women in poverty typically fell prey to
recruiters as the promise of work or money was a common phrase to lure females into
slavery. Korea became a prime location for the abduction of women as the population
was made destitute by colonization which pulled resources from Korea for use in Japan
thus obliterating the Korean economy. Forced kidnappings of women became prevalent
as the sexual slavery campaign continued, especially as the populations became more
aware of the recruitment lies and women increased in scarcity (Tanaka, 2002).
In the expansion efforts of the sexual slavery campaign in 1938, the Japanese
government granted the Ministries of the Army and Navy the power to create and manage
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comfort stations without interference from local consulates. The same year the Ministries
approved access to comfort stations for all military members and banned attendance at
non-military brothels. In response to new comfort station regulations, military units were
told to prepare for an increase in comfort stations through the mobilization of women and
the establishment of designated areas for stations. Comfort stations were provided with
food, limited medical supplies, and condoms furnished by the Japanese military (Tanaka,
2002).
Forced sexual slavery became part of the Japanese Imperial Army’s strategy as
the Meiji government planned to conduct war against the Allied Forces. Stations began to
be systematically established in country soon after occupation occurred. Comfort stations
appeared throughout Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines while
maintaining the stations in China (Chung, 1997).
While the Ministries of the Army and Navy regulated and helped to maintain
comfort stations throughout the military, there were three different classifications of
locations that were utilized by military forces. Permanent stations were attached to large
supply bases located in or near major cities. When Japanese women were involved with
comfort stations they were commonly found at permanent stations. Semi-permanent
stations were attached to large army unites such as divisions, brigades, and regiments.
Both the permanent and semi-permanent stations were rigorously controlled by the unit
or branch they belonged too but were often directly managed by private brothel owners
that had been contracted by the Japanese military. Temporary stations were set up and
maintained by small battalions, usually near the front lines. Native women of occupied
countries were used for semi-permanent and temporary stations, while the Korean
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population could be found throughout the Military Mobilization System in all stations
(Tanaka, 2002).
Hundreds of thousands of women were needed to fill the demand for comfort
stations. Scholars estimate that upwards of 200,000-400,000 women were victimized as
Comfort Women, 80% of which were Korean. This “Korean hunting” relied heavily on
force and deception. Comfort Women were treated like military supplies, with one
woman for every 40 men (Lie, 1997). While Japanese women were not excluded from the
Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, racism facilitated the exploitation of nonJapanese women for the system as the nationalism promoted by the Meiji government
depicted other populations as inferior, even the Korean population whom had been
upheld as racially similar to the Japanese (Lie, 1997).
Women were procured through many different avenues such as state sponsored
recruiters and brothel owners as previously mentioned, but records have also indicated
that policemen, local officials, and leaders from the colonial government also took part in
forcible trafficking (Chung, 1997). Many Women were taken through means of deceit
through promises of employment within factories and restaurants (Kim, 2014). Other
women were physically kidnapped off the streets. During her testimony in 1992 at the
first press conference held by the Task Force on Filipino Comfort Women, Maria Rosa
Henson gave a detailed account of being forcibly kidnapped as she was traveling within
the Philippines and held against her will for nine months where she was repeatedly
brutalized (Henson, 1999; Chung, 1997).
The life of a Comfort Woman was brutal. Comfort station facilities were
designated by military authorities; typically any large building near the base was
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converted into stations, even school buildings and temples. As stations were set up closer
to the front lines, military tents or part of the barracks were used. Facilities were typically
divided with the use of thin screens or curtains. The women lived in small rooms usually
with only a bed or futon in each room. Women were provided with a disinfectant,
typically a cresol soap solution, and were instructed to wash after every encounter
(Tanaka, 2002). Often times this instruction was not followed due to the large amount of
soldiers arriving each day. As soon as the comfort station opened for service in the
morning men often waited in line until the close of the station late in the evening
(Henson, 1999).
Maria Rosa Henson describes such days of not having any rest except for an hour
at lunch and an hour at dinner. Comfort Women very rarely received days of respite, at
times she was given rest days when she was menstruating or ill but this was not
guaranteed. In addition, Women were only given a small ration of food each day,
typically only enough to keep them alive. A Comfort Woman’s day was filled by being
raped repeatedly anywhere from 10 to 30 men a day (Henson, 1999).
Soldiers were allotted certain times they could visit the station with regular file
and rank members usually allowed to visit on their off days once a week and officers
allowed to visit any time they wished. Before their visitation, soldiers were often required
to purchase tickets for their visits which were given to the Comfort Woman upon
entrance into the room. At the end of the day or beginning of the next the woman would
turn in the collection of tickets to the station manager. Military regulations stated that
members were allotted 30 minutes with Comfort Women but on very busy days men only
received a few minutes. The common standard throughout the mass human trafficking
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campaign was that Comfort Women received no part of the ticket sales even though
regulations allowed for women to be compensated (Tanaka, 2002).
Even though it was promoted as a way to prevent the spread of STDs, the comfort
stations were unsuccessful in this promise. The Ministries of the Army and Navy
provided stations with condoms that men were required to use during each visit.
However, men would often refuse the condoms. In addition soldiers rarely disclosed
venereal diseases to their senior officer for fear of punishment. Thus contracting STDs
was a fear for Comfort Women. When STDs were discovered at the routine medical
examinations, the woman would be injected with the highly potent “Number 606,”
salvarsan, which has harmful side effects. Other women who were found to have serious
venereal diseases were prohibited from returning to the comfort stations. It is not known
where the women were sent or if they left the facility alive (Chung, 1997).
Along with STDs, pregnancy was another health concern for Comfort Women.
Due to the violent life they were forced to endure many women did not know they were
pregnant until a miscarriage occurred. However, if a pregnancy resulted in a live birth
Comfort Women were not permitted to keep the infant, the child was typically taken from
the mother soon after delivery. It is not fully known what happened to the infant after
being taken from its mother but it has been suggested by scholars that the child was
killed. If a woman knew she was pregnant she would typically assist in bringing on a
miscarriage herself by not eating or by drinking a certain strong herbal tea. The military
doctors who performed the routine medical examinations would not perform abortions
(Tanaka, 2002).
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Physical abuse was also present in the daily lives of the Japanese sex slaves.
Accounts from former Comfort Women detail events where they were beaten multiple
times a day by men who would hit them with closed fists all over their body, or would
smash their heads or other body parts against room walls or bed posts (Henson, 1999).
Women usually sustained severe injures due to these encounters. Violence was fueled by
soldiers who would take their anger out on the Comfort Women, were quick to anger if
they did not feel satisfied after their visit, or were violent when they were drunk.
Regulations stated that men were not to enter the station premise while intoxicated.
Nevertheless nothing was done to inforce this regulation or to keep violence from
occurring on site beyond controlling riots while the soldiers were waiting in line (Chung,
1997).
Due to the lifestyle and mistreatment, the overall health of Comfort Women
rapidly declined. Because of the amount of forced intercourse, the violent nature of such
attacks, and home abortions, the women often became sterile or physically deformed
(Lie, 1997; Chung, 1997). While enslaved, some women became addicted to drugs as a
way of mental escape. Others committed suicide as the physical and mental trauma was
too much to bear. Suicide was committed by drinking the cresol soap solution that was
provided for washing or purposefully overdosing on drugs which were openly provided
within the station (Tanaka, 2002). The women who survived were typically left with
paralyzing PTSD. Maria Rosa Henson vividly recounts her physical response to her past
mistreatment which included losing her hair, being unable to speak for years, and being
afraid in the presence of men. It took her years to overcome the physical response to the
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mental scars she had sustained while the painful memories and panic attacks attached to
them lasted the rest of her life (Henson, 1999).
Women enslaved in this system were held for different lengths of time. Policy
stated that women were “mobilized” for about twelve months. However, Korean women
who were transported to foreign countries were enslaved for three to five years. If they
were freed from captivity there was no support in returning to their home nation. Other
populations, typically women native to the area, were held for less time, anywhere from
three months to a year (Tanaka, 2002).
As the demand from comfort stations remained undiminished throughout WWII,
the Japanese government had to increasingly rely on local, non-military personnel for the
procurement of women as the military campaign became widely known and feared
throughout the general public. In 1943, the Women’s Voluntary Labor Service Corps (the
Corps) was organized in Korea by the Japanese government and quickly became
synonymous with the forced sexual slavery campaign. Through the Voluntary Labor
Service Law, enacted in 1944, any unmarried woman between 12 and 40 years old was
required to serve at least 12 months in war time activities. Women in the Corps were
moved across Korea and into Japan where they worked in factories, assisted medical
personnel, and other war activities. But the law increased the difficulty and scarcity of
women who could be mobilized for the comfort stations. Due to the shortage, some
women were deferred to comfort stations to fulfill their required war time activities
without notice of the sex work in which they were slated (Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).
Many Korean families tried to have their daughters married quickly as a form of
protection but ultimately no women were safe. The demand for Comfort Women was so
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great that neither age nor marital status were taken into account when kidnapping
females. Women also searched from employment so as to already be employed in war
time activities without service in the Corps. Unfortunately, official employment offices as
well as promises of employment with local brokers created an easy way in which to
capture women (Chung, 1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).
As WWII was drawing to a close the comfort stations fell into chaos. As Allied
troops advanced, Comfort Women became civilian causalities of war through the
Japanese military neglect or with purposeful intent. Some women were forced to serve
Japanese soldiers in underground shelters during bombing attacks, perishing along with
them. Others were murdered while the Japanese forces committed suicide. Some were
murdered by being placed in caves or submarines and then deserted. The most common
response was for the Japanese military to abandon the stations with the women inside, but
some battalions would burn the station with the women inside, as they left (Chung,
1997).
Many of the women who were abandoned and survived had great difficulty
returning home. Some were saved by U.S. military and aided in their return home.
Unfortunately, some overseas Comfort Women were unable to return home or chose not
to return due to the shame they felt they would incur to themselves and their family from
their enslavement. It is not known how many women died as victims of warfare (Chung,
1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).
The settlement of peace between the Allied nations and Japan was a vast and
complicated task. The end of WWII was made more complex given the expansive war
crimes and excessive violence that occurred throughout the Asia Pacific, specifically

41

where the Japanese military was present (Maga,2001). In 1945, the United Nations
Crimes Commission (UN Commission) was created to ensure the detection,
apprehension, trial, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes, with potential
charges of Class A-crimes against peace, Class B-conventional war crimes, and Class Ccrimes against humanity. Due to the vastness of WWII, the majority of responsibility for
field investigations and the preparation of charges fell to individual Allied nations in
countries where the crimes occurred (Henry, 2013).
Of the many trails of Japanese personnel after WWII, the Tokyo Trails became
the most widely known due to the high ranking military leaders and government officials
indicted on crimes against peace. Laws establishing the protection of human rights and
peace were first created for the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trails, as the UN Commission
created a list of 32 crimes that were punishable at the subsequent trials which included
rape and the abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution
(Maga, 2001; Henry, 2013).
While the Tokyo Trails, as well other WWII criminal trails, created important
laws and precedence for the protection of humanity as well as settling the matter of peace
after WWII, the Tokyo Trials have been met with criticism since their conclusion. Such
criticism includes that the verdicts favored the victors, or Allied Nations, and that there
was a lack of support for Asian victims within trial decisions (Maga, 2001). Sexual
slavery has also become a point of contention in review of the trials as crimes conducted
against women forced into sexual slavery were never brought to trial. No rape victims or
surviving Comfort Women were ever called to testify at the Tokyo Trials or any of the
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other trials held across Japan. Additionally, rape was not counted as a crime against
humanity or a war crime in the Tokyo Charter (Henry, 2013).
While information was not brought before the courts for the crimes of rape and
forced sexual slavery as the law had allowed, there was information available to do so
given public knowledge of the campaign by participating Japanese military members,
forced Korean laborers, testimony of surviving victims, and the U.S. military
involvement in returning surviving Comfort Women home (Tanaka, 2002). Justice for
Comfort Women was socially constrained at the time due to cultural and societal beliefs
of not speaking of sexual relationships in public forums and the lack of women’s rights
within the region and the world (Pyong, 2005; Henry, 2013).
Relations normalized in 1965 between South Korea and Japan under South
Korean dictator, President Park Chung-hee and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku.
While normalization occurred 50 years ago, details within this agreement continue to
influence South Korean and Japanese relations today. The normalization of relations
brought a boost to both states’ economies but it incited riots within the South Korean
public. Riots broke out as the normalization process progressed as the public demanded
reparations and Japanese governmental acknowledgement of past wrongs before normal
relations were restored. Given Park’s control of the government, he forcefully put down
the protests and the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed. With the
agreement, both states consented to close the issue of reparations and past wrongs related
to WWII and the colonization of the Korean peninsula, which included the issue of
Comfort Women. The Japanese government also agreed to pay $800 million in aid to
South Korea as a whole (Seth, 2011).
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The history of Comfort Women did not enter into the Japanese national discourse
and discussion of WWII upon its conclusion. Information regarding the issue was not
readily available to the public due to the destruction of information at its conclusion and
information being contained within classified government documents. The national
discussion and educational representation of the WWII in Japan focused more on the
Japanese experience than that of also including the victimization of other nations due to
Japanese action (Tanaka, 2002; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Harney, 2014).
Even though the Japanese government did not directly acknowledge their
involvement with atrocities such as the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, Japanese
soldiers’ diaries and memoirs concerning events of WWII were published as books
available for purchase by the public. The Japanese public had vague knowledge of the
events of forced sexual slavery during the war, but it was often portrayed as freely chosen
military prostitution or romanticized as love during the struggles of war (Hyun & Yi,
2003).
Rumors of the forced exploitation of women during WWII within the Korean
public were rampant after WWII. Due to the Korean War, dictatorship, and the
authoritarian regimes that followed WWII there was not an open social space to discuss
and pursue the collective remembering to address the atrocity of Comfort Women fully
until democratic elections in 1988. During the South Korea’s struggle for democracy in
the 1970s and 1980s, women’s rights organizations grew alongside pro-democracy
groups. These women’s rights organizations first started with the cause of equality in the
work place and in society but soon expanded to championing the rights of former
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Comfort Women when their plight came to light during the 1980s as women’s groups
were continuing to increase (Cho, 1998; Pyong, 2005).
I.

Japanese governmental use and response to the history of Comfort Women
In 1991, lawsuits filed by South Korean Comfort Women brought the atrocities of

the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery to international attention. After the
first South Korean case, similar lawsuits followed from Filipinos and Taiwanese women.
Of the lawsuits filed by Comfort Women in 1991 to 1992, all were rejected by the
Japanese courts. Comfort women from the around the world have continued to submit
lawsuits requesting compensation and governmental acknowledgement of the pain the
Japanese government inflected during WWII, as of yet no such lawsuit has won in the
Japanese judiciary system (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).
The first Comfort Woman to file a lawsuit against the Japanese government and
publicly share her testimony was Kim Hak-sun from South Korea. Her testimony inspired
Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki to conduct research on the Japanese government’s
involvement in the Comfort Station campaign. Yoshimi’s research unearthed
governmental documents pertaining to the organization of Comfort Stations within the
archives of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. He published his findings in major
newspapers around Japan in 1992 (Nozaki, 2002). Due to the strong accusations made
against the Japanese government within the lawsuits and from Yoshimi’s evidence from
governmental records, Prime Minister Miyazawa’s administration launched a
governmental investigation in 1991 to assess government involvement in the Military
Mobilization of Sexual Slavery (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.).
Speeches and Pronouncements
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The governmental study on the issue of Comfort Women was carried out by the
Japanese Cabinet Councillors' [sic] Office on External Affairs from December 1991 to
August 1993. The study reviewed governmental agencies and their documentation related
to WWII that included the National Police Agency, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of
Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health
and Welfare, the Ministry of Labor, the National Archives, and the National Diet Library.
Along with Cabinet officials exploring Japanese government documentation, they also
visited the U.S. National Archives to gather relevant information (Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.). 190 documents pertaining to the issue of Comfort Women were
found throughout the government agencies. Along with government documentation the
Cabinet Councilors’ Office also collected personal testimonies from 16 former Comfort
Women as well as Japanese military veterans (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).
The study concluded with results of the investigation being publically announced
by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei on August 4, 1993. Kono stated that the study
confirmed that the Japanese Imperial Military was involved with the establishment,
organization, and recruitment of a great number of women whose totals were largely
composed of Korean citizens. Kono further acknowledged that women forced into the
Sexual Slavery Campaign suffered immense misery and indignity. He offered apologies
on behalf of the Japanese government for the brutality that was inflicted on these women
which is reflected in the full statement in appendix A. Kono’s public announcement is
commonly referred to as the Kono statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 b.;
appendix A).
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The Kono Statement has been pivotal in framing the government response from
Japan on the issue of Comfort Women, specifically towards South Korea, since its
creation. After the Kono Statement, three Japanese Prime Ministers offered apologies for
the comfort system campaign, which included, Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992, Hosokawa
Morihiro in 1993, and Murayama Tomiichi in 1995, please see Appendix B,C, and D for
full statements (Memory & Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific, 2007 b.; Appendix B,C,D
respectively). Most notably, these apologies were on behalf of the Prime Ministers
themselves and make a clear distinction between the current democratic government of
today versus the Imperial government during WWII.
While Japanese Prime Ministers have publicly offered their sincerest apologies to
the Comfort Women, no compensation has ever been provided by the Japanese
government. The Japanese government refuses compensation to individual South Korean
Comfort Women citing the 1965 normalization agreement where the issue of reparations
for past violence was agreed to be closed (Japan Daily Press, 2013).
Current Prime Minister (as of 2016) Abe Shinzo has also been actively involved
with the issue and remembrance of Comfort Women. Since the beginning of Abe’s
second term in December 2012, there have been four incidents where the authenticity of
the Comfort Women history has been publicly questioned through rhetoric or action.
The first such event includes the possible revision of the Kono statement. As Abe
began his second term, he was under suspicion by the international community for
potentially revising the Japanese Comfort Women apology due to multiple statements on
the topic before being elected to his second term. He refuted these claims when he was
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officially assumed office as Prime Minister. In March, 2014, Abe made a public
announcement that he would not revise the statement (Quigley, 2014).
But in April 2014, Abe created a committee of five experts, in the fields of law
and history from prominent universities with previous distinguished careers from around
Japan to review the Kono Statement. The panel was given the task to evaluate the
Statement for evidence of coercion by the South Korean government and the historical
accuracy of information relating to the Japanese government’s involvement in the sexual
enslavement of women. The panel reviewed classified governmental documents
concerning the Kono Statement and historical evidence on the sexual slavery campaign.
While the review was being conducted, Abe and his cabinet stated that they would not
revise the Kono Statement no matter the outcome of the review. In June, 2014, the
committee released their findings and stated that there was evidence of coercion by the
South Korean government through specific wording to force the Japanese government
take responsibility, that during the creation of the apology the South Korean government
was not seeking compensation for Comfort Women, and that the statement was issued so
that bilateral relations with South Korea would not deteriorate. The panel also claimed
they did not find any evidence directly connecting the Japanese government to the
recruitment of Comfort Women (Yoshida, 2014 a.).
The intention of not revising the Kono Statement became uncertain again in
August, 2014 when a large popular newspaper based in Japan, the Asahi Shimbun,
retracted a number of stories published concerning the Comfort Women in the 1990s. The
first publication of the Comfort Women articles was controversial due to the blame that
was placed on the Japanese government and their publication around the time of the first

48

lawsuits that were being filed by former Comfort Women. The articles were given
credence due to their reliance on personal testimony from Yoshida Seiji, a man who
claimed he kidnapped Korean women to work in comfort stations. These articles were
retracted in August, 2014 as the Asahi Shimbun claimed they had evidence that Yoshida
had falsified his testimony (Yoshida, 2014 b.). This retraction of Comfort Women articles
by a leading newspaper has helped to fuel Abe’s apparent campaign of questioning the
history of Comfort Women.
On October 1, 2014 Abe weakly reaffirmed his commitment to not revising the
Kono Statement (Richards, 2014). However, following this second claim of not revising,
his cabinet vowed to correct “wrong” information circulating worldwide. On October 16,
2014 Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide contacted Radhika Coomaraswamy,
former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, and requested a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special
rapporteur’s report on the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery she authored. Suga
and the cabinet pressed for the revision due to the inclusion of testimony from Yoshida,
which the Asahi Shimbun had found false. The request was denied citing that the report
was based on multiple sources of evidence with a strong reliance on former Comfort
Women’s testimony. Yoshida’s testimony was just one supporting piece of evidence that
was included (Yoshida, 2014 e.).
Response to Challenges
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996) set up the Asian Women Fund
(AWF) in 1995 in response to the demands from regional governments and their
respective sexual slavery survivors for reparations. Prime Minister Murayama stated that
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the AWF was created so that the Japanese population could atone for the Military
Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. This sentiment of country wide atonement is also
reflected in the AWF’s mission statement. While the Japanese government paid for the
operational costs of the AWF, it was led by its own Board of Directors (Asian Women’s
Fund, 2007).
The AWF raised 600 million yen during its twelve operational years through
donations from multiple sources throughout the population which included Diet
members, Cabinet Ministers, companies, labor unions, political parties, and individual
contributions in an effort to compensate and support former Comfort Women. Beginning
in 1996, each woman who was identified by their respective government as a former
Comfort Woman, and then whose name was sent to the AWF, received 2 million yen for
her personal use and 3 million yen provided by the Japanese government for medical
expenses through governmental agencies and welfare projects (Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2014).
The Comfort Women who received the monetary offerings from the AWF
included 211 women from the Philippines, 61 women from South Korea, and 13 women
from Taiwan. Women from the Netherlands, and Indonesia were never identified by their
governments and so the AWF conducted social welfare projects in the respective
countries which included the construction of living facilities for the elderly in places
where Comfort Women were believed to have lived with first priority occupancy
provided to former Comfort Women. Grant money for the care and support of WWII
survivors was also made available to Indonesia and the Netherland governments’ welfare
programs (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).
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When a former Comfort Women received compensation from the AWF, an
apology letter from the Japanese Prime Minister followed. The letter acknowledged the
atrocity that Comfort Women were forced to endure and expresses atonement for the past
in the form of monetary compensation on behalf of the Japanese people including the
Prime Minister. The letter was first written and sent by Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro and was subsequently resigned by Prime Ministers Obuchi Keizo, Mori Yoshiro,
and Koizumi Junichiro. The letter stayed the same under each administration as shown in
Appendix E. Unfortunately, rumors abounded that the women who accepted
compensation from the AWF would be barred from filing lawsuits against the Japanese
government for the atrocities they were forced to endure. The AWF published a statement
on their website refuting these claims (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014;
Appendix E).
While the AWF’s main objective was to atone for the Japanese population’s
misdeeds of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, it avowed in its mission
statement that the fund would also support projects aimed at resolving contemporary
problems concerning women such as domestic violence. In the effort to tackle women’s
issues, the AWF created the Women’s Dignity Project where it supported various NGOs
that championed women’s rights, held round table discussions, and led international
conferences (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).
In 2000, former Prime Minister and creator of the AWF, Murayama Tomiichi was
elected as the fund’s President. Seven years later, under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the
fund closed, as it was determined that the AWF had completed its mission of atonement
and remembrance. The AWF compiled a digital history of the Military Mobilization of
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Sexual Slavery on its website (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007). Funds, such as the 2 million
yen for personal use and the 3 million yen for medical support is no longer provided to
any additionally identified Comfort Women from the AWF or the Japanese government.
Interestingly, on March 1st, 2007, the same month that the AWF closed, Abe gave a quote
stating, “The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion," which supported a
group of 120 LDP lawmakers in their proposal that same year to revise the Kono
Statement (Tabuchi, 2007).
The Internet has also become a point of contention where the Japanese
government has had to respond to challenges on the issue of Comfort Women. On
October 15, 2014, Japan’s Foreign Ministry took down a page of its website dedicated to
the 1995 appeal for donations on behalf of the AWF. While the AWF has been closed
since 2007, the Foreign Ministry page also included a deeply remorseful apology to the
victims of the sexual slavery campaign. According to the Reiji Yoshida, the key portion
of the donation appeal read:
Particularly brutal was the act of forcing women, including teenagers,
to serve the Japanese armed forces as ‘comfort women,’ a practice that
violated the fundamental dignity of women. No manner of apology can
ever completely heal the deep wound inflicted on these women both
emotionally and physically (Yoshida, 2014 d.).
The repeal of the page came after Yamada Hiroshi’s, Secretary-General of Party
for Future Generations, request at the Diet session on Oct. 6, 2014 for the review and
removal of government documents that erroneously cite government responsibility in the
issue of Comfort Women. In response to protests from South Korea, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Suga held a press conference where he claimed the removal of the page was in
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natural maintenance of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website since the page was related
to the AWF and further was not written by government officials (Yoshida, 2014 d.).
Memorials
Memorials have also been a point of contention between Japan and South Korea.
Japanese leaders, including Ministers and Director-Generals, have been frequently vocal
in their call for the South Korean government to remove statues commemorating Comfort
Women within South Korea and around the world during their respective Minister and
Director-General meetings.
Of specific concern is the Comfort Woman commemorative statue placed outside
the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The statue is of a young Korean woman, dressed in
traditional garb, sitting solemn in a chair with an empty chair beside her. The statue is
strategically placed across the street from the Japanese Embassy, facing the building’s
front entrance (The Korean Herald, 2014). The Japanese government is also concerned
about similar statues placed around the world commemorating Comfort Women. Of
those, two have been erected in the United States, one in Paradise Park, New Jersey and
the other in Glendale, California. Both sites are home to identical statues to the one in
Seoul and were erected by Korean-American organizations (Schrank, 2013).
The discussions on commemorative Comfort Women statues peaked in late 2014.
Japanese leaders demanded the removal of the Comfort Women statues in Seoul to
improve bilateral relations, but South Korean leaders responded saying that they were
unable to remove the statues since they were erected by private organizations who had
followed proper procedure to have them placed, they also encouraged Japanese leaders to
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resolve the issue themselves through a correct apology and compensation to victims (The
Korea Herald, 2014).
II.

South Korean governmental use and response to the history of Comfort
Women
Similar to the Japanese government, the South Korean government has been

actively involved with the remembrance of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery
campaign but, unlike the Japanese government South Korean leaders have acted in
support of the former Comfort Women and their history. Government involvement with
championing the cause of reparations, support, and remembrance of Comfort Women
began most notably during the transition of the state from authoritarianism to democracy,
specifically under the growth of South Korea’s Women’s Movement.
The Women’s Movement within South Korea first developed under the
authoritarian leadership of President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) in response to his
agenda of rapid industrialization (Seth, 2011). This agenda left labor rights, protections,
and safety nonexistent within the workplace. Women were specifically targeted during
the industrialization campaign as they were seen as a source of cheap labor and easily
controlled. Many women toiled long hours in factories that were unsanitary and
dangerous. These women also typically experienced violence, such as sexual harassment
and abuse, from supervisors who were usually male (Ching & Louhe, 1995).
Women’s unions, composed mainly of financially poor factory women, developed
in the late 1960s in response to the continued deplorable working conditions. A second
major focus of the women’s movement developed around abolishing the Family Law in
the 1970s within educated, middle class women. The Family Law was passed in 1958
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under South Korea’s first president, Rhee Syngman. This law institutionalized many of
the Confucian values that were entrenched within Korean society as well as a Japanese
family organization system that was used during colonialism (Lee & Lee, 2010).
Lee Tai-young, the first South Korean female lawyer, advocated for the
abolishment of the Family Law and constructed as well as sponsored nine organizations
to support women around South Korea, which included the Women’s Issues Research
Center and the Young Women’s Christian Association (Cho, 1998).
Both movements came together for the cause of democracy. The South Korean
public had strived for democracy since the end of the Korean War and had over thrown
the first president, Rhee Syngman, through public protests over corruption. The
movement for democracy continued under President Park Chung-hee, although it was
severely oppressed through force. The Women’s Movement joined the cause of
democracy in the 1970s. Through the democratic cause, the Family Law and women’s
labor movement came together to become more organized, expand their objectives
beyond that of labor and the Family Law, and develop a collaborative network
connecting multiple women’s groups. A great influence from the democracy movement
was the developed awareness of equality within a democratic state where women and
men can equally shape the government.
The democracy movement succeeded in 1988 with the free election of Roh Taewoo as President. The Women’s Movement blossomed at the dawn of democracy. In
1989 there were 2,000 women’s organizations compared to 18 in the 1970s and 23 in the
1960s (Lee & Lee, 2013). The large number of women’s organizations provided the
opportunity for multiple organization to work together to accomplish a broad amount of
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objectives. In 1987, 27 women’s organizations came together to form the Korean
Women’s Associations United (KWAU) with the fundamental objectives of passing
legislation for the protection of women and children against sex trafficking and violence,
to make such actions illegal, and the abolishment of the Family Law which was
successfully repealed in 2005. An important feature of the KWAU, that continues today,
is that while KWAU provides a platform for multiple women’s organizations to
collaborate, it is also organized with the purpose of the Women’s Movement speaking to
the government with one voice (Ching & Louhe, 1995).
Another important collaboration of women’s organizations is the Korean Council
for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council) which was
created in 1989 from 36 independent women’s organizations that focused on combating
sexual tourism and sexual violence. With the liberties that came with democracy many of
the individual member organizations, like the Korean Church Women United, began to
conduct research on the long rumored Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery,
which initiated the creation of the Korean Council for a combined effort in researching
and addressing this issue (Pyong, 2005).
Part of the research the Korean Council conducted was collecting testimonies
from living former Comfort Women. The Korean Council took out newspaper ads as well
as ads on the radio asking former Comfort Women to come out from hiding and share
their story. One of the women was Kim Hak-sun. Kim, working with the Korean Council,
held a press conference in 1991, in Seoul where she publicly shared her experience of
being a Comfort Woman. After her public testimony, 200 women from South Korea and
China also provided their experience to the Korean Council. Women from the Philippines
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and Taiwan also chose to share their encounters with the Korean Council once Kim’s
testimony gained international attention, which prompted the Korean Council to expand
their call for testimonies beyond South Korea. Later that same year in December, the
Korean Council supported and encouraged three former Comfort Women as they filed
lawsuits against the Japanese government for reparations due to violence against them
during WWII (Pyong, 2005).
Speeches and Pronouncements
Since the 1991 Comfort Women lawsuits, the South Korean leadership has been
calling for the Japanese government to make a correct apology and reparations to living
Comfort Women to atone for misdeeds in WWII. Such calls have come from standing
Presidents, Foreign Ministers, Cabinet Members, and Chief of Commissions among
others. The Minister of the Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) and the Chief of the
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under
Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission) have been two fervent outspoken
leaders on the issue of Comfort Women as both organizations prioritize this issue within
their respective mission objectives (The Korea Herald, 2013 a.; Fantz & Armstrong,
2014).
Even though South Korean leadership had been pushing the Japanese
government for redress on the issue of Comfort Women since 1991, some activists
groups and survivors claimed that the South Korean government was not doing enough
on the behalf of the former Comfort Women to reach a solution. In August 2011, South
Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that “the Korean government had failed to make all
diplomatic effort to obtain compensation for the comfort women” (The Korea Herald,
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2013), which “constitutes infringement on the basic human rights of the victims and a
violation of the Constitution.” (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). The Constitutional Court
ruling ignited an active whole of government response in making diplomatic effort to
obtain compensation and solution for the former Comfort Women.
After the Constitutional Court decision during a regular scheduled Foreign
Ministers meeting in October, 2011, Kim urged Gemba for compensation and a
governmental apology from Japan to the former Comfort Woman. Likewise, the 2011
MOGEF Minister, Kim Kum-lae called for the Japanese government to make an official
apology while former Comfort Women are still alive during a visit to a shelter for elderly
women. The Chief of the Commission, Yoon Mi-hyang, also made a public statement
calling the Japanese government to help the surviving Comfort Women regain their
human rights and repair their reputation by issuing a government apology (Laurence,
2011).
In December, 2011, President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) also participated in
rectifying the issue of Comfort Women during his visit to Japan where he urged Prime
Minister Noda Yoshihiko (2011-2012) to make the issue right, with an official apology
and compensation, while surviving Comfort Women are still alive. Noda, like all of the
Japanese Prime Ministers before him, stood behind the Kono Statement and the 1965
Normalization of Relations Agreement (Foster, 2011).
The fervency of seeking acceptable governmental resolution on behalf of
surviving Comfort Women did not end with President Lee. President Park Geun-hye
(2013-present) has made the resolution of Comfort Women central to her administration.
Park refused to meet Prime Minister Abe citing his incorrect view of history upon taking

58

office. This freeze in relations has lasted nearly three years, since the beginning of Park’s
term in 2013 until the first initial meeting in November, 2015 (Choe, 2015).
Park has been vocal in calling for Japan to acknowledge the history of Comfort
Women to make amends for the state’s past atrocities through compensation and a correct
government apology. Park has been quick to issue such statements and rebukes in
response to Abe’s controversial actions such as over the committee review over the Kono
Statement. In addition to publicly stating frustration over Japan’s actions and decision, in
this event the Park administration also lodged a formal complaint with Japan’s
ambassador to Korea. Additionally, other actions that have elicited responses from the
Park administration include Abe’s visit to Yad Vashem, a memorial in Jerusalem for the
victims of the Holocaust in January, 2015 (Yonhap News, 2015). Park has also been
willing to criticize Japan’s incorrect view of history and its failure to address the Comfort
Women issue around the world such as at the South Korean-European Union Summit on
November 9th, 2013 (Hofilena, 2013).
Park has not been the only active member of her administration in addressing the
issue of Comfort Women. While Park has not been holding high level meetings with Abe
until late 2015, lower levels of government such as Foreign Ministers and MOGEF
Ministers have been continuing to meet and address the Comfort Women. Foreign
Minister Yun Byung-se made a public statement on October 23rd, 2014, while in the
United States, urging Japan to resolve the Comfort Women issue. Additionally, MOGEF
Minister Cho Yoon-sun (2013-2014) had been attempting to meet each South Korean
Comfort Woman individually (Fantz & Armstrong, 2014).
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While the Japanese government continues to stand behind the Kono Statement
and the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement and thus not issuing an apology or
reparations, the Japanese government also believes that the AWF provided appropriate
compensation to surviving Comfort Women. The South Korean government, as well as
activist groups, does not see compensation from the AWF as an acceptable form of
compensation for the atrocities former Comfort Women sustained as the funds are not
directly from the government but by donations from private individuals and businesses
(Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).
Of the registered surviving Comfort Women only 61 accepted the funds from the
AWF before its closure in 2007 (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Many former
Comfort Women were pressured by activist groups as well as governmental agencies not
to take the compensation the AWF was offering. According to the project completion
report from the AWF, President Kim Dae-jung created a fund to support surviving
Comfort Women with money from the South Korean government as well as the Korean
Council, but this money was only provided to women who did not accept AWF funds.
142 women accepted this fund and agreed not to accept funds from the AWF (Asian
Women’s Fund, 2007).
Response to Challenges
The Korean Council and the KWAU, have been, and currently are, active in the
remembrance of Comfort Women. During the administrations of Presidents Kim Youngsam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae-joung (1998-2003) women’s organizations enjoyed
strong support from the government. Such support propelled the South Korean women’s
movement into participation in international forums such as the U.N. Fourth World
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Conference on Women in 1995 held in Beijing, China. One of the most important take
away from both of these administrations was that it set the framework for increased
government involvement into the Women’s Movement through a small commission on
Women Affairs, which planned and carried out policies for women. The success of the
Women Affairs commission in supporting women through government action led to the
creation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Ministry of Gender Equality &
Family, 2012).
The MOGEF was founded in 2001 by its first title, Ministry of Gender Equality.
In 2005 the Ministry was renamed to include family. Objectives of this Ministry include
implementation of “women, family and youth policies so that each member of the nation
can be benefited through the whole life [sic]” (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family,
2012). The MOGEF works directly with the KWAU, and as such places large emphasis
on combatting human trafficking. Through the emphasis on human trafficking and
KWAU’s work on the issue of Comfort Women, the MOGEF is a leading governmental
agency with dedicated efforts to the issue of Comfort Women. The MOGEF has allocated
funds for the support of Comfort Women with the objectives of “Support to stabilize the
livelihood of comfort women and related commemoration business” (Ministry of Gender
Equality & Family, 2012).
While the MOGEF includes support for former Comfort Women as part of its
mission, this is not the only government agency within South Korea to do so. In 2005, on
the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of WWII and the end of the Japanese
colonialization of Korea, President Roh Moo-hyun established the Commission. This
commission is currently organized as a temporary committee under the authority of the
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President, and has been empowered by each successive President since 2005. Beginning
in 2013, the Commission has been actively working toward becoming a standalone
governmental agency (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).
The mission of the Commission is to provide awareness of the atrocities that the
Korean people were forced to endure in WWII at the hand of the Japanese and to seek
redress for the victims. Such reparations include the return of Korean people’s remains to
South Korea, public Japanese governmental apology to the victims and their families, as
well as financial compensation. The Commission also maintains a record of selfidentified victims (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).
The Commission has estimated that 7.8 million Koreans were forcibly mobilized
under Japanese occupation for labor, such as in factories and coal mines, for military
service, and to service Japanese personnel, such as Comfort Women, throughout its
growing empire. As of August, 2012 there were 226,000 registered South Korean forced
labor victims (The Japan Times, 2012).
Under President Lee’s Administration, the Comfort Women issue reached a
particularly tense period in February, 2012 when a former special rapporteur on the U.N.
Human Rights Council, Gay McDougall, met with Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan to
suggest forming an arbitration panel with Tokyo to reach a resolution for surviving
Comfort Women. McDougall argued that, “The Japanese government remains liable for
grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their
totality to crimes against humanity.” Kim acknowledge the option that McDougall
presented and stated that due to the constrains of time, given the advanced age of the
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survivors, the South Korean government is determined to do everything it can to resolve
the issue (The Korean Times, 2012).
While Lee again pressed for an apology and compensation from Prime Minister
Noda during a second state visit in August, 2012 South Korean Foreign Ministry officials
claimed that an arbitrations board would not be perused due to the potential deterioration
of relations such an action would cause (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012).
Memorials
While the South Korean and Japanese governmental view of how to rectify the
issue of Comfort Women has been at a standstill for a number of years, the beginning of
meetings between Abe and Park have brought new matters to the forefront. The growth
of commemorative Comfort Women statues around South Korea and the world,
particularly in the United States, has become an additional point of contention within the
Comfort Women dispute. Bilateral talks between South Korean and Japan are currently
stalled as Abe has placed the condition of removing the statue outside the Japanese
Embassy in Seoul for resolving the tense diplomatic relations surrounding the history of
Comfort Women (The Asahi Shimbun, 2015). The commemorative statue outside of the
Japanese Embassy was erected by the Korean Council in 2011 not only to honor former
Comfort Women but to also highlight the 1,000th weekly protest held by supporters of
Comfort Women demanding an official apology and compensation. The Japanese
government has requested the removal of this particular statue multiple times since its
creation, first by Prime Minister Noda (Foster, 2011).
Such commemorative statues have been created and placed by private, student,
and activist groups in South Korea and Korean-American groups in the United States.
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South Korean leaders, Foreign Ministers, Director-Generals, and President Park, have
stated that all of the monuments that have been raised, which have been in the last five
years, are not of the South Korean government’s doing but by private donors who follow
the law when they are established. South Korean leaders commonly refer the Japanese
government back to the South Korean government’s approved method of resolving the
Comfort Women issue and the most likely way of removing the Comfort Women statues
issue (The Korea Herald, 2014).
III.

Chapter Analysis
Japan and South Korea have both demonstrated involvement from the entire

government in the history of Comfort Women as illustrated through the events detailed in
the previous sections. There is a trend in the position of government involved with this
history. Figure 1 below categorizes each event in the case study in relation to
governmental position.
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Figure 1. Position of Government action in relation to the remembrance of Comfort
Women
Japan
Number of Gov’t Actions
6

Officials Involved
4 actions: Prime Ministers

Category
Speeches and
Pronouncements

Event Description
1.

2 actions: Chief Cabinet
Secretary
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

8

7 actions: Prime Ministers

Response to Challenges

1.
2.

1 action: Diet
Members/Lawmakers

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

5

5 actions: Ministers and
Directors

Memorials and Offerings
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1.

PM Miyazawa
apologizes in regards to
Comfort Women at the
South Korean National
Assembly, 1992
PM Hosokawa
apologizes for Comfort
Women at the 127th
session of the Japanese
National Diet, 1993
PM Tomiichi publicly
apologizes to Comfort
Women at the founding
of the AWF, 1995
PM Abe creates a
committee to review the
Kono Statement, 2014
Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kono issues the results
of the Japanese Comfort
Women Study, 1993
Chief Cabinet Secretary
Suga request revision of
UN report on Comfort
Women, 2014
PM Tomiichi creates
AWF, 1995
PM Hashimoto creates
apology letter for AWF
compensation, beginning
in1996
PM Obuchi resigns AWF
apology, 1998-2000
PM Mori resigns AWF
apology, 2000-2001
PM Koizumi resigns
AWF apology, 20012006
PM Abe closes AWF,
2007
PM Abe gives a public
statement against the
Kono Statement, 2012
120 LDP lawmakers
draft a proposal to revise
the Kono Statement,
2007
2014 Japanese and South
Korean Ministers met
during Director-General
meetings to create better
Japanese-South Korean
bilateral ties.

South Korea
Number of Gov’t Actions
11

Officials Involved
5 actions: President
5 actions: Ministers
1 action: Constitutional
Court

Category
Speeches and
Pronouncements

4

3 actions: President
1 action: Minister

Response to Challenges

2

2 actions: President

Memorials and Offerings
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Event Description
1. Pres. Kim creates a South
Korean Comfort Women fund,
1995
2. Pres. Lee calls for an
official apology and
compensation to PM Noda,
2001
3. Pres. Park refuses to meet
with PM Abe, 2013
4. Pres. Park lodges formal
complaint against Japan, 2015
5. Pres. Park publicly criticizes
Japan, 2013
6. At 2011 Foreign Ministers
meeting, South Korea
Ministers call for an official
apology and compensation to
former Comfort Women
7. MOGEF Minister calls for
apology an official apology,
2011
8. Chief of the Commission
calls for compensation and an
official apology, 2011
9. Foreign Minister gives a
public statement calling for an
official apology and
compensation, 2014
10. MOGEF Minister publicly
meets with Comfort Women,
2014
11.Constitutional Court ruling
on government involvement
with the settlement of the
Comfort Women issue, 2011
1. MOGEF established under
Pres. Kim, 2001
2.Pres. Roh established the
Commission, 2005
3. Pres. Lee calls for an
official apology and
compensation after arbitration
is cancelled, 2012
4. Foreign Minister considers
arbitration panel, 2012
1. Pres. Lee told PM Noda an
official apology and
compensation will remove the
statue, 2011
2.Pres. Park told Japanese
leaders that they have the
power to remove the statue
with an official apology and
compensation, 2014

All of the events under review show the active involvement of high levels of
government. Participation by multiple levels of government casts doubt on popular
newspaper claims that engagement in the history of Comfort Women center around single
political actors such as Prime Ministers Abe or Koizumi.
For the category of Speeches and pronouncements, Japan had four events of
government involvement while South Korea had eleven. In both governments, the
Executive was equally as involved in addressing the issue. Likewise, the category of
Response to Challenges also saw the most involvement from the President and Prime
Minister while the category of Memorials was divided with the South Korea President
responding more than the Japanese Prime Minister. The number of acts from the
leadership of each respective government, as well as the involvement of high level
officials, demonstrates a vested interest in how the history of Comfort Women is being
told as well as perpetuating their specific understanding of what it means to have the
issue of Comfort Women resolved.
The majority of the Comfort Women issues between the Japanese and South
Korean government has been over the idea of remedying the wrongs of the past on behalf
of the former Comfort Women. The Japanese government has offered apologies for the
event of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, as Figure 2 illustrates, but has never
offered compensation as the Japanese government stands behind the 1965 Normalization
of Relations Agreement as do the Japanese Courts (Asian Women Fund, 2007). A chart
depicting the ideas or words used by political leaders was not created as four out of the
six Speeches and Pronouncement category were found to be apologies on behalf of the
Japanese government. Likewise, the South Korean government’s dominate rhetoric was a
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call for compensation and an appropriate apology. However, since apologies by the
Japanese government have been issued in the two categories of Speeches and
Pronouncements as well as Response to Challenges, Figure 2 provides some analysis of
the data in relation to Japanese government involvement.
Figure 2. Japanese government apologies for the Military Mobilization of Comfort
Stations
Number of Gov’t apologies

9

Officials Involved

8 apologizes: Prime
Minister
1 apology: Chief Cabinet
Sec.

Event Description
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

PM Miyazawa apologizes in
regards to Comfort Women at
the South Korean National
Assembly, 1992
PM Hosokawa apologizes for
Comfort Women at the 127th
session of the Japanese National
Diet, 1993
PM Tomiichi publicly
apologizes to Comfort Women at
the founding of the AWF, 1995
PM Tomiichi creates AWF, 1995
PM Hashimoto creates apology
letter for AWF compensation,
beginning in1996
PM Obuchi resigns AWF
apology, 1998-2000
PM Mori resigns AWF apology,
2000-2001
PM Koizumi resigns AWF
apology, 2001-2006
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono
issues the results of the Japanese
Comfort Women Study, 1993
which offers an apology and the
history is reaffirmed as true.

Similarly, while the Japanese government has apologized through the Kono
Statement, which is currently the government sanctioned way to resolve the issue of
Comfort Women, the case study demonstrates that the South Korean government has
continually rejected all of the apologies as an appropriate form of atonement for the past
wrongs against Korean Comfort Women. South Korean leadership have continued to call
for compensation and an official apology from the Prime Minister on behalf of Japan.
The previous apologies issued from the Prime Ministers have all been rejected by the
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South Korean politicians because they were not on behalf of the Japanese government but
personal apologies and not accompanied with compensation directly from the Japanese
government to former Comfort Women. The same message of an appropriate apology
and compensation to surviving sexual slavery victims is found throughout all the
categories by the South Korean leadership.
While the Japanese courts have been involved with the issue of Comfort Women
in relation to lawsuits, the South Korean Constitutional Court has also been involved by
requiring the South Korean government to seek compensation and an appropriate apology
from the Japanese government. The case of government involvement in seeking and
obtaining compensation for former Comfort Women was first brought to the courts
through distressed activists and survivors for the cause. Such an action to prompt the
Court to motivate the government illustrates a strong relationship of government
legitimacy to the memory of Comfort Women. The population expects a competent
government to work towards and achieve compensation and apology on behalf of
survivors. Additionally, in the 17 events of governmental involvement in the memory of
Comfort Women, Japan is the sole perpetrator of crimes against Comfort Women and the
only government that is able to provide the complete resolution to the history. This idea
of a “sole perpetrator” is an act of othering by the South Korean elite towards Japan. The
Korean Comfort Women are portrayed as part of the in group, one of the population’s
own, who have been victimized by the out group. Thus, the population is motivated by a
sense of nationalism to seek redress from the outside group.
Likewise, the Japanese elite are developing a sense of nationalism within the
population through the idea of compensation. While the government has issued multiple
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apologies compensation is withheld as a point of national pride. The government seeks to
separate itself from the dark past through the Normalization of Relations Agreement with
South Korea. The government of Japan today is portraying itself as separate from the evil
past and thus as a good government, population, and in turn as a positive “in group”
through apologizing and moving forward.
All the government officials involved in the case study have maintained the status
quo of their respective government in relation to Comfort Women except for Prime
Minister Abe. Abe and his cabinet have deviated twice in the four events under the
Speech and Proclamation section, first in making a committee to review the authenticity
of the Kono Statement and in his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requesting a revision to
the UN report on Comfort Women. Through his actions, Abe has directly questioned the
history of Comfort Women which has increased the negative response from the South
Korean government.
His actions to revise the Comfort Women history illustrate a motive in changing
the narrative of the historical memory within the Japanese population. The goal of
creating a more positive retelling of history has the potential to create a more positive
view of the Japanese society and again developing a more positive view of the in group.
This development of a more positive view of the in group bolsters the creation of
nationalism.
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I.

Yasukuni Shrine in Historical Memory
Yasukuni Shrine (literally ‘peaceful national shrine’) (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014) is

a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Japan that was created by the Meiji government in 1896 to
memorialize and house the souls of those who died fighting on behalf of the emperor in
the Boshin War (O’Dwyer, 2010). At Japan’s entrance into conflicts after the Boshin War
(1868-1869), the Shrine was expanded to honor all of Japan’s citizens, military and
civilian, who died on behalf of the country in military altercations. The conflicts
memorialized at Yasukuni Shrine are the Saga Uprising (1874), the Seinan War (1877),
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the First
World War (1914-1918), the Manchurian Incident (1931-1932), the China Incident
(1937), and World War II (13-937-1945) (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008; Drea,2009). The
Shrine proclaims, “the 2,466,000 divinities enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine all sacrificed
their lives to the public duty of protecting their motherland” (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008).
These persons who gave their lives are honored as heroic souls (The Asahi Shimbun,
2013). Among Japanese citizens there are also a number of former colonial Korean and
Taiwan soldiers enshrined at Yasukuni who died while serving Japan in WWII (Inuzuka
& Fuchs, 2014).
Yasukuni Shrine follows the traditions and belief system of Shinto. A part of
Shinto is the tradition of respecting and worshipping the deceased. It is believed that
while no longer physically present, ancestors remain on earth as guardians protecting
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their loved ones. The act of worshiping the guardian deities becomes a way in which to
show honor and respect to these persons (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). While Yasukuni
Shrine honors the war dead and reveres them as deities who impart their blessings on the
nation (O’Dwyer, 2010), there are no bodies or ashes contained on premise.
Enshrinement is a ritual, or spiritual ceremony, conducted by the Shrine’s priests.
The only physical connection to the person being honored is a small slip of paper with
their name that is housed at the Shrine’s repository (Breen, 2008).
Along with the repository of the enshrined names, Yasukuni Shrine is made up of
other significant historical items that are specifically militant in nature given the original
intent of the Shrine’s creation. Around the grounds and at the Shrine’s entrance are
multiple statues of imposing military figures and tributes to military events. Depictions
include events from the Meiji (1868-1912) and Showa (1926-1989) periods (Perez, 1998)
as well notable events from WWII, such as a statue depicting a Kamikaze pilot
(O’Dwyer, 2010). Along with memorials such as these, Yasukuni Shrine also
encompasses the Yushukan. According to Shaun O’Dwyer, the Yushukan is a museum
dedicated to memorializing the history of sacrifice and weaponry of Japanese forces
before the Meiji era until present day. Such artifacts include weapons, uniforms, battle
relics and other memorabilia throughout these periods, however, materials from WWII
dominate the museum (O’Dwyer, 2010).
Yasukuni Shrine has had a unique history with the Japanese government since its
creation. Yasukuni Shrine’s commemoration of war casualties and Shinto’s connection
with the emperor became a tool used by the Meiji government. The emperor preformed
various Shinto rituals at Yasukuni Shrine which cemented ancient traditions into the

72

Meiji oligarchs’ modernizing agenda. The Meiji government’s use of Shinto traditions
was the beginning of the modern ideology known as State Shinto (Breen, 2008;
O’Dwyer, 2010). The tradition of the Emperor visiting Yasukuni Shrine and presenting
the Shrine with offerings at the Great Rites of Autumn and Spring was established under
the Meiji government as well (Breen, 2008). The commonality of Shinto and a shared
place to mourn the war dead helped to unite Japan after the Tokugawa era (1600-1868)
(Perez, 1998) and also aided in developing a sense of nationalism throughout the
population.
The Meiji government continued to utilize the Yasukuni Shrine as a source of
nationalism and unity for the population throughout its time in power. Such use is
exemplified in the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors (1882) as it stressed loyalty
to the emperor as commander-in-chief and promised the reward of enshrinement as a
divine spirit at Yasukuni Shrine. A customary farewell by kamikaze pilots to each other,
as reported by Shaun O’Dwyer, was, “see you at Yasukuni” illustrating the power of the
Shrine within society and the role of the Meiji government in promoting such a belief
(O’Dwyer, 2010). Due to the glorification of death on behalf of the emperor, the
Yasukuni Shrine became identified with the virtues of loyalty, self-sacrifice, and
nationalism within the population (Breen, 2008; Ryu, 2007).
With the significance placed on the Yasukuni Shrine, the Meiji government directly
oversaw its administration. The Shrine was overseen jointly by the Ministry of the Army
and Ministry of the Navy. The Ministries handled the operations of Yasukuni Shrine such
as determining the days of ritual, appointing priests, and managing the Shrine’s funding.
In 1879, the Yasukuni Shrine was given the status of Special state-funded Shrine, which
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provided the Shrine with ample amount of funds to cover expenses (Breen, 2008). With
the government oversight, the Ministry of the Army and the Navy were able to directly
nominate and approve persons for enshrinement (Ryu, 2007).
The conclusion of WWII and the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945 to 1952)
changed the Yasukuni Shrine’s relationship with the government. During occupation, the
U.S. and the new Japanese government4 created a new constitution for Japan which
included the separation of government and religion, this separation is still a part of the
Japanese constitution today in Article 20 (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the installation of the
new constitution, Japan had the option of making Yasukuni Shrine a non-religious
governmental organization or a private religious institution. The Shrine today is a private
religious organization separate from the government (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the
separation, Yasukuni Shrine lost the status of Special state-funded Shrine as well as the
direct relationship with the government that had aided it in receiving government records
of deceased military members for enshrinement (Breen, 2008).
While it became a separate entity apart from the government, the Shrine
maintained its original mission of honoring citizens who died on behalf of the state
through enshrinement. The Health, Labour, and Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief
Bureau (today the Social Welfare and War Victims' Relief Bureau) (Japan Ministry of
Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2015) provided former military members and repatriated
citizens with social services. Since this bureau worked directly with the population who
4

The pre-war Japanese Constitution, written in 1890, was found to be flawed in a post-war Japan, in part,
due to the extensive power that was given to the military. The Japanese leaders created the Constitutional
Problems Investigation Committee to draft a new constitution for Japan which was comprised of various
Japanese groups and scholars. The first draft created by the committee was submitted to the MacArthur
government for approval. The draft was rejected and returned with a suggested draft and edits from U.S.
scholars. The second draft constitution was submitted to the Japanese National Diet where it was debated,
revised and ultimately adopted in 1946 and enacted in 1947 (Learning Gateways, 2015).
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had the potential to be honored at Yasukuni Shrine, the responsibility of gathering the
information needed for the process of enshrinement, such as name, age, regiment, rank,
place and date of death, was organized under the Repatriation Relief Bureau once the
Ministries of the Army and Navy were reorganized (Breen, 2008). A new process of
sending governmental records to Yasukuni Shrine was implemented.
Instead of being readily supplied with the government personnel information as
had been done previously, Yasukuni Shrine now has to officially request information on
the war dead from the government. From this request the Health and Wellness Ministry
sends each prefecture a survey to compile the necessary information. Once the surveys
are completed, the Health and Wellness Ministry compiles information cards which are
then sent to Yasukuni Shrine for consideration. The Shrine makes the final decision on
who are honored and who are not (Higurashi, 2013).
The new system of enshrinement was first practiced in April 1959. The vastness
of WWII in the Asia-Pacific left a large number of persons available for enshrinement as
well as numerous persons missing in action, unidentified, or left behind, who also had the
potential for enshrinement albeit missing crucial information. Honoring those deceased
in WWII began slowly in 1945 and concluded in 1959 with a mass memorial service.
There were no war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during these subsequent
rituals (Breen, 2008; Higurashi, 2013).
The label of war criminal was first established and tried in a court of law at the
conclusion of WWII at the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Trials (Maga, 2011). With the
conviction of nearly 5,000 Japanese military members as Class A, B, and C war
criminals, the government of Japan was left with the challenge on how to interpret

75

Japanese war criminals in relation to honor at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi, 2013). During
WWII, propagandists had promoted the divinity of the emperor and that through the
pledge of loyalty to him any solider that died in battle died for a just cause since the
emperor was divine (O’Dwyer, 2010).
The enshrinement of war criminals occurred gradually. Class A war criminals
were widely known, given the publicity of the Tokyo Trials where 28 military and
government leaders were indicted on crimes against peace as they ordered and led the
war in Asia. 25 men were sequentially charged, two died in prison before trial
proceedings were finished, and one man’s case was dismissed due to mental instability
(Maga, 2011). There were 4,830 military members convicted as either Class B or C war
criminals (Higurashi, 2013). Due to Allied war crimes trials throughout the Asia-Pacific,
and with the high volume of military members indicted for crimes, these persons were
not widely known by the public (Maga, 2011).
In 1958, the Health and Wellness Ministry quietly sent out the informational
surveys to gather the personal information of Class B and C war criminals for
consideration of enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine, due in part to the lobby of deceased
war criminals’ loved ones. The public was not notified of the dissemination of the
surveys or of the plans to pursue possible enshrinement of war criminals, due to the
government’s fear of widespread negative public opinion and possible repercussions. The
limited knowledge of war crime classification also helped to keep the process of
enshrinement quiet (Higurashi, 2013).
In 1959, under Head Priest Tsukuba Fujimaro (1946-1977) the first collection of
Class B and C war criminals were quietly enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. By 1967, four
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sets of Class B and C war criminals had been enshrined, totaling 984 persons. Family
members of the Class B and C war criminals were not notified of the enshrinement until
after enshrinement occurred, even though some families had opposed enshrinement of
their loved one (Higurashi, 2013).
The enshrinement of Class A war criminals was not as simple as Class B and C.
The Japanese government had to proceed with greater caution than before due to the wide
spread knowledge on who constitutes a WWII Class A war criminal. In 1966, the Health
and Welfare Ministry once again began quietly sending out informational surveys, this
time for the collection of Class A war criminals’ personal information. The public was
not notified of this collection of data with the intention of enshrinement (Higurashi,
2013).
In 1970, a group of 14 deceased Class A war criminals was submitted to the
Yasukuni Shrine for consideration of enshrinement. The Lay Council of Yasukuni Shrine
passed a resolution calling for the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals but left the
timing of when to perform the ceremony up to the head priest. While Head Priest
Tsukuba had worked quickly to honor Class B and C war criminals, he was not in favor
of enshrining Class A war criminals and held off the enshrinement for this population as
long as possible (Higurashi, 2013).
Tsukuba died in March, 1978. That same year in July, Matsudaira Nagayoshi was
installed as Head Priest. Matsudaira moved quickly to honor the Class A war criminals.
In October, 1978 all 14 Class A war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during
a secret enshrinement ceremony (Higurashi, 2013).
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In April 1979, it was announced to the public that all of Japan’s war criminals had
been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. According to Higurashi Yoshinobu, the public had a
limited reaction to the news (Higurashi, 2013). However, the enshrinement of Class A
war criminals did affect the relationship between the Emperor and the Yasukuni Shrine.
The Showa Emperor stopped his visits to the Shrine as a show of opposition to the
Shrine’s decision to honor Class A war criminals. The last visit by the Emperor to
Yasukuni Shrine was in 1978. Currently, while the tradition of an Emperor visiting
Yasukuni to pay respects to the war dead have been informally stopped, an imperial
emissary continues to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and provides offerings on behalf of the
Imperial Family (O’Dwyer, 2010; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014).
While Imperial visits stopped after 1978, visits by Japanese prime ministers to
Yasukuni continued. It had become a tradition since the conclusion of WWII for prime
ministers to pay their respects to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine during their
administration. According to Phil Deans, every prime minister from 1945 until 1985,
except for Prime Ministers Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1955) and Ishibashi Tanzan (19561957), visited the Shrine at least once during their time in office. While the tradition of
visiting Yasukuni Shrine by sitting prime ministers still occurred after the enshrinement
of Class A, B, and C war criminals such visits came under scrutiny once the
enshrinement of all war criminals was brought to light (Deans, 2007).
The scrutiny of prime minister visits stemmed from the discussion of separation
of religion and government detailed in the Japanese Constitution (Article 20). Many
prime ministers, such as Prime Minister Miki (1974-1976), declared that he was visiting
the Shrine as a private person and refrained from signing Yasukuni Shrine’s guest book
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with his official title or using any state funds and properties to visit the Shrine which he
claimed did not violate Article 20 (Deans, 2007).
Visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine briefly stopped in 1985 under Prime
Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) in response to the negative international reaction to his
visit. Prime Minister Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985 in honor of
the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of WWII. His visit was met with protests from
China and South Korea who believe that such visits to Yasukuni Shrine by prime
ministers honor the atrocities committed by war criminals enshrined there. 1985 was the
first time a prime minister had been criticized internationally for visiting Yasukuni.
Nakasone personally did not visit the Shrine again as Prime Minister out of respect for
Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea. An incumbent Japanese prime minister
did not visit Yasukuni Shrine again until 1996 with a visit by Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro (Deans, 2007).
I. Japanese governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine
Memorials and Offerings
Visits by Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine have continued to be the largest
part of neighbors’ complaints in regards to the Shrine itself. As such the section of
memorials and offerings was chosen to be discussed first in this chapter. Beginning in
1996, there have presently been eight visits by an acting prime minister to the Yasukuni
Shrine as illustrated in Figure 3 below, each was met with criticism from the Asian area,
including South Korea.
Figure 3: Japanese Prime Minister’s Visits to Yasukuni Shrine
Date
July 29, 1996

Prime Minister
Hashimoto Ryutaro

Political Party
LDP
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Event for visit
In honor of his 59th

August 13,2001

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

April 21, 2002

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

January 15, 2003

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

January 1, 2004

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

October 17, 2005

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

August 15, 2006

Koizumi Junichiro

LDP

December 26, 2013

Abe Shinzo

LDP

Birthday
Campaign Promise;
Honoring the end of
WWII while avoiding 815
Campaign Promise;
Annual Spring Festival
Campaign Promise; New
Year
Campaign Promise; New
Year
Campaign Promise;
Annual Fall Festival
Campaign Promise;
Anniversary of end of
WWII
Honoring 1st anniversary
of administration in
office

Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998) was the first acting prime
minister to visit the Shrine in over a decade since visits stopped in 1985 with Prime
Minister Nakasone. When questioned about his visit to the Shrine as a government
official as well as its potential impact on relations with other states in the region,
Hashimoto stated, “Why should it matter? It’s time to stop letting that sort of thing
complicate our international relations.” Further, Hashimoto signed the Yasukuni Shrine
guest book with his official title. Additional questions concerning his visit were directed
to the Prime Minister’s Office where they were left unanswered (The New York Times,
1996).
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) has gone to Yasukuni Shrine
more than any other incumbent prime minister since 1996. Out of the eight prime
minister visits since 1996, Koizumi attended the Shrine six times; once a year during his
administration. The visits came as the fulfillment of a campaign promise where he
pledged to visit Yasukuni Shrine every year while in office, even on August 15th, the
anniversary of Japanese surrender in WWII (French, 2002; Onishi, 2006).
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Koizumi’s first visit occurred on August 13, 2001, purposely avoiding the August
15th anniversary so as not to further infuriate regional neighbors. The visit brought
criticism from China and South Korea as well as reproach from supporters and some LDP
party members who had pressed for the first visit to occur on August 15th (Strom, 2001).
However, his final visit as Prime Minister occurred on August 15th to commemorate the
61st anniversary of WWII (Onishi, 2006; Keck, 2013).
The eighth visit by a serving prime minister was made by Prime Minister Abe on
December 26th, 2013 in honor of the 1st anniversary of his administration taking office
(Abe, 2013). Multiple television stations documented his motorcade as well as his
entrance into Yasukuni Shrine. After his time in the Shrine, Abe told reporters, “There is
criticism based on the misconception that this is an act to worship war criminals, but I
visited Yasukuni Shrine to report to the souls of the war dead on the progress made this
year and to convey my resolve that people will never again suffer the horrors of war”
(Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013).
While visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine have elicited harsh
international attention, they are not the only governmental officials who pay their
respects at the Shrine. It is a common practice for lawmakers to visit Yasukuni Shrine
during high ritual days every year which occur during the Spring and Autumn festivals
held on April 21st-23rd and October 17th-20th, respectively, as well as the anniversary of
the end of WWII on August 15th (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). Such attendance has occurred
through the cessation of visitation by the Emperor and limited attendance by prime
ministers.
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Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi brought greater media
attention to the appearance of lawmakers at the Shrine as well as an increase in the
scrutiny of Ministers’ and Cabinet Members’ attendance due to their rank in government.
This has been evidenced by the lack of news articles focusing on other government
representatives during Prime Minister Hashimoto’s administration from 1996-1998 and
during his1996 visit within the Wright State University Library’s online database as well
as through searches of popular newspapers’ archives such as The New York Times, CNN,
BBC World News, The Japan Times and the Korean Herald. Figure 4 illustrates the
attendance of lawmakers and cabinet ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine as reported by
newspapers.
Figure 4: Cabinet Ministers and Lawmakers visits to Yasukuni Shrine
Date
October 17, 2006
October 17, 2007
August 15, 2009
October 18, 2012
April 21, 2013

December 23, 2013
January 1, 2014

August 15, 2014
October 17, 2014`

Notable Ministers/Lawmakers
Political Party
84 lawmakers, 8 ministers
67 lawmakers, 4 ministers
Koizumi, Abe, Minister
Koizumi, Abe, and NodaNoda Seiko, 35 lawmakers
LDP
Abe, 2 cabinet ministers
LDP
168 lawmakers, 3 ministersMinisters-LDP
which included Finance
Minister and Former PM
Aso Taro
159 lawmakers, 2 ministers
Ministers-LDP
Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal
Affairs and Communications
Minister
83 lawmakers, 3 ministers

LDP

Ministers-LDP

April 21, 2015
August 15, 2015

Newspaper reported
Lawmakers attended
106 lawmakers
66 lawmakers, 3 ministers

Ministers-LDP

October 17, 2015

169 lawmakers, 2 ministers

Ministers-LDP

Event for visit
Annual Autumn Festival
Annual Autumn Festival
Commemoration of WWII
end
Annual Autumn Festival
Annual Spring Festival

Birthday of current
emperor
New year

Commemoration of WWII
end
Annual Autumn Festival
Annual Spring Festival
70th anniversary
commemoration of WWII
end
Annual Autumn Festival

Koizumi did not announce his visits to the Shrine and varied the dates of his
attendance. As such he conducted the visits by himself, unless his appearance coincided

82

with the high ritual days where the tradition of attendance by political leaders is in
practice.
Both Koizumi and Abe also made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine while they
were out of office as prime minister on August 15th, 2009 along with the Cabinet Minister
of Consumer Affairs, Noda Seiko. Noda told reporters that her visit reconfirmed her
belief that “we should never have a war. Peace is not something that naturally exists—it
is something that has been built” (Nagata, 2009). This was not Abe’s only appearance
while out of office as he made a second visit to the Shrine on October 18, 2012, the same
week as the annual Autumn Festival where he was accompanied by two cabinet ministers
(FlorCruz, 2012).
While the annual Spring Festival at Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 was welcomed by
168 lawmakers as well as three Cabinet ministers who paid personal visits to the Shrine,
it is notable that among the three ministers was Former Prime Minister and current
Finance Minister Aso Taro. While Aso did not attend the Shrine during his tenure as
prime minister, his appearance at Yasukuni Shrine as a cabinet minister was noted among
the public and international community (Kim & Liang, 2013).
Abe’s December 26th visit was prefaced on December 23rd by visits not only of
lawmakers but also of two cabinet ministers, one of which was Abe’s brother, Senior vice
Foreign Minister Kishi Nobuo. The lawmakers gave a group supported statement saying,
“How the war dead are commemorated is determined according to each country’s own
culture and tradition. This long tradition of homage and commemoration is a matter of
national sovereignty and should not be subjected to distortion by outside interference and
propaganda” (Park, 2013). Likewise, Chairman of the National Public Safety
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Commission Cabinet Minister, Furuya Kiji who also attended, made a statement stating
that he did not wish to anger regional neighbors, only to fulfil his duty as a national Diet
member by praying for the peace of Japan and honoring their heroic fallen (Park, 2013).
Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal Affairs and Communications Minister claimed he
visited the Shrine on January 1, 2014 to, “pay respects to those who lost their lives in war
and to pray for peace” (Qatar News Agency, 2014).
The same year on August 15th, 2014 three Cabinet Ministers claimed their attendance
were private visits. Cabinet Minister Furuya stated, “It’s only natural to extend sincere
condolences to people who dedicated their lives to their country. I paid a visit to pray for
peace.” (Yoshida, 2014 c.).
The following year on August 15, 2015 in honor of the 70th anniversary of the end
of WWII, again three Cabinet Ministers made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine. Armura
Haruki, Minister of Women’s Empowerment, stated “I offered my prayers in the hopes
that Japan will continue to make efforts to contribute to the safety and peace of the
world.” (Osaki, 2015).
While Cabinet Ministers have participated in high ritual holidays, they have not
attended every one as noted in Figure 4 on October 17, 2014 and April 21, 2012. The
gathering of lawmakers at the Shrine has also incurred criticism from the South Korean
government, similar to the visits of prime ministers and cabinet members (Zheng, Ueda,
& Wang, 2015).
While not an elected government official, Abe’s wife, Akie, has also made public
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. On May 22, 2015, Mrs. Abe posted photos of herself in front
of the Shine to her official Facebook page with a caption saying her visit was in honor of
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the 70th anniversary of WWII. While paying her respects, Mrs. Abe stated she prayed and
reflected upon the pain and suffering endured by soldiers and their families (Kageyama,
2015). The First Lady made a second similar visit to the Shrine on August 19th again in
honor of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. Like her first visit, photos of her
second visit were also posted on her Facebook page (The Japan Times, 2015).
Many visits by lawmakers, cabinet members, and prime ministers are
accompanied by personal offerings to Yasukuni Shrine. Such offerings have included
monetary donations, tree branches from a sacred Shinto tree, wreaths, plaques, and
ordainments. Figure 5 shows the offerings made by Prime Ministers’ Koizumi and Abe
during their time in office.
Figure 5: Offerings made to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe
Prime Minister

Date

Type of Offering

Koizumi

August 13, 2001

$250 wreath with name and
title

Koizumi

April 21, 2002

Koizumi
Koizumi
Koizumi

January 15, 2003
January 1, 2004
October 17, 2005

Flowers
Flowers
Flowers

Koizumi

August 15, 2006

Flowers

Abe
Abe

December 23rd, 2013
April 21, 2014

Abe
Abe
Abe

August 15, 2014
October 17, 2014
April 21, 2015

Abe
Abe

August 15, 2015
October 15, 2015

$230 cash donation

(not stated by news reports)
Wooden plaque with his name
and title
Tamagushi tree branch
Tamagushi tree branch
Wooden plaque with his name
and title
Cash Offering
Tamagushi Tree branch

Event for Offering
Campaign Promise; Honoring
the end of WWII while avoiding
8-15
Campaign Promise; Annual
Spring Festival
Campaign Promise; New Year
Campaign Promise; New Year
Campaign Promise; Annual Fall
Festival
Campaign Promise; Anniversary
of end of WWII
Emperor’s Birthday
Annual Spring Festival
Commemoration of WWII
Annual Autumn Festival
Annual Spring Festival
Commemoration of WWII
Annual Autumn Festival

Koizumi presented offerings to Yasukuni Shrine during his personal visits (Strom,
2001; French, 2002; The Daily Yomiuri, 2004). Since his personal appearance, Abe has
routinely sent offerings in his place on key dates, such as the annual Spring and Autumn
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Festivals and August 15th. Offerings were accompanied at times by statements from Abe
such as on August 15, 2014 were he wished to, “extend sincere condolences to the people
who fought and died for the state and to pray for eternal peace” through his donation
(Yoshida, 2014 c.). Abe’s offerings have been identified as private donations by the
Japanese government (Sieg, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015).
Speeches and Pronouncements
The Japanese district courts have been involved with upholding Article 20, the
separation of church and state, in relation to the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni
Shrine. Beginning in 2004, 900 people have filed eight lawsuits with six district courts
seeking a court ruling on the constitutionality of Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine as Prime
Minister as well as compensation for mental anguish plaintiffs claimed they incurred due
to the annual visits (The Japan Times, 2005 b.).
Out of the eight lawsuits, only two district courts ruled that the visits by Koizumi
were unconstitutional, while all denied compensation to plaintiffs. In 2004, Fukuoka
District Court decided that the 2002 visit made by Koizumi was unconstitutional as his
appearance was made as a government official (The People’s Daily, 2004). Likewise, in a
case brought to the Osaka High Court by 236 people, comprised of Japanese and
Taiwanese citizens, also ruled that Koizumi’s visits from 2001-2004 to the Yasukuni
Shrine were unconstitutional because his attendance was carried out in an official manner
at a religious institution. The Yasukuni Shrine gave a public statement saying that the
court decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.). As evidenced through the
documentation of newspapers and the Yasukuni Shrine guest log, the court rulings did
not impact Koizumi’s annual visitation to the Shrine.
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Similar to Koizumi, the Osaka District Court also heard a case concerning Abe’s
2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The case was brought before the court by a group of 765
people comprised of Japanese and Korean citizens living in Japan. The plaintiffs sought
an injunction barring Abe from visiting the Shrine as well as compensation from him, the
Japanese government, and Yasukuni Shrine due to the violation of Article 20. The Court
dismissed the case. While it did not provide a verdict on the constitutionality of Abe’s
visits, it did release a statement saying that the Yasukuni Shrine has a different
significance than other shrines due to its history and that the act of visiting Yasukuni
Shrine does not impair another’s belief or life. Upon the Court’s dismissal, Hagiuda
Koichi, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated that the “state’s claims have been upheld”
while the Yasukuni Shrine welcomed the ruling as, “it hoped it would foster proper
historic understanding of the shrine among the greater public” (The Japan Times, 2016).
While the Japanese district courts have made pronouncements on the
constitutionality of visits by the Prime Minister, the Prime Ministers themselves have
also given speeches on their attendance to the Shrine. On the day of his first visit to
Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, Koizumi gave a statement declaring his remorse for the victims
of WWII and his pledge in the belief that Japan should never hold war again. He included
in his speech his decision not to attend the Shrine on August 15th, as he had originally
promised, as he felt a visit on that day would cast doubt on Japan’s denial of war and
pledge to cultivate peace. In addition to his announcement of a new visitation date,
Koizumi also called for meeting with the leaders of China and South Korea to discuss the
peace and development of the Asia-Pacific regions as well as the possibility of creating a
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process for peoples of the Asian region to pay respect while honoring feelings toward
Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery (Koizumi, 2001).
Koizumi again made a statement on the day of his second visit to the Shrine in
2002. In his reflection, Koizumi reaffirmed his visits’ intention of mourning those who
had given their lives for Japan as well as to once again promising to never resort to war.
Additionally, Koizumi mentioned that Yasukuni Shrine is a central institution for many
Japanese citizens to mourn the fallen and thus he had no intention of causing stress on
relations at home or abroad (Koizumi, 2002).
Koizumi continued to address international concern that was raised from his
annual appearance at Yasukuni Shrine by using a portion of his speech at the AsianAfrican summit in 2005 to reassert the understanding that Japan caused a great amount of
suffering to many people and states during WWII, promising that “…Japan squarely
faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and
heartfelt apology always engraved in mind…”, Japan moves forward in to the future
cultivating peace and prosperity at home and abroad (Koizumi, 2005).
Equivalent to his predecessor, Abe also gave a statement regarding his appearance
at the Shrine the same day after his visit. In his observation he stated that his attendance
was to pay respects and pray for the souls who made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of
Japan at Yasukuni Shrine and also Chinreisha National Cemetery, where he meditated on
the sufferings the fallen, as well as their families, had endured. Abe further stated that the
purpose of his visit was to also report to the souls of the war dead the progress of the first
year of his administration while renewing the pledge to uphold peace and never to wage
war again (Abe, 2013).
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While Abe has not currently made a second visit to Yasukuni Shrine, during a
plenary session of the House in February, 2015 Abe included in his speech
encouragement for Cabinet members to decide for themselves if they would like to attend
the Shrine or not. Abe stated, “It is natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit
Yasukuni Shrine to pay their respects to those who died for the country,” emphasizing the
importance of leaders paying their respects and praying for those who gave their lives on
behalf of Japan (JiJi., 2015).
Response to Challenges
Koizumi, Abe, and the Japanese government have responded to the various
criticism stemming from the appearance of active prime ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine.
Nearly All of the responses centered around the claim that prime ministers were visiting
the Shrine as private citizens, with no bearing on the issue of Article 20 or international
relations since they would be in their personal right to worship freely. While the visits to
the Shrine were publicized as private by the Japanese government and the politicians
themselves, for Koizumi his attendance did fulfill his campaign promise of attending the
Shrine every year while in office.
Koizumi was vocal in regards to the lawsuits levied against him by Japanese and
foreign citizens. After the first unconstitutional court ruling in 2004 by the Fukuoka
District Court, Koizumi declared that his visits to the Shrine were made in a private
capacity as a citizen, citing that the Japanese government had already asserted his visits
did not violate the Constitution. Within his statement, Koizumi lamented his uncertainty
as to why visits to Yasukuni Shrine elicit criticism as being unconstitutional whereas
visits to other shrines, such as the Ise Grand Shrines, do not-even though they are both
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considered religious places as shrines. Koizumi declared his visits were based on
personal beliefs; as such he would not change the style of his visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo also gave a statement in regards to the
Court ruling saying the Court’s decision went against the position of the government as it
believed the visits were made by Koizumi as a private citizen (The Daily Yomiuri, 2004).
The 2005 Osaka District Court’s verdict of unconstitutional visits prompted
Koizumi to again publically assert that he did not believe his visits to Yasukuni Shrine
violated the Constitution as he was not paying visits as an official and was confused as to
why the Court would make such a ruling. Koizumi declare that he ultimately won the
lawsuit while adding that the Court verdict would have no impact on his future decisions
to visit the Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine also gave a public statement saying the Court’s
decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.).
Prompted by the two district court rulings as well as the harsh disapproval from
regional neighbors, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a memo outlining
the basic position of the Japanese government toward Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine in
October 2005. The document reiterated Koizumi’s personal belief that Yasukuni Shrine is
a place of mourning to honor the war dead, emphasizing that his personal appearances at
the Shrine were as a private citizen. The message is also very clear in stating that the
belief of Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shine as a glorification of Japan’s aggressive
military past is wrong and further summarizes two of Koizumi’s public statements
describing Japan’s deep seeded feelings of remorse. The memo ends with declaring the
stability and prosperity of the East Asian region as one of Japan’s most important policy
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priorities and thus places great importance on friendly relations with regional neighbors
including South Korea and China (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not published a memo on Abe’s initial visit to
Yasukuni Shrine, however, Abe has altered the way he honors the war dead from
personal attendance to the donation of personal offerings on key dates, such as the
seasonal festivals and the anniversary of WWII, in response to severe reproach from
China and South Korea.
II. South Korean governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine
Memorials and Offerings
The South Korean government claims they view the Yasukuni Shrine as a
commemoration of Japan’s militaristic past. A sentiment often reiterated by South
Korean officials is that each visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese leaders glorifies the
atrocities that were committed against the Korean population by the Japanese state,
including the brutalities that occurred during the forced colonization period and crimes
committed during WWII.
South Korea maintains their own specific memorials and traditions
commemorating the war dead and notable evens of the past, but beyond the Comfort
Woman statue located outside of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, the state does not
maintain a memorial that receives negative attention from regional neighbors like that of
the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.
However, while the similarity between a physical South Korean memorial and a
Japanese memorial is non-existent, both states have an overlapping day of
commemoration. August 15th is observed as a national day of mourning in Japan,
commonly known as Surrender Day, since 1982 and honors Japan’s surrender to Allied
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forces and the Japanese war dead. Commemorations of this day include visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine by some and a memorial service commonly held at Nippon Budokan
Hall. The Emperor and his family commonly attend this ceremony due to the informal
hiatus with the Yasukuni Shrine (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002; O’Dwyer,
2010; Smith, 2015). Whereas in South Korea this day is celebrated, and referred to as,
National Liberation Day. National Liberation Day celebrates the end of the Japanese
colonization of the Korean peninsula. This national holiday is filled with official
ceremonies, parades, performances, and a key note address by the South Korean
president (Korea.net, 2012). While a comparison of a physical structure is not applicable
in this instance, the South Korean presidents have often used their key note address to
focus on the South Korean-Japanese relationship which has included criticism and
recommendation toward Japan on their shared history.
The government of South Korea maintains an online archive of presidential
speeches two administrations at a time. The two administrations currently available are
the Park and Lee, which span from 2008 to the present. Out of Lee’s five National
Liberation Day addresses, only his 2009 speech did not use explicit language to highlight
Japan’s military past. The other four, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012, contained pointed
statements toward Japan calling for such actions as, “Japan should face up to history and
refrain from making the foolish mistake of repeating the unfortunate past again today” in
his 2008 address (Lee, 2008) and “Japan has a responsibility to teach its young
generation the truth about what happened in the past” within the 2011 speech (Lee,
2011). The 2010 address was milder toward Japan on historical issues compared to the
other three speeches in that it only called for more to be done to resolve historical issues,
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citing a Japanese government apology on the forced colonization of the Korean peninsula
that year (Lee, 2010). Lee’s 2012 address was very critical of Japan as he cited the crime
committed against Comfort Women by the Japanese government in WWII and urged the
state to take “responsible measures in this regard” (Lee, 2012). While Lee did not
specifically address past visits to Yasukuni Shrine, his broad statements on historical
issues eluded to multiple concerns which encompasses the South Korean state’s alarm
over elite visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
As of this writing, President Park has currently given three National Liberation
Day speeches. Her first address in 2013 directly dealt with historical conflicts as she
stated;
…Yet the recent situation surrounding historical issues has cast a dark
shadow on the future of our two countries. In the absence of courage
enough to face the past and determination enough to care for another’s
pain, it will be difficult to build the trust necessary for our future.
… it is time for the political leaders of Japan to show us a leadership
of courage that seeks to bring healing for the wounds of the past.
Yi Am, a great scholar of the later Goryeo Kingdom, said the nation is
the body of a people and their history is their soul. What nation or
what people would consent to the affliction of their soul, or the taking
of any part of their body? Japan must confront this issue. I look
forward to seeing responsible and earnest action that will seek in
particular to heal the pain of those who, even now, carry with them the
scars of history (Park, 2013, 5).
Park’s first address set the tone for the rest of her keynote presentations as they did not
shy away from expressing negative opinions against the government of Japan’s actions
and attitudes toward historical events as well as pointedly requesting a change in the
behavior of Japan’s elite. 2014 marked the 49th anniversary of the South Korean-Japanese
relations, as such Park purposely included in her speech the statement, “It is now time to
set our sights on the next 50 years and start making progress toward future-oriented
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friendly, cooperative relations. To do so, efforts must be made to heal the wounds of
history that persist to this day. …Yet in Japan, the actions of some politicians have
caused rifts between our two peoples and brought serious pain” (Park, 2014). Likewise,
the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in 2015 provided Park with fodder to continue
the criticism of Japan, specifically of Abe’s address commemorating WWII, of which
Park found fault with as being less than what was hoped for in apologizing for past
atrocities. In her 2015 speech she also called for Abe to follow the lead of past Japanese
cabinets who have issued apologizes like that of the Kono Statement (Park, 2015).
President Park’s 2014 and 2015 National Liberation Day speeches specifically
mentioned the historical remembrance of Comfort Women but all of the addresses did not
exclude Yasukuni Shrine from the difficult relationship with Japan even though it was
not specifically mentioned.
Speeches and Pronouncements
Each time a Japanese prime minister personally visited Yasukuni Shrine,
statements of denouncement have been quickly produced from a spokesman of the South
Korean government. In response to Hashimoto’s 1996 visit, the South Korean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) released a statement the same day condemning his
appearance at the Shrine (The New York Times, 1996).
Due to Koizumi’s public campaign promises of an annual visit to Yasukuni
Shrine, in July 2001 before his first visit the same year, the South Korean Ambassador to
Japan, Choi Sang-yong, issued a statement to the press underling the impending negative
impact on South Korean-Japanese relations if such promises were to be carried out, “I
can only presume that Prime Minister Koizumi does not understand what kind of impact
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his visit has on countries in Asia” (Tolbert, 2001). After the visit, the MOFAT released a
public statement issuing deep regret and concern over the Koizumi’s attendance at the
Shrine where he paid respects to war criminals, “who destroyed world peace and inflicted
indescribable damage to the neighboring countries” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2001).
In an act of goodwill, on August 25th, 2001, twelve days after his visit to the
Shrine, Koizumi publically made known that he would like to meet with the leaders of
South Korea and China in an effort to smooth the tense relations that had begun to
develop due to the MEXT’s approval of a controversial textbook. The potential meeting
between Koizumi and current South Korean President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was
speculatively set to occur during the U.N. Special Session on Children in May, 2002.
Instead of publically rejecting Koizumi’s meeting request, Kim laid out preconditions
that Koizumi had to abide by before Kim would agree to a meeting. The terms required
Koizumi to issue a new apology that reaffirmed the 1998 Apology for Wartime Atrocities
published by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo (1988-2001) within the Japan-Republic of
Korea Joint Declaration, for Koizumi to adhere to the agreements contained within the
declaration, as well as publicly acknowledge that the decision by the majority of local
school boards within Japan not to use the controversial history textbook was the correct
choice in regards to the national approval of the text (Stuck, 2001).
The 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration details the public apology by
Obuchi where he expressed acknowledgement of the facts of history, through a spirit of
humility, that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of South
Korea through colonial rule, and expressed deep remorse over past actions (Japan
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). The declaration further details multiple avenues of
increased integration of South Korean and Japanese relations through cultural, economic,
and military activities. While the terms of a meeting set by Kim were acknowledged as
lofty by some reporters, ultimately, Koizumi never fully satisfied the preconditions to the
South Korean government’s approval. After his 2001 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Kim did
not hold one-on-one meetings with Koizumi while he was president (Stuck, 2001).
The MOFAT issued negative statements toward Koizumi and his personal
attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine after each visit from 2002 to 2004 under the Kim and
Roh administrations. These statements followed a similar structure of expressing regret
towards the visit due to the Shrine’s representation of Japan’s militarism and honor to
war criminals. The 2002 statement exemplifies this format in stating, “Our government
expresses deep regret toward Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni
shrine, which represents Japan’s militarism” (Los Angeles Times, 2002). In 2003 the
Foreign Minister included within the statement a call “for a sensible determination from
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government so as not to damage the
sentiments of the Koreans who suffered from the Japanese invasions” (South Korea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). Koizumi’s 2004 visit increased the hostile
verbiage used in a statement from the South Korean Foreign Ministry which read, “We
cannot understand why the Japanese prime minister continues to pay homage to war
criminals, and express much disappointment and anger that the national sentiments of the
Koreans have been damaged once again” and expressly called for Koizumi to end his
attendance at Yasukuni Shrine (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
2004).
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Visits to Yasukuni Shrine increased in sensitivity during 2005 as the year marked
the 60th anniversary of WWII’s end. While Koizumi did not attend the Shrine on August,
15th that year, his attendance in October was met with harsh criticism from the South
Korean government. The Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement of regret akin to
those issued before it and included a call for the Prime Minister and other Japanese
leaders to, “halt acts that nullify its apology and reflection of past wartime atrocities,” the
South Korean government also summoned Japan’s Ambassador and lodged a formal
protest (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005; Onishi, 2005 a.).
Likewise, Koizumi’s visit to the Shrine on August 15th, 2006, brought harsh
condemnation from the South Korean government and continued the standstill of high
level meetings that had been ongoing since 2001 (Faiola, 2006 b.). The Foreign Ministry
again issued a statement condemning Koizumi’s visits declaring such actions damaging
to South Korean-Japanese relations and urged Japanese leaders in “responsible” positions
not to “hinder the development of friendly relations” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2006).
While not formally in office, Abe’s visit in 2012 prompted a statement from
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Cho Tai-young, saying, “It is regrettable to
hear about the irresponsible behavior that ignores the feelings of the people in
neighboring countries, who have been victimized by Japanese imperialism in the past”
(FlorCruz, 2012).
2013 was a turbulent time in the South Korean-Japanese relationship in relation to
the issue of Yasukuni Shrine. Abe’s December, 2013 visit was the first by an acting
prime minister in seven years, the last visit occurring with Koizumi in 2006.
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Days before Abe’s 2013 visit, the Spokesperson on behalf of the South Korean
MOFA issued a public statement condemning the attendance of leading politicians and
cabinet members at the Shrine. The Spokesperson expressly stated that the visits were
deemed “deeply deplorable” and through the disregard of repeated concerns from South
Korea and the international community about governmental visits to Yasukuni Shrine,
Japan is physically illustrating that the government is still “turning a blind eye to their
history” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013).
In 2013, with the beginning of the Park Administration, the MOFAT began
issuing statements against the offerings made by Prime Minister Abe and visits by
Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. With Abe’s first offering on April 22, 2013 while as
Prime Minister, the South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Kim Kyou-hyun, lodged a formal protest with the Japanese
Ambassador on the, “latest retrograde comments and behaviors by the Japanese
government officials and political leaders”. In his formal protest Kim declared, “it is
completely incomprehensible that Japan, which deeply values honesty and trust, turns a
blind eye and a deaf ear to excruciating loss and pain that Japan inflicted on neighboring
countries through its aggression and colonial rule” further adding a call for Japanese
leaders to reflect on past atrocities and in correct actions for the future (South Korea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013). Such sentiments were reiterated again on
August 15 and October 17th, 2015 by an official statement by the MOFAT (South Korea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 c. and d.).
Abe’s personal attendance at the Shrine elicited even greater criticism from the
South Korean government. While the MOFAT issued a statement expressing “deep
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concerns and regret” the same day as Abe’s visit (Yamaguchi, Gillian,& Lee, 2013)
President Park also issued a public statement where she declared, “Japan needs to face up
to the issues of history, I expect the country to take responsible and sincere measures to
alleviate the agony of those living in pain, and scarred by history” (Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Additionally, South Korea’s Minister of Culture,
Sports, and Tourism, Yoo Jin-ryong, broadcasted his message against Abe’s visit live on
television where he stated, Abe’s visit was an “anachronistic act” that “hurts not only the
ties between South Korea and Japan but also fundamentally damages the stability and cooperation in Northeast Asia” (Yamaguchi, Gillian,& Lee, 2013).
While Abe has not visited Yasukuni Shrine since December, 2013, the political
leadership of South Korea has continued to strongly scrutinized and criticized current
events involving the Shrine since his attendance. In 2014 the MOFAT issued public
statements against Abe’s offering to Yasukuni Shrine for the annual Spring and Fall
Festivals as well as on August 15th saying it deplores the offering to the Shrine that
glorifies “Japan’s colonization and invasive war” adding that “Japan should move
forward to a bright future based on serious reflection on the past, not locking itself in the
dark past” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014 a., b., c.;
Adamczyk, 2014).
2015 also brought statements against Abe’s offerings and Japanese leaders’ visits
to the Shrine. Statements of public denouncements and regret were issued on April 22,
August 15th, and October 17th against the honoring of Japan’s militaristic past and war
criminals which caused devastating harm to the South Korean population and Asian
neighbors. Given the public attention that was directed toward the Japanese government
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that year due to the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII with the anticipated apology
from Abe, the MOFAT also included within their criticisms that without proper actions
and reflection such public statements of regret are hollow (South Korea Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 a., b., c.).
Response to Challenges
On August 13th, 2001, 20 men stood in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to
protest the impending visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine. During
the public demonstration the 20 men chopped off one of their little fingers as an act of
defiance towards Koizumi’s decision to voluntarily visit the Shrine (Prusher, 2001).
Such a strong negative reaction within the public illustrates a deeply held adverse belief
of the Yasukuni Shrine within the South Korean population.
While there currently is no record of an active government official participating in
self-mutilation in response to Japanese officials visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the South
Korean government has vigorously acted to deter Japanese Officials, specifically prime
ministers, from using the Shrine as a place of commemoration. In 2001, after Koizumi’s
first visit to Yasukuni Shrine, President Kim Dae-jung refused to meet with the Japanese
Prime Minister until Kim’s list of conditions were met (Stuck, 2001). This standoff
between Kim and Koizumi lasted beyond Kim who he left office in 2003. When Roh
Moo-hyun became president in 2003 he chose to continue the status quo of impasse due
to visitations to the Yasukuni Shrine until 2005. 2005 was the 60th anniversary of the end
of WWII as well as the 40th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two
states. In an effort to end the stalemate, President Roh met with Koizumi for two hours in
Seoul discussing ways to move beyond historical issues. Roh had emphasized that visits
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by government officials to Yasukuni Shrine was “the core of the history related problems
between the two countries” and pressed for the creation of an alternate facility to
commemorate the fallen of Japan without war criminals. No agreement was reached from
the meeting and South Korea and Japan were again at a standstill on head of state
meetings (Onishi, 2005 a.).
On August 5, 2013 Cho Tai-young, the MOFAT Spokesperson, released a public
request asking Japanese officials to abstain from visiting Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th.
Cho’s appeal stated, “Worshipping at the Yasukuni Shrine by the Japanese government
and political leaders is something that should not happen. The stance of our government
is clear and known to the world” (United Press International, 2013).
While attendance by Japanese lawmakers occurred even though the MOFAT
Spokesperson requested officials to withhold their public visit, a strong governmental
response was enacted as a result of Abe’s personal attendance in 2013. Coupled with the
many vocal denouncements of his visit, the South Korean Defense Ministry cancelled
multiple defense meetings and military exchange programs that were scheduled for the
following year (Emirates News Agency, 2013). President Park also added Abe’s visit to
Yasukuni Shrine as an additional reason to prolong withholding heads of state meetings
with Japan (Xinhua, 2014).
Meetings between Park and Abe did not occur until November 1, 2015 where the
leaders met to discuss accelerating talks on repairing the strained relationship that stems
from historical grievances. The meeting was an effort to protect other areas of the South
Korean-Japanese affiliation such as economic interests and military collaboration. Park
went into the meeting “calling for Japan to heal the painful history” while Abe advocated
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for South Korea to look toward the future. While the meeting was a break from Park’s
Administration’s staunch stance against engagements with Abe until Japanese leaders
acknowledged past wrongs, no issues were resolved at this meeting (Choe, 2015).
III. Chapter Analysis
Similar to the historical issue of Comfort Women, leaders in South Korea and
Japan have been actively involved in the remembrance of the past in regards to Yasukuni
Shrine and in promoting how they believe the Shrine should be viewed by the Asian
region and the world. Figure 3 below illustrates the position of government officials and
their involvement with the historical issue of Yasukuni Shrine.
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Figure 6: Position of Government action in relation to the remembrance at Yasukuni
Shrine
Japan
Number of Gov’t Actions
901

Officials Involved
14 actions: Prime Minister

Category
Memorials and Offerings

29 actions: Cabinet Ministers
858 actions: Lawmakers and
lower political leaders*

13

5 actions: Prime Minister

Speeches and
Pronouncements

8 actions: Japanese District
Court

5

3 actions: Prime Minister

Response to Challenges

1 action: Cabinet Minister
1 actions: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Event Description
1.PM Hashimoto visited once in
1996
2.PM Koizumi visited each year
from 2001-2006
3.PM Abe visited once in 2013
4.PM Abe made 6 offerings from
2013-2015
5.Public newspapers indicated
there were 29 visits by Cabinet
Ministers from 2006-2007, 2009,
and 2012-2015
6.Public newspapers indicated
that 858 lawmakers attended the
Shrine between 2006-2007, 2009,
2012-2015
1.Koizumi’s Observation on 2001
visit
2.Koizumi’s Observation on 2002
visit
3.Koizumi’s Speech at the AsianAfrican Summit 2005
4.Abe’s Observation on 2013
visit
5.Abe’s encouragement of
cabinet members to visit
Yasukuni during House Plenary
meeting 2015
6.6 Constitutional visit rulings
7.Unconstitutional visit rulings
1.2 responses from Koizumi due
to unconstitutional court rulings,
2004 and 2005
2.Abe alters the way he pays
respects at Yasukuni from visits
to offerings
3.Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda
statement that the 2004 court
ruling went against the
government’s position
4.Ministry of Foreign Affairs
memo on the Basic Position of
the Japanese government toward
Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni
2005

*Newspapers have highlighted visits by political leaders during the years that a prime minister attended the Yasukuni
Shrine, or due to tense statements denouncing such visits from regional neighbors like South Korea. Given the Japanese
tradition of political leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine that dates back to the Meiji era, the number of cabinet members
and lawmakers in attendance from 1988 to 2015 is probably much higher than what is gathered here.
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South Korea
Number of Gov’t Actions
7

19

Officials Involved
7 actions: President

Category
Memorials and Offerings

2 actions: President

Speeches and
Pronouncements

3 actions: Cabinet
Ministers/Ambassadors
14 actions: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

6

4 actions: President

Response to Challenges

1 action: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
1 action: Cabinet Ministers

Event Description
1.Lee’s National Liberation Day
Speeches 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012
2.Park’s National Liberation Day
Speeches 2013, 2014, 2015
1.Pres. Kim Dae Jung issue
preconditions for a Leaders of
State meeting between himself
and PM Koizumi 2001
2.Pres. Park public statement
against Abe’s 2013 visit
3.South Korean Ambassador to
Japan’s statement against PM
Koizumi’s impending 2001 visit
4.Formal protest lodged with
Japan’s Ambassador to South
Korea, 2005
5.Minister of Culture, Sports, and
Tourism broadcasts live message
against Abe’s visit 2013
6.Pronouncement against PM
Hashimoto’s 1996 visit
7.Pronouncement against PM
Koizumi’s 2001-2006 visits
8.Statement of regret over
Abe’s2012 visit to Yasukuni
while Abe was out of Office as
prime minister
9.Pronouncement condemning
attendance of Japanese leaders at
Yasukuni 2013
10.Statement of deep concern and
regret over Abe’s 2013
appearance
11.Issues statements deploring
Abe’s offerings and lawmakers
visits to the Shrine 2013-2015
Spring and Autumn Festival
1.Pres. Dae Jung stops State
leader meetings with Koizumi
2.Pres. Roh stops visits with
Koizumi
3.Roh meets with Koizumi to try
and reach an agreement over
Yasukuni 2005
4.Park refuses to meet with Abe
5.Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade public request for
Japanese officials not to visit
Yasukuni 2013
6.Defense Ministry cancels
defense meetings and exchange
programs for 2014 in response to
Abe’s 2013 visit

Both governments have an all-of-government approach with multiple persons and
offices addressing the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Top offices initiate the event of
concern and respond to the action of the other. Within the South Korean state, Japan is
portrayed as the sole perpetrator of the issue, in an effect of othering, where Japan is the
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villain by glorifying past wrongs through visitations and offerings by leaders to Yasukuni
Shrine. Likewise, the Japanese government differentiates itself from other Asian nations
by promoting Yasukuni Shrine as a uniquely Japanese place of worship and respect for
Japanese people while justifying the promotion and action of visitation by relating it to
the rights of every other nation to honor their dead. Both states actively embrace the
concept of nationalism in promoting the good or evil of Yasukuni Shrine in relation to
their population, or in group.
Within the case study of events surrounding the Shrine, it is evident that speeches
and pronouncements were the largest area for the South Korean government in
addressing the issue, in part, due to Yasukuni Shrine’ s location in Japan. However, the
Japanese government and political leaders also worked to define their actions through
government statements and press interviews. Since there is data on the statements and
words used to describe the Yasukuni Shrine, a comparison was charted to analyze the
similarity, difference, frequency of political actors engaging in public communication
about the Shrine, and the medium in which the message was delivered to the public. The
full chart comparison is located in appendix K. Figure 7 below is a summary of the
larger comparison of the type of words used between the two states and how it was
presented to the public. The selection of statements under review were taken from the
accounts presented within the case study, however, many of the assertions used in the
chart were taken out of larger documents or statements as to gain more focus on the
sections specifically related to Yasukuni Shrine. For the chart summary, phrases relating
to the Yasukuni Shrine were organized by statement idea and at times exact words used.
The statements are also organized by the way in which they were delivered. Official
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government statements refers to accounts written and released directly from the
government itself while statements to newspapers refers to the causal interactions with
newspapers by government officials where they are not necessarily highlighting their
governmental role or asserting their personal opinion. A chart was not created to analyze
smaller portions of the event data, as was conducted in chapter 2 on Japanese apologies,
as there was believed to be not as many similar occurrences between the different
categories in which to equally compare, since all of the categories hinged on state leaders
visits or offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Figure 7: Summary of the comparison of Government Statements regarding the Yasukuni
Shrine
Japan: 12 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine
Number of statements from Gov Officials

PM Abe: 4
PM Koizumi: 2
Cabinet Minister Furuya: 2
Minister Armura: 1
Cabinet Minister Noda: 1
Group of Lawmakers: 1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
1
Osaka District Court: 1

Occurrence of Descriptors

Died in the battle for
country: 7
Promise to never wage war
again: 6
To express mourning: 3
To express remorse: 2
To express condolences: 2
To express my belief: 2
Natural to visit: 2
Honor victims of war: 2
Duty of a Diet member: 1
Different significance than
other shrines: 1
Country’s own culture and
tradition: 1
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Medium of Delivery

Official Government
statements: 4
Statements to Newspapers:
9

South Korea: 21 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine
Number of statements from Gov Officials

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade: 18
Ministry of Culture , Sports,
and Tourism: 1
President Park: 1
Ambassador to Japan, Choi
Sang Yong: 1

Occurrence of Descriptors

Call for sincere response
from PM and Japanese
government: 16
Honor national sentiments
of neighbor countries: 12
Call for the correct
understanding of history: 11
People and countries
suffered as a result of
Japan’s invasion and
imperialism: 7
Praying to/Honoring war
criminals: 2
Visits impact countries in
Asia:1
Visits are disappointing: 1
Visits cause anger: 1

Medium of Delivery

Official Government
statements: 17
Statements to Newspapers:
3
Broadcast on Television: 1

Figure 7 shows that the South Korean officials’ dominant form of communication
concerning the Shrine is by official government statements. Out of 17 instances, only
three are not government statements but government officials making comments to the
press. However, in Japan’s communication out of 13 instances only four were made as an
official government statement while nine were made as statements to the press.
Additionally, the message relayed by Japanese political leaders did not have as
similar messages as did the South Korean leaders. The largest similarity in the statements
from Japanese leaders were on the ideas of “to never wage war again” and “for those who
died in battle” while those were only found in six and seven instances of the messages,
respectfully. The difference in wording of the message could be that as a religious
institution the Shrine holds different meaning to every person. However, in this
difference of meaning, the Shrine’s portrayal either as a place to remember and promote
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peace or as a national memorial may not be uniformly agreed upon within Japanese
political leaders as the ideas, “Natural to visit,” “Duty of a Diet member,” and “Country’s
own culture and tradition,” which reflect more of the Shrine being a national memorial,
combined marks four instances which places it in the top three of common ideas
delivered.
The South Korean leaders had very similar messages which is due in part to the
majority of communication on the Shrine being delivered from the MOFAT. The most
common idea was the “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister and Japanese
government leaders” while “Honor national sentiments of neighbor countries” was
second, followed closely by the “Call for the correct understanding of history.” The
majority of messages with the idea of “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister
and Japanese government leaders” instead of the “call for the correct understanding of
history” reflects that the South Korean government views the physical action of visiting
or worshipping at the Shrine as more offensive than the incorrect understanding of
history behind the action.
For Japan such a governmental silence on the issue of Yasukuni Shine
demonstrates an approval of the Shrine as being a personal decision for Japanese citizens
which also upholds the various arguments of Koizumi and Abe on Yasukuni Shrine.
Likewise, from the statements of Abe and Koizumi, the “natural duty” of Japanese
lawmakers to pay respects at the Shrine has not been met with any denouncement from
the Japanese state. As demonstrated by lawmakers’ statements to public newspapers
coupled with the various statements from prime ministers there is an idea that it is good
for a Japanese leader to pay respects at the Shrine.
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It’s important to also note Koizumi’s promise of attending Yasukuni Shrine
during his campaign for election as Prime Minister. While this promise may not have
been the whole basis of his argument for election, however, such a promise illustrates the
use of historical memory as a tool to gain public opinion and support in obtaining
political power.
The majority of governmental responses from the MOFAT tend to follow the
same structure and wording. Exemplifying this similarity are the statements issued on
Koizumi’s visits from 2002-2004 whose wording are nearly identical. Statements from
the MOFAT and other governmental officials increased in severity in 2013 before Abe’s
visit to the Shrine, beginning with the MOFAT statement against offerings and
lawmakers’ visits along with the governmental protest from the 1st Vice Foreign
Minister’s summons of Japan’s Ambassador over Japan’s wrong perception of history in
April, 2013.
Whereas the South Korean government issued statements against lawmakers and
Prime Ministers’ attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine, under Park’s administration the state
included offerings made by Prime Minister Abe. The expanse of criticism from the South
Korean state to include offerings correlates with the strong stance President Park’s
Administration initiated upon the start of her presidential term.
With the timely statements against the involvement of prime ministers and
lawmakers at the Yasukuni Shrine, the South Korean government has portrayed such
responses as duties of the state. The state has championed the specific time period of
colonialism of South Korea and atrocities of WWII, relating such violence back to the
oppression of Japanese forces. The specific focus on a certain period of time highlights
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the specific memory the Korean government’s wishes to remember and the way in which
they want it remembered; through a narrative of victimization. The framing of
victimization allows the South Korean government to bolster nationalism in that the
government, through political parties, are creating an environment based on a uniquely
Korean experience that must be made right before time ends for those who had a
firsthand account of brutalities.
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I.

Manipulation of Historical Memory within History Textbooks
In his popular novel, 1984, George Orwell penned the statement, “Who controls

the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1949, 35;
Kim, Moon, & Joo, 2013, 1). Orwell’s quote encompasses the contention innate within
history textbooks as these educational materials are a tool utilized by the state to cultivate
loyal citizens. According to Heiko Paabo, every state develops a national narrative that is
used to guide the writing of history textbooks. As he states, the national narrative
“provides the general framework explaining what the nation is, where it comes from, and
what its future is;” this includes inundating the younger generation and new citizens with
shared values, norms, and beliefs which shape their national identity (Paabo, 2014). This
framed understanding is presented within the educational system as legitimate, accurate
knowledge (Schneider, 2008).
The development of national identity, which is advanced through the national
narrative, is the primary object of history textbooks, where the national narrative is
presented. Elites define and give meaning to the collective memories held by a
population, which are then used to help craft the narrative through connecting the past to
the present (Paabo, 2014), similar to the concept of historical memory. Thus, political
agendas influence textbook content in an effort to achieve specific goals such as shaping
national identity and cultivating patriotism or nationalism (Shin & Sneider, 2011). This
political influence inevitably effects the selection of events as well as their description
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(Paabo, 2014). Shin Gi-wook claims that “vocabulary is significant in describing events
in the creation of national identity” as the overall story of a textbook, through the “events
described,” leads students to a very distinct understanding of the past which in turn
influences their current worldview and potential future of the state. The power of history
textbooks in shaping the population and the potential future fuels the anger within the
parties involved in a history textbook dispute (Shin & Sneider, 2011).
In addition to the political burden they are endowed with, textbooks are inherently
political as they gain a “quasi-official” character in representing the voice of the state
through the involvement of the government in control mechanisms. The process of
approval or regulating textbooks occurs not only in a system of state sponsored texts but
also in pluralistic textbook systems, which ultimately empowers history textbooks with
the near official status beyond whatever system is implemented (Yi, 2009). This
representation of the voice of the state has the potential of spurring tense relations
between countries due to the idea of a government’s acceptance and promotion of what
others may believe is an incorrect understanding of the past.
As described in chapter 1, both Japan and South Korea maintain a pluralistic
textbook system where the Ministry of Education outlines general topics that are to be
included in the text that are written by private publishers. In each state, the final approval
of the privately produced educational material lies with the Ministry of Education. The
texts that are approved are provided to the schools without charge as the respective
governments bear the burden of printing costs (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science & Technology, 2014; South Korea Ministry of Education, 2008).
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Beyond the information constraints set forth by governments, the physical format
of textbooks also plays a role in how history is portrayed to the intended audience. In
Japan, history textbooks are limited to 220 pages and are required to go over the
country’s entire history which spans approximately 1,300 years (Shin & Sneider, 2011).
While the page limit enables the Japanese government to regulate printing costs, the
expanse of the time frame required for history textbooks coupled with the traditional
year-round school calendar, limits the amount of time educators are able to spend on each
era. Additionally, with the cultural pressure of college entrance exams, “teaching to the
exam” is also a common practice throughout the Japanese educational system which adds
a level of distortion to the history presented (Shin & Sneider, 2011).
South Korea faces many of the same challenges with textbooks that Japan does
such as the government’s burden of financing textbook printing and the cultural emphasis
on entrance exams. However, South Korea’s recent history of military dictatorship and
authoritative rule after liberation in 1945 has had a lasting impact on the educational
system. In 1974, Dictator Park Chung-hee set up a system of state controlled history
textbooks where the government wrote and published the educational text used in
schools. This state production of history textbooks was not revised until 2003 under
President Roh Moo-hyun when the current system, as of this writing, was set in place for
a more liberal and pluralistic educational framework (Denny, 2015).
The history textbook controversy between Japan and South Korea centers on
events that occurred during WWII and how they are portrayed within educational
material, as well as a the territorial dispute of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands.5 While
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The Takeshima/Dokdo Islands are a grouping of uninhabited land formations within the East Sea located
between Japan and South Korea. The area provides valuable fishing locations. Both countries claim
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Japan and South Korea were involved in the same war, they had vastly different
experiences largely due to the colonization of the Korean peninsula by Japan which has
shaped the nations’ view of the past. With the retelling of history, Shin claims, “Involved
nations are simultaneously bound together and separated by distinct-often contradictory
historical accounts and perceptions” (Shin & Sneider, 2011).
South Korea’s history textbooks concerning this time period focus on its own
nation’s plight during WWII with comparatively little mention of the ensuing battles and
destruction outside of the peninsula (Shin & Sneider, 2011). Japan’s textbooks, likewise,
place strong emphasis on what Alexander Bukh describes as “Japanese victimhood”
which delineates between the Imperial military as perpetrators and the Japanese
population as victims of the military’s transgressions. Before 1982, Japanese textbooks
focused largely on Japanese victimhood with limited information on regional neighbors’
suffering. After 1982, textbooks increased the incorporation of regional neighbors’
sufferings and the complacency of the Japanese public (Bukh, 2007). However, the
vocabulary used to describe these events has become points of contention domestically in
Japan and abroad which relate back to the concept of national identity formation and the
potential future of the state. This tension over vocabulary has led some history textbooks
within Japan to become more reflective of a time table of events, lessoning the national
narrative but adding to the burden of the educator in disseminating historical
understanding (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

ownership of the islands and both use historical documents dating back thousands of years to state their
claim; South Korea claims Japan recognized the formations as Korean territory in 1696 stemming from a
skirmish between Korean and Japanese fishermen. South Korea has occupied the islands with a coastguard
detachment since 1954 (BBC World News, 2012).
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Textbook controversies between Japan and South Korea first began in 1982,
ignited by a prominent Japanese historian’s challenge of Japan’s textbook approval
system, charging that it was a form of censorship (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.).
Ienaga Saburo filed his first of three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) in 1965 for suppressing intellectual freedom
when his history textbook was rejected for containing “too many illustrations of the ‘dark
side’ of the war, such as an air raid, a city left in ruins by the atomic bomb, and disabled
veterans” (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.). In 1982, Ienaga’s textbook was again
rejected by the MEXT with recommended changes to 41 different passages that included
softening words used to describe the Japanese military action during WWII such as
replacing “aggression” to “advancement.” The Japanese press had been closely following
the textbook approval process that year, and unlike the 1965 rejection, Japan’s regional
neighbors picked up on the 1982 denial of Ienaga’s text (Woods Masalski, 2002).
North and South Korea, along with China, responded to the MEXT’s dismissal
with public and formal protests from the respective governments and populations.
Additionally, Vietnam also formally requested changes to approved textbooks. The
Japanese government responded to the large outcry by sending senior LDP Diet leaders
to South Korea and senior MEXT officials to the Chinese government to explain the
MEXT’s decision of accepting and denying the year’s textbooks (Shin & Sneider, 2011).
In addition to the government visits, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi
also issued a statement to help smooth diplomatic relations with South Korea and China
the same year. In his statement, Miyazawa acknowledged that the Japanese educational
system and textbook authorization process should keep the same spirit of humility in
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regards to past atrocities that is contained within the Joint Communiques, issued between
the respective countries and Japan when relations normalized after WWII. To achieve
this end, Miyazawa promised that Japan, “will pay due attention” to criticisms from
neighboring countries from a “perspective of building friendship and goodwill.”
Miyazawa further stated that the guidelines for textbook authorization would be revised
and future textbooks would also, “give due consideration” to criticisms from regional
neighbors. Miyazawa’s complete statement can be found in appendix L. (Miyazawa,
1982; appendix L). Miyazawa’s statement is known as the Neighboring Countries Clause
and continues to provide a basis, according to Daniel Sneider, for “Asian nations to
intervene regarding the content of Japanese textbooks” (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 249).
The year 1986, the culmination of the traditional four year cycle of textbook
authorizations in Japan, also brought another round of controversy. The “National
Conference to Defend Japan” was formed after the publication of the Neighboring
Countries Clause in 19826 and promised to publish its own textbook that year. According
to Sneider, in September, 1986 the National Conference to Defend Japan submitted their
textbook to the MEXT and received approval due to political pressure (Shin & Sneider,
2011).
The adoption of this text once again prompted outcries from the South Korean and
Chinese governments as the countries contended the textbook did not adequately address
the Japanese atrocities committed against their nations in WWII, citing the Neighboring

6

Miyazawa’s statement, known as the Neighboring Countries Clause, required the textbook authorization
process in Japan to take regional neighbors’ concerns as well as objections to textbook content under
careful advisement before any text is published. This clause provides neighboring countries with an official
pathway to submit apprehensions and recommendations for change to the MEXT on any pending textbook.
A channel for regional involvement within the MEXT’s textbook approval process had not been available
until the publication of the Neighboring Countries Clause in 1982. (Yi, 2009).
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Country Clause. Frustrated by the criticisms made by South Korea and China as well as
the new constraints of consideration by the Neighboring Countries Clause, Education
Minister Fujio Masayuki made public comments denying the wrongdoing associated with
the Nanjing Massacre, questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials, and claimed the
colonialization of Korea was mutually agreed upon by the Korean and Japanese
government. This was the third of such comment by the Education Minister who had
taken office in July, 1986. The South Korean government lodged a formal complaint
concerning the comments, cancelled multiple scheduled foreign ministers meetings, and
threatened to cancel an official visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to Seoul in honor of the
opening of the Asia games. Fujio was removed from office for his remarks and lack of
incorporation of the Neighboring Country Clause (Jameson, 1986; Shin & Sneider,
2011).
II. Japanese government’s use of history textbooks
The Neighboring Countries Clause was first used in Japan after the Japanese
Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign was brought to light in 1991.
Beginning in 1992, approved history textbooks all contained some reference to Comfort
Women and increased the portrayal of regional neighbors’ history. However, the
incorporation of multiple understandings of the past within history textbooks also spurred
the growth of conservative organizations with the mission of creating textbooks that are
more “balanced” in comparison to regional histories as well as casting Japan’s own
history in a more positive light (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 251).
In 1997, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Japanese Society)
was created with the mission of countering textbooks that are “biased against Japan,”
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promote “self-denigration” within the Japanese population, while promoting a “healthy
form of nationalism” (Prusher, 2001 c.; The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The Japanese Society
has been a leader in the campaign of creating a “balanced” history within Japanese
schools through the publication of texts that heavily casts Japan’s history in a positive
light. The Japanese Society’s textbooks have been approved every year of the textbook
approval cycle since 2001. This organization maintains an objective of having its
textbooks in 10% of Japanese public schools (The Japan Times, 2005 a.).
Speeches and Pronouncements
Japan’s history textbook controversies did not end in 1986. Since 1988, there have
been 15 controversial events within Japan concerning the content of history textbooks.
Figure 8 below outlines the events which occurred during the 1988 to 2015 time frame.
Figure 8. Japanese Textbook Incidents 1988-2015
Year
Controversy
1995

1995 Murayama Statement

2001

Textbook Approval
nd

Government
Agency
Prime
Minister
MEXT

Administration
Murayama

Political
Party
SDP

Koizumi

LDP

2001

MEXT Denies 2 Textbook Review

MEXT

Koizumi

LDP

2005

Textbook Approval

MEXT

Koizumi

LDP

2007

Deletion of Imperial Military’s role in Okinawa Mass
Suicides within Textbooks

Abe

LDP

2009

Educational Program to Increase Education on Japan’s
Territorial Claims

Aso

LDP

2009

Textbook Approval

Prime
Minister
MEXT
Prime
Minister
MEXT
MEXT

Aso

LDP

2012

Textbook Approval

MEXT

Noda

DJP

2012

Abe’s mission of “restoring the country’s self”

Abe

LDP

2013

National involvement in Local Textbook Adoption

Prime
Minister
MEXT

Abe

LDP

2013

Proposed new Textbook Screening Standards

Abe

LDP

2013

MEXT Advisory Committee proposal to reject texts that do
not foster patriotism

Minister of
Education
MEXT

Abe

LDP

2014

New Screening Standards for textbooks Approved

MEXT

Abe

LDP

2015

Japanese Diplomats speak with U.S. Virginia Lawmakers

MOFA

Abe

LDP

2015

Abe publicly denounces U.S. History textbook

Prime

Abe

LDP
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Minister

As textbooks began to change in light of the 1992 Neighboring Countries Clause,
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi went further to advance the diversity of perspectives
within Japan’s compulsorily education through his 1995 WWII commemoration address.
His statement focused on the remembrance of history as he apologized for Japan’s past
actions and urged reflection on the lessons learned from atrocities to promote peace and
democracy, and to, “foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and
trust” (Murayama, 1995). Murayama subsequently launched the Peace, Friendship and
Exchange Initiative to cultivate this “deep understanding and trust” between Japan and its
neighbors which supported historical research into their respective joint modern relations.
Murayama’s full statement can be found in Appendix M (Murayama, 1995; appendix M).
The expanded exchange program included the participation of educators in the
compulsory education system as well as professors from multiple universities (Prusher,
2001 a.). Murayama’s statement continues to guide Japan’s involvement with the past as
purported by the MOFA (Suga, 2014).
Progress continued to be made within history textbooks on the content and
description of events related to other nations until 2001, as Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichiro began his first year in office. In 2001, the MEXT approved a controversial
history textbook authored by the Japanese Society, entitled New History Textbook, for
junior high schools. The New History Textbook had been described as controversial by
news media following the textbook approval process as it left out pertinent details of
Japanese actions during WWII; including the history of Comfort Women, and insinuating
that Korea had supported and benefited from Japanese occupation (French, 2001). The
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textbook’s approval resulted in violent public protests within South Korea as well as
harsh responses from Seoul. Likewise, Japanese teachers’ unions carried out a mass
public campaign against the New History Textbook’s use in public schools (Prusher, 2001
a.). One of the Japanese Society’s leading members responded to criticism saying the
textbook, “merely balances out a distorted view of history and presents a more
appropriate picture for young students” (Prusher, 2001 a.).
Citing the Neighboring Countries Clause, the South Korean government
demanded 25 changes to the Japanese Society textbook and petitioned the MEXT for a
second review. The MEXT granted the second review but only accepted two of the 25
changes cited by the South Korean government. The two accepted changes concerned
aspects of ancient history; no history of the 20th century was revised. The South Korean
government challenged the MEXT’s second review and pushed further for the acceptance
of the full 25 changes. Further reviews were denied by the Japanese government (French,
2001).
In the 2002-2005 textbook cycle, the Japanese Society’s textbook was only used
by six out of 532 public school districts, missing the organization’s goal of the textbook
being in 10% of schools by a large margin at 0.04% (Prusher, 2001 c.). However, while
the MEXT did not push additional revisions on the Japanese Society textbook beyond the
two accepted from the South Korean government’s demand, the authors voluntarily made
nine revisions, after the book become a national best seller, which included removing
suggestions that Korea supported colonization (French, 2001).
In 2005, as Prime Minister Koizumi was nearing the end of his time in office, the
Japanese Society’s history textbook was marginally revised and submitted again for
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approval to the MEXT for the next round of junior high school textbooks. While
revisions were made before submission, the text still downplayed atrocities that occurred
during WWII, did not mention Comfort Women history, and claimed Japanese ownership
of the Dokdo Islands (The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The same year, Shimane Prefecture
declared February 22 as “Takeshima Day,” incorporating various forms of celebration in
honor of Japan’s ownership of the Takeshima/Dokdo islands (Konishi, 2005). Takeshima
Day sparked outrage within the South Korean public and government (BBC World News,
2012) and has aided in enhancing the Dokdo claims within educational resources.
While the New History Textbook contained the most controversial portrayal of
history, seven out of the eight history textbooks approved that year also did not mention
Comfort Women, a change in the trends that began in 1992. Similar to the reaction in
2001, the MEXT’s approval of the New History Textbook once again ignited violent
protests and harsh responses from the South Korean public and government (Sakamaki,
2005). With their approved book, the Japanese Society still did not meet its 10% school
adoption rate, however, use of the textbook in public schools increased to 0.44% that year
compared to the 0.04% use in 2001 (Nakamura, 2005).
Abe had praised the MEXT’s approval of the Japanese Society’s textbook as he
entered office as Prime Minister in 2006. He claimed the lessons contained in the book
were tools for creating a “more confident nation” (Faiola, 2006 a.). During his campaign
for office, Abe had made the objective of increasing patriotism within education part of
his platform; promising to enact a “sweeping education bill” that would strengthen the
idea of patriotism within Japan’s school system during his tenure as Prime Minister
(Faiola, 2006 a.; Vries, 2006).
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Abe’s textbook reforms began most notably in early 2007, during the beginning
of the textbook screening process, as the MEXT ordered publishers to delete sections in
history textbooks that stated the Imperial Army was responsible for ordering civilians to
commit mass suicide during the Battle of Okinawa (Norimitsu, 2007 a.). During WWII,
as the war was nearing its conclusion, Okinawans had been indoctrinated by the Japanese
military to believe the lie that suicide would be a preferable death than being slaughtered
by the advancing Allied forces (Norimitsu, 2007 b.). Public protests within Okinawa
against the revision erupted after the MEXT’s announced the new requirements. Abe
publicly responded to criticism of political involvement regarding the exclusion stating,
“I believe the screening system has been followed appropriately.” (Norimitsu, 2007 a.).
However, after Abe stepped down as Prime Minister in October, 2007 (succeeded by
Fukuda Yasuo), the MEXT reconsidered the earlier requirements of silence on Japanese
military involvement to softer language of involvement (Norimitsu,” 2007 b.).
Similar to the controversial textbook approvals in in 2001, and 2005, in early
2009, the New History Textbook was once again approved by the MEXT, while Aso Taro
was Prime Minister. The 2009 version of the textbook still maintained the controversial
issues that many consider to be “whitewashing” history in Japan’s favor. The 2009
approval once again saw public South Korean protests and incurred harsh responses from
the South Korean government (UPI, 2009).
The beginning of the 2012 textbook screening process brought the textbook
controversy to the forefront with renewed intensity. In March, 2012, under Prime
Minister Noda, the MEXT approved three high school textbooks that claimed Japanese
ownership of the Dokdo islands. The ownership claims stemmed from an educational
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program supported by Aso’s administration in 2009 to increase territory related education
in schools which was strongly reflected in the 2012 textbook screening process. Of the
39 total social studies textbooks undergoing review in 2012, 21 claimed Japan’s
ownership over the Dokdo islands. Within those 21 books, three mentioned the
ownership for the first time, while the other 18 had mentioned Japanese ownership in
previous editions (Kim, 2012 a.). Likewise, 12 out of the 19 history textbooks submitted
did not contain any reference to Comfort Women (Kim, 2012 b.).
Abe’s 2012 campaign for Prime Minister added to the intensity as he made
history textbooks a central issue of the LDP party platform stating that, “Japanese schools
take a self-deprecating view of history” and vowed to revise the textbook screening
process in an effort to correct this interpretation. As such, contention over the portrayal of
history has occurred every year of Abe’s administration. Abe’s Minister of Education,
Shimomura Hakubun, expounded on the proposed revision after the election of Abe in
December, saying that the intention for reform stems from the goal to develop the
“Japanese spirt” the population is currently lacking and to teach Japanese youth the
“2,000 year history of Japan’s wonderful traditions and culture” (Ito, 2012).
The goals that were set in the 2012 election began to take shape in 2013 through
multiple events. In October, the MEXT ordered a local school board to use a
controversial history textbook that had been selected by the school district for the
upcoming four year cycle. A local school board within the district unanimously voted not
to use the newly selected text due to its, “overtly revisionist content.” According to
Martin Fackler, this was the first instance of the national government involving itself
within local politics on the issue of textbooks (Fackler, 2013).
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Following the local dispute, the Education Minister proposed new screening
standards in November that would require textbooks to portray a “balanced picture” of
disputed history. A balanced history would be shown in textbooks by including the
understanding of events from nationalist scholars on the two most controversial issues in
Japan’s history; the Nanking massacre and the history of Comfort Women (Fackler,
2013). The advisory committee to the MEXT took the proposed standards further in
December, recommending that textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. The
advisory committee’s recommendation came at the same time as a government appointed
committee to the MEXT suggested changing the power of textbook selection to city
mayors instead of school districts (Fackler, 2013).
Education Minister Shimomura’s proposed textbook standards were adopted in
2014 and required that publishers “state the government’s unified views” within history
and social studies textbooks. The standards were immediately put in place with the
ongoing textbook screening cycle. Due to the adoption, in May, 2015, five textbooks
were mandated to undergo major revision which included rewriting passages concerning
Comfort Woman as well as past racial violence against Koreans living in Japan and
forced labor during WWII (Osaki, 2015). The textbooks that were approved also
strengthened Japanese ownership of the Dokdo Islands (Qatar News Agency, 2015 a.).
Differing from his predecessors, Abe has taken an international approach to
history education and vowed to fight inaccurate interpretations of the past concerning
Japan’s involvement during WWII abroad. The United States has become a notable
foreground in the apparent battle to influence the understanding of the past against South
Korea’s interpretation. In 2014, Japanese diplomats spoke to Virginia state lawmakers
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concerning a pending requirement for new textbooks to include the name “the East Sea”
to describe the body of water in between South Korean and Japan. The Japanese
diplomates pushed the U.S. lawmakers to only use the name “the Sea of Japan” without
success (Fackler, 2015).
In January, 2015, Abe publicly denounced a U.S. high school textbook published
by McGraw-Hill for its portrayal of the Japanese military involvement with Comfort
Women and their forced service, saying he was shocked at such a depiction of history.
The Japanese Consulate General in New York had met with leaders of McGraw-Hill in
December, 2014 and demanded revision to the textbook. The denial of revision by
McGraw-Hill, who backed their decision with factual evidence, sparked the public
denouncement from Abe (Fackler, 2015).
Response to Challenges
Japan’s revision of standards and approval of controversial textbooks have been
met with international criticism to which the government has publicly responded. The
2001 textbook approval and the subsequent denial of additional reviews, per request of
neighboring countries, ignited a firestorm of diplomatic and economic repercussions
which was led by the South Korean government. At the MEXT’s announcement of the
approval of the New History Textbook in April, 2001, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda
Yasuo, also issued an official government statement defending Japan’s textbook approval
system. In his statement, (located in full within appendix N) Fukuda claimed that the
textbooks selected for approval was done so without bias in an effort to include a diverse
group of textbooks for use in schools. He further stated that while textbooks are reviewed
within the approval process, the MEXT only looks for fundamental flaws which include,
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“obvious mistakes or a lack of balance” which the MEXT then recommends for
correction with support by academic research. Fukuda stressed that approved textbooks
do not reflect the Japanese government’s views on history but that it continues to support
the 1995 Murayama Statement and reiterated a general apology from Japan for actions in
WWII with its commitment to promote mutual understanding and trusts with the world
community (Fukuda, 2001).
Fukuda’s statement did not appease the international community as the South
Korean government continued to threaten diplomatic and economic recourse for the lack
of Japan’s action in remedying the controversial textbook. In May, 2001, in response to
strongly worded governmental threats from South Korea’s MOFAT, Japan’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Makiko, issued a comment stating that South Korea’s positon
was received by the Japanese government with sincerity and would be studied closely. He
further encouraged the upcoming Japan-ROK National Exchange as a time for both
countries to “join their hands” to further Japan-South Korea relations and to face the past
squarely (Tanaka, 2001).
In July, 2001, the MEXT announced that no further revisions would be made to
textbooks once the first neighboring countries’ petition was complete. A public statement
was issued by the MEXT defending their position, according to Howard French, saying,
“Under the current textbook screening system, it is up to the authors to decide what
historical facts to include in their books. We [the MEXT] cannot force inclusions of
certain points” (Tanaka, 2001). Koizumi also weighed in on the matter as he entered
office a few days after the MEXT’s April approval, saying, in regards to the feelings of
regional neighbors, “Apart from such contentious issues, there are areas where we can
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cooperate more peacefully. There is a need to turn our eyes to those areas. It is not good
to only look at points of contention.” He also added that since a lot of work had already
been done to adjust textbooks, he did not believe additional work would be required
(Tanaka, 2001).
The second approval of the New History Textbook in 2005 brought a new round of
international criticism. At a press conference held by the MOFA on April 5, the same day
as the sanctioned history textbooks for the upcoming school year were announced, the
Press Secretary defended Japan’s textbook approval system; reaffirming once again that
approved textbooks do not reflect the governments’ stance on history but that its stands
behind the 1995 Murayama statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 a.). The
MOFA also publicly released a detailed description of the process involved in the
textbook approval system which was placed on the MOFA’s website to support the
MEXT claim of involvement within the educational process (Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2005 b.). Translated copies of Japan’s 20th century history contained within the
eight approved junior high school history textbooks were also placed on the MOFA’s
website in an effort to eliminate any confusion of the Japanese history that is used within
schools (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 c.). Koizumi also publicly called for
“restraint of emotions” in regards to regional neighbors’ ignition while supporting the
MOFA objectives of transparency (Sakamaki, 2005).
While Koizumi took a passive stance against the complaints of regional
neighbors, not every political leader did so. In November 2005, during an appearance on
a popular Asahi network television program, the DPJ leader, Maehara Seiji, urged
Koizumi to resolve the territorial disputes with South Korea and called South Korean
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President Roh’s understanding of Japan’s textbook policy and territorial claims “shallow”
(The Japan Times, 2005 c.).
The MOFA has not published any new statements regarding the approval of
history textbooks under Abe’s administration, but has upheld the 2005 publications
produced under Koizumi and the 1995 Murayama statement in relation to the issue.
However, Abe and his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga have released multiple general
statements on issues related to the remembrance of history, concerning issues such as the
Comfort Women and the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII
(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).
Even though it has been at the center of the issue, the MEXT has been largely
silent on the controversy surrounding history textbooks. The focus of the MEXT’s
webpage is posting reports on policy standards, general information on the Japanese
educational system, as well as a few announcements such as new policy objectives for the
educational system as a whole. In 2004, the MEXT released a statement on a program for
compulsory education reform, entitled, “Japan! Rise Again!” The program was created
under Koizumi’s administration in acknowledgement that “It is necessary for Japan also
to open up a new era and aim to foster spiritually rich and strong Japanese people, and, as
a national strategy, to promote educational reform.” (South Korea Ministry of Education,
2005).
Similar to Koizumi, Abe has also implemented a reform program in an effort to
instill a greater love of the nation within the educational system. However, coupled with
his stated campaign of patriotism, Abe has also created scholastic objectives to increase
study abroad programs to and from Japan, increase universities’ global ranking compared

128

to international leaders such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as to
increase Japan’s competency in the English language (Shimomura, 2014).
A New York Times article published in October, 2014 described Abe’s education
reform as a divided strategy that promoted an inward looking nationalism while striving
for globalization objectives. The author, Michael Fitzpatrick, had used an email interview
with the Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, as one of his resources for the
article. As such, Shimomura posted a statement to the MEXT website defending the
educational reform supported by Abe by claiming that the change positively shapes
student’s national identities while improving areas of weakness within the current
educational system, with no inherent dichotomy. Shimomura’s full statement can be
found in appendix O (Shimomura, 2014).
Memorials and Offerings
In 2012, the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul reemerged as a point of strife within
the history textbook division between South Korea and Japan. As the South Korean
government continued to demand revision of history textbooks that claimed Japanese
ownership of the Dokdo Islands, Prime Minister Noda asserted the Comfort Woman
statue outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul distorts historical facts. Noda specifically
referenced the inscription on the statue as erroneous (Kim, 2012 b.).
III.

South Korean government’s use of history textbooks
South Korea has sustained multiple turbulent events during the 20th century which

have now become points of contention in how the past is remembered. The disputed
history begins in 1910 with the formal colonization of the peninsula by Japan and ends
roughly in 1988 with the election of the first President in a successful democratic
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election. This time period includes not only colonialization, but also the Korean War
which ultimately divided the peninsula, two dictators; one of which was Park Chung-hee
who ruled South Korea for 18 years from 1961 to his death in 1979, vast political
corruption, economic growth and the rise in living standards, as well as massive social
movements in the struggle for democracy (The Japan Times, 2014; Seth, 2011).
Park Chung-hee was the first South Korean leader to implement a system of state
written textbooks with an objective of framing the understanding of current and past
events. Upon taking power, Park employed the new textbook system to cast his military
takeover of the government in a more positive light, referring to the event as a military
revolution instead of a military coup. Even in the founding of a democratic state,
government involvement with history textbooks have continued (The Japan Times, 2014;
Choe, 2015).
Speeches and Pronouncements
Comparable to Japan, South Korea has also experienced multiple controversial
events regarding history textbooks from 1988 to 2015. 29 events have been classified
under the Speeches and Pronouncement section and have been divided into two charts
due to the large number of incidents. Below, Figure 9 illustrates government
pronouncements and action concerning history textbooks within South Korea. Figure 10,
presented later, displays the statements issued from the South Korean government against
Japan in regards to history textbooks.
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Figure 9. South Korean Textbook Incidents 1988-2015
Year
Controversy
2003
2004
2005
2008
2010
2010
2013
2013
2013
2014
2015
2015
2015

Textbook writing is open to 3rd party publishers
The Commission is Created
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is Created
MOE “straightens facts” in history textbooks
MOE announces revision to the national curriculum
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Closes
Textbook Approval
The Commission published 13th book, the first on Comfort
Women
MOE Recommends Changes to Approved Textbooks
Minister of Education suggest Yu’s history and single
history textbook for compulsory education
2 million copies of information booklets on the Dokdo
Islands given to public schools
The Commission published English version of Comfort
Women book
MOE announces state issued history textbook

Government
Agency
President
President
President
MOE
MOE
President
MOE
The
Commission
MOE
MOE

Administration
Roh
Roh
Roh
Lee
Lee
Lee
Park
Park

Political
Party
DJP
DJP
DJP
SP
SP
SP
SP
SP

Park
Park

SP
SP

MOE

Park

SP

The
Commission
MOE

Park

SP

Park

SP

The Ministry of Education (MOE) was established after the conclusion of WWII
with the purpose of providing democratic education to the general public. While
democracy was not fully achieved until 1988, the pre-democracy era set up a modern
educational institution for the state. In the era of democracy, the MOE is charged with
creating national educational policies that promotes not only high quality learning within
schools, but also loyal and well-rounded citizens. Additionally, the MOE manages
educator standards, national entrance exams, university standards, as well as financial
elements related to educational services. An important role of the MOE is its involvement
with educational material. Since the beginning of South Korea in 1948, the MOE
compiled and freely distributed textbooks for compulsorily education (South Korean
Ministry of Education, 2008).
While the liberalization of history textbooks began with the establishment of
democracy, the biggest impact of openness on textbooks occurred under President Roh’s
administration from 2003 to 2008. During his first year in office, Roh reformed the
production of history textbooks from the state to third party private publishers who
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maintained content standards set forth by the MOE. The system that Roh implemented is
used today, as of this writing, and mimics the system used in Japan (Koo, 2015).
Roh took the idea of openness toward the peninsula’s 20th century history a step
beyond educational texts and established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) in 2005. The TRC’s goal, according to the first Commissioner Kim Dong-choon,
was to, “create favorable conditions for achieving historical, political, and legal justice
through revealing long-suppressed truths” (Selden & Kim, 2010). The TRC focused their
efforts on giving a voice to Korean victims through the exposure of events that had been
repressed which occurred under the rule of multiple dictators, the Korean War, and
colonialization (Selden & Kim, 2010).
The TRC operated under a renewable four year mandate with a completion date
set for early 2010. The TRC accomplished many projects and reports concerning
atrocities in South Korea’s modern era but their work on the history of the Korean War
proved to be one of the most sensitive issues. Their work on the Korean War
inadvertently touched upon the national identity of South Korean citizens in relation to
the formation of the state and its relationship with vital allies, including the United States,
which increased tensions politically and domestically.
Roh’s appointed officers’ term limit expired in 2009, under President Lee’s
administration (which began in 2008). While Lee appointed new personnel to fill the
TRC’s vacancies, he did not approve the TRC’s renewal. According to Kim Dong-choon,
under the Lee administration the government was not open to working with the TRC for
the effort of transparent history as it had been under Roh and there was fear of not being
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able to complete reports, specifically on events which occurred during the Korean War.
The TRC officially closed in June, 2010 (Selden & Kim, 2010).
The Lee administration did not advance the liberalization of history education
after Roh, but worked to once again constrain the content within textbooks. In 2008, the
MOE announced that it would “straighten the facts” within history textbooks by requiring
the textbook committee to necessitate changes in potential texts on the topics of the 1948
Jeju Uprising, and South Korea’s past leaders. Specific changes included referring to the
1948 Jeju Uprising, a large political protest that was violently put down by Korean
soldiers, under US command, that resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, instead of as
the Jeju Riot. The Rhee and Park years were to include positive aspects that occurred
during their reign to balance the negative history of vast political corruption and
authoritarian rule. Additionally, more aggressive descriptors against North Korea were
also inserted (McNeill, 2008). The textbook revision was met with objection from the
Democratic Party (DP), the largest opposition party at the time, who claimed Lee’s
Administration was working to “beautify the past” (McNeill, 2008).
In 2010, the MEO announced a revision to the national history curriculum
through increasing the information presented on the Dokdo Islets. According the MOE’s
“Revision of History Curriculum” press release, which can be found in appendix P, “the
content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the wrongfulness of
Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise students’ awareness on
Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an informed view of history”
(South Korea Ministry of Education, 2010; appendix P).
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Textbooks have continued to escalate as points of contention within the current
Park Administration. In November 2013, the MOE approved eight history textbooks for
use in the upcoming school year, one of which was published by Kyohak Publishing. The
approval of Kyohak’s text ignited public protests against its use in schools, citing that the
text presents past atrocities in a positive view; such as the history of authoritarian rule,
leaves out specific brutalities, as well as downplays the struggle for democracy. DP
lawmakers expressed outrage over the approved controversial text and called for its
remove from the approved list (Nam, 2013).
The approval of the controversial text was part of a yearlong disagreement
surrounding the textbook approval process. In 2013, President Park publicly cautioned
advancing “ideological prejudices” in history textbooks in response to the criticisms of
approved textbooks (Choe, 2015). In October, 2013 the MOE had proposed 830 revisions
within the eight textbooks that had already been approved for use in South Korean high
schools. The MOE claimed the recommended changes comprised factual errors, typos,
and ideologically imbalanced descriptions of historical events. The publishers corrected
all but 41 recommended changes. However, after the completed 789 changes, the MOE
ordered the publishers to make all 830 changes or risk suspension of their book. The
publishers responded to the MOE by filing a lawsuit with Seoul’s Administrative Court
citing that the order was based on a lack of evidence and that the government was
requiring unnecessary revisions as the texts had all followed the mandated screening
process and been approved, leveraging a Supreme Court ruling that requires additional
screening processes before recommended changes can be enforced (Nam, 2013).
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The history textbook dispute did not end in 2013 with the approval system. In
2014, the Minister of Education, Hwang Woo-yea, began campaigning for the inclusion
of a colonial era Japanese resistance fighter, Yu Kwan-sun, into South Korean history
textbooks. Yu Kwan-sun was a 17 year old Koran girl who was imprisoned and tortured
to death for opposing Japanese rule during the March First Movement.
One March 1, 1919, nearly 1 million Korean colonists marched against Japanese
colonial rule throughout the country in a largely peaceful movement throughout the
spring, 1919. The Japanese colonial government brutally put down the protest with an
acknowledged 553 deaths, 1,409 injured and over 14,000 imprisoned. However, Korean
history estimates that more than 7,000 people died and tens of thousands were arrested by
the Japanese for this protest for independence (Seth, 2011).
Hwang found it problematic that only four of the eight history textbooks approved
the previous year contained any mention of the young woman. In an effort to amend the
missing piece of Yu’s history, Hwang publicly suggested a single history textbook be
used for all South Korean schools which would also hedge against, “sowing seeds of
division in public opinion” (The Japan Times, 2014). When the MOE was questioned
about the possibility of a state led textbook, a spokesperson responded saying that
creating a history textbook in today’s world is an open process that includes the
involvement of multiple historians. The government only seeks “consistency” in the
teaching of history (The Japan Times, 2014).
In the Education Minister’s push for inclusion of specific points of history, the
Dokdo Islands once again became a point of national pride. In 2015, two million copies
of a supplementary booklet focusing on the Dokdo islands were distributed to every

135

school to be used in conjunction with the approved history textbooks. The MOE released
a statement concerning the booklet upon its circulation. The statement asserted that the
booklets improved the learning material that was devised by the MOE in 2011, made the
material easier for students to understand, and incorporated “new research outcomes” on
the islands. For elementary students, the information was simplified and for high school
students the information presented contained more, “in-depth legal grounds based on
international law” which supported the Ministry’s overall educational goal of Dokdo Islet
education, which states, “Students should be able to understand why Dokdo is Korean
territory based on both historical and geographical facts, as well as by the perspective of
international law” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2015).
South Korea’s internal struggle of how to portray the past within textbooks
reached a peak in late 2015 when the Minister of Education announced that the state
would be issuing one history textbook for required used in compulsory education
beginning March, 2017. Hwang assured opponents of the government textbook that the
history presented would be “objective and balanced” as the MOE will invite a committee
of historians to write the history book with a variety of persons to review the final draft
before its use in schools. The Minister further defended the decision for a state issued text
claiming that the main objectives of textbooks should be teaching “the proud history of
South Korea” emphasizing the country’s achievement of democratic transition and its
very quick industrialization and economic rise. The Deputy Minister of Education, Kim
Jae-choon, bolstered Hwang’s assertions stating that the textbooks currently used in
schools are lenient in their portrayal of North Korea and its direct involvement with
causing the Korean War, while providing many critical interpretations of South Korea’s
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history compared to the North (Choe, 2015). Park also defended the state issued text
publicly asserting that textbooks and history classes must “inspire pride in students for
being South Korean citizens” (The Japan Times, 2015 c.).
Opponents of the state issued text, including the DP and educators, claimed such a
move by the state embarrasses the country globally and sets up a textbook system that is
reflective of the repression of history under Park’s father. Likewise, critics asserted that
the mandated text will whitewash history, and is an effort by Park to redeem her father’s
reputation within the South Korean population (Jun, 2013; Choe, 2015). The Park
Administration’s decision to author the history textbook ignited riots throughout South
Korea; 50,000 people have signed a petition against the textbook (Kirk, 2015), historians
from over 20 universities as well as 800 associated with the Korean History Research
Association refused to participate in the government’s writing process for the book (The
Japan Times, 2015 c.). The DP has also vowed to create a bill to ban the government
from writing textbooks, even though such a bill would not likely pass due to the Senauri
Party majority in the National Assembly, which supports the state issued textbook
initiative (Choe, 2015).
While the MOE was dealing with controversies surrounding the approval and
publication of history textbooks, The Commission on Verification and Support for the
Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission)
was publishing their own books for wide dissemination within South Korea and the
world. As of 2015, the Commission has published 14 volumes of accounts from the
Korean population who suffered under Japanese colonial rule as forced soldiers and
laborers since its creation in 2004 under President Roh.
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In 2013, the Commission produced and released its 15th book entitled, Can You
Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of Comfort Women, a compilation of oral testimonies
from 12 surviving Comfort Women and one civil activist on their experience with
Japan’s Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign (Yonhap News Agency, 2015
a.). The book’s stated objective is to spread the history of Comfort Women in an effort to
lessen their secret pain and ensure their history does not fade from public knowledge.
Coupled with the idea of increasing public awareness, the book also admonishes the
Japanese government to make appropriate amends to resolve the Comfort Women issue,
currently rife between South Korea and Japan (The Commission on Verification and
Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea,
2015). The book was first released in 2013 in Korean to the South Korean public (Yonhap
News Agency, 2015 a.; The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). However, the
Commission quickly set to work producing the text in English for global consumption,
beginning first with the U.S. public. This was the first book produced by the
Commission that was distributed overseas (The Commission on Verification and Support
for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015).
The volume is set up in a similar fashion to a case study with methodology of
collection and the history of Comfort Women mentioned before the section of transcribed
testimonies. The personal accounts were gathered by the Commission employees from
2005 to 2006, with one former Comfort Woman adding her testimony later in 2012 due
her own personal choice. No personal identifiers of the women are given beyond their
age, except for one woman who volunteered all of her demographic information for
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publication. The average age of the 12 women at the time of their interviews was 81 (The
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under
Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015).
The English version of Can You Hear Us? was completed in 2014, with the
translation provided by the History Museum of Comfort Women (Media Joha LTD) (The
Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under
Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). The translation was conducted in Palisades Park,
New Jersey home to a well-known Korean American community. This particular town
has been sympathetic to the issue of Korean Comfort Women as it is home to one of two
US memorials to Comfort Women that are identical to the original statue located in
Seoul, South Korea (Schrank, 2013; Alvarado, 2015; The Commission on Verification
and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in
Korea, 2015).
As part of its mission to distribute the book within the U.S., the Commission
worked to gain support from local, state, and national U.S. leaders. Political leaders’
support is also documented in front of the text though official letters produced by the
officials themselves. In January, 2015, 20,000 copies of the book were available and
distributed free of charge to US politicians and public libraries (Alvarado, 2015).
The South Korean government has not only focused attention on their own history
textbooks but also on history textbooks of their regional neighbors, specifically Japan.
Beginning in 2001, official statements against the content of Japanese history textbooks
have been issued by the South Korea government each time the MEXT concluded their
cycle of textbook approvals. Figure 10 below displays the statements issued from the
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South Korean government beginning in 2001 until 2015. This figure comprises official
statements issued directly from various governmental ministries as well as leaders’
statements gleaned through newspaper articles. However, Figure 10 is not fully
comprehensive due to time limits placed on archival documents and the accessibility of
websites available to English users.
Figure 10. List of South Korean government statements against Japan’s history textbooks
Gov’t Person
Han Seung-soo Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade
Han Seung-soo, Minister
of Foreign Affairs and
Trade
Spokesperson of MOFAT

Gov’t Department
MOFAT

MOFAT

2004

Spokesperson of the Task
Force Team on the Issue of
Distorted Japanese History
Textbooks
Minister of Education

2005

Minister of Education

MOE

2007

Minister of Education

MOE

2009

Spokesperson and Deputy
Minister for Public
Relations of MOFAT
Lee Ju-ho, Minister of
Education
Cho Byung-jae, Foreign
Ministry spokesperson
Cho Sei-young, DirectorGeneral for Northeast
Asian Affairs

MOFAT

2012

President Lee

Executive

2012

Spokesperson and Deputy
Minister for Public
Relations of MOFAT
Spokesperson and Deputy
Minister for Public
Relations of MOFA

MOFAT

National Assembly

National Assembly

Year
2001
2001

2001

2002

2011
2012
2012

2014

2015
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MOFAT

MOFAT

MOE

MOE
MOFAT
MOFAT

MOFAT

Statement Title
Statement of deep disappoint
Korea’s Demand for
Correction of Distortions in
Japanese History Textbooks
Statement by MOFAT
Spokesperson on the Outcome
of the Japanese Government’s
Screening of History
Textbooks
Statement on the Outcome of
the Japanese Government’s
Screening of High School
History Textbooks
Ministry of Education issues
strong protest and urged
correction of Japanese history
textbooks.
Ministry of Education issues
strong protest and urged
correction of Japanese history
textbooks.
Ministry of Education issues
strong protest and urged
correction of Japanese history
textbooks.
Spokesperson’s Statement on
Japan’s Approval of a MiddleSchool History Textbook
Minister Sends a Letter of
Protest to Japan
Seoul rebukes Tokyo over
textbooks
Director-General for Northeast
Asian Affairs Summons a
Japanese Diplomate of the
Textbook Issue
Lee calls for Japan to muster
up courage to face up to
history
Spokesperson’s Statement on
the Outcome of Japan’s High
School Textbook Examination
MOFA Spokesperson’s
Statement on Japan’s
Approval of Elementary
School Textbooks
S. Korea’s Parliament
Denounces Japan for Dokdo

2015

Lee Wan-koo, Prime
Minister

Executive

Claims
S. Korean PM Warns Japan
against History Distortion

While multiple ministries issued statements during each year of controversy, they
all followed a similar structure of denouncement, such as utilizing the phrases, “The
Government of the Republic of Korea strongly protests” (Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Spokesperson, 2012), “expresses deep regret” (South Korea Ministry of
Education, 2011), “strongly appeals” (Kim, 2012 b.) the decision to approve. All the
statements of denouncement go further to declare that the victims of the MEXT approval
are the youth of Japan who will ultimately become Japan’s future. The statements also
declare that the South Korean grievances are supported by the 1982 Neighboring Country
Clause, the 1995 Murayama Statement, and the 1998 Joint Declaration on a new KoreaJapan Partnership for the 21st Century.
The MOFAT’s 2001 statement, “Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in
Japanese History Textbooks,” seemingly sets precedents for future governmental action
in relation to the history textbook controversy with Japan. This particular assertion
discusses the 25 items submitted to the MEXT for correction within their history
textbooks which were identified by a team of researchers commissioned by the
government. After the explanation of the items submitted and their support through
previous legal agreements, the South Korean government promised to, “demise mid to
long term measures to prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer
the world an accurate and objective understanding of Korea’s history” along with
consideration in “reinforcing history education in the schools.” The complete statement
can be found in Appendix Q (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001
b.). Actions following this MOFAT’s 2001 statement supports its claim of “mid to long
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term measures” as the MOE has been involved with the petition of corrections within
Japanese textbooks (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2011) and the governments
continued involvement with its own history education.
While Figure 10 demonstrates a wide array of government participation within the
history textbook controversy, an interesting point of involvement is the resolution issued
by the National Assembly in 2015. Since the disagreement’s outbreak in 1982, there has
not been evidence of the National Assembly’s engagement in the issue as a whole until
33 years later when a resolution was issued in 2015. The issued adopted by the National
Assembly denounced Japan’s continued claims on the Dokdo islands, stating, “the
parliament strongly denounces Japan’s repeated provocations of violating South Korea’s
territorial sovereignty and distorting history.” The resolution passed with 181 votes out of
a possible 182 (Qatar News Agency, 2015 b.).
Response to Challenges
While South Korea has used speeches and pronouncements to call for the change
of Japanese history textbooks, this has not been the only means utilized to push the
government of Japan to redress the issue. In response to the Japanese government’s
refusal to correct history textbooks, South Korean leaders have used the threat of harming
economic and diplomatic relations to pressure change within Japan’s educational texts.
President Kim Dae-jung initiated strong repercussions in response to the MEXT’s
decision to approve a controversial textbook coupled with Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni
Shrine in 2001. In 1999, Kim had begun to ease restrictions on the imports of Japanese
cultural items which had long been strictly controlled since the end of WWII. Kim
threatened to reverse the trade liberalization with Japan if the textbook was not revised
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(French, 2001). In addition to the threat of restricting trade, Kim refused to meet with
Koizumi until his conditions of meeting the requirements set forth by the 1998 Joint
Communique as well as publicly acknowledging that it was incorrect to approve the
controversial textbook (Stuck, 2001). Kim did not meet with Koizumi during his
presidency and the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan stalled (French,
2001; Stuck, 2001).
Cold relations between South Korea and Japan continued under President Roh’s
administration, which began in 2001. In 2005, with the creation of “Takeshima day”
combined with the approval, once again, of the controversial New History Textbook
ignited a formidable response from Roh himself. Roh published a three page letter to the
nation on the current status of South Korean-Japanese relations (Konishi, 2005). In his
letter, Roh called the claims on the Dokdo islands and the history textbook row as Japan’s
attempt at justifying its colonialist and expansionist past to which he declared, “This
government has no choice but to respond firmly.” While “Takeshima day” was organized
by a local government, Koizumi nor his administration gave a statement against its
production or comment on how such an event would affect regional neighbors, as such
Roh remarked on the event specifically saying, “These actions are not just undertaken by
a single local government or some thoughtless extreme nationalists, but they are done
under the abetting of the Japanese leadership and the central government. That is why we
can only look at them as the actions by Japan. These are actions that completely nullify
repentance and apologies made so far by Japan.” Roh further stated that South Korea’s
determination may cause a “diplomatic war” (Gulf News, 2005) and that the South
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Korean people must be prepared for a “prolonged fight with economic and social
implications” (Konishi, 2005).
Presidents Kim and Roh took aggressive stances towards Japan’s textbooks,
whereas Lee’s administration focused on bolstering South Korea’s own history within
textbooks as evidenced by events outlined previously. While Lee had a large internal
focus on educational texts, he met with Prime Minister Noda three times during Noda’s
time in office; December, 2011, August, 2012, and October, 2012, where Lee discussed
the correct presentation of history, specifically in relation to the issue of Comfort Women
(Foster, 2011; The Asahi Shimbun, 2012, The Korean Times, 2012 b.). Park also took a
hard stance against the portrayal of history within educational texts, citing such
representation of histories like the Comfort Women, and refused to meet with Abe until
November, 2014 (Xinhua, 2014).
Memorials and Offerings
The Comfort Woman memorial in Seoul, South Korea was erected in 2011 at the
beginning of Prime Minister Noda’s administration, as discussed in chapter 2. President
Lee responded to Noda’s calls to take down the statue by saying, “The monument would
not have been erected if only Japan had shown a little bit of concern” over the issue,
warning, “second and third statues will be set up each time one of the elderly women
dies, unless sincere measures are taken” (Choi, 2012). President Lee stood behind this
statement throughout the rest of his time in office.
IV. Chapter Analysis
Both Japan and South Korea’s national government have been actively engaged
within the controversy surrounding history textbooks. While national level involvement
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with the production of educational materials is innate in both educational systems
reviewed, Japan and South Korea have displayed increased government involvement into
the production of textbooks since 1988. Figure 11 below depicts the actions of
involvement by government officials relating to history textbooks.
Figure 11. Position of Government action in relation to history textbooks
Japan
Number of Gov’t Actions
Officials Involved
Category
15
5 actions: Prime Minister
Speeches and
11 actions: MEXT
Pronouncements
1 action: MOFA
12
3 actions: Prime Minister
Response to Challenges
3 actions: MEXT
4 actions: MOFA
1 action: Chief Cabinet Sec
1 action: DJP Leader

1

1 action: Prime Minister

Memorials and Offerings
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Event Description
See Figure 8 for Event
descriptions
1.

2001 Chief Cabinet Sec
Fukuda statement
defending textbook
approval system
2. 2001 MOFA issued
response to South
Korea’s letter against
approved textbook
3. 2001 MEXT statement
defending decision not to
review a 2nd time
4. 2001 Koizumi’s
statement to newspapers
on need to focus on
positive elements of the
Japan-South Korean
relationship
5. 2004 MEXT program
“Japan! Rise Again!”
released
6. 2005 MOFA Press
Secretary statement
defending MEXT
7. 2005 MOFA released
description of textbook
approval process
8. 2005 MOFA translated
passages of textbooks
coverage of 20th century
history
9. 2005 Koizumi calls for
“restraint of emotion”
10. 2005 DJP leader calls
Roh’s policies on
Japan’s textbooks
shallow and urged
Koizumi to resolve the
issue
11. 2012 Abe’s proposed
educational reform
program begins
12. 2014 MEXT responds to
NY Times Article
defending Abe’s
educational reform
program
1. Noda claims Comfort
Woman statue’s
inscription contains
incorrect history

South Korea
Number of Gov’t Actions
29

6

Officials Involved
6 actions: President
10 actions: MOE
8 actions: MOFAT
2 actions: The Commission
1 action: National
Assembly
6 actions: President

Category
Speeches and
Pronouncements

Response to Challenges

Event Description
See Figure 9 and 10 for Event
Descriptions

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

2

2 actions: President

Memorials and Offerings

1.

2.

2001 Kim refused to
meet with Koizumi until
conditions were met;
threat to reverse trade
liberalization
2005 Roh threatens
diplomatic war
12/2011 Lee meets with
Noda to discuss
historical issues
8/2012 Lee meets with
Noda to discuss
historical issues
10/2012 Lee meets with
Noda to discuss
historical issues
2012 Park refused to
meet with Abe due to
historical issues,
including history
textbooks
2011 Lee refused to
move or revise the
Comfort Woman statue
until an appropriate
apology was issued by
Japan
2012 Park has kept with
Lee’s initial stance

The respective Ministries of Education have had the most involvement with
history textbooks since they are endowed with the power of approving and producing
educational material, which sets this ministry at the center of the controversy. It is
important to note that both Japan and South Korea’s Minister of Education are appointed
by each incoming Prime Minister or President as part of their respective cabinets (Jun,
2014). While both governments have proclaimed unbiased and historically accurate
books (McNeill, 2008; The Japan Times, 2014; Fackler, 2013; Ito, 2012) the Ministry of
Education typically follows the policy set forth by the President or Prime Minister, which
is exemplified throughout the previous sections. Figure 12 below examines the number of
history textbook events that occurred during each administration.
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Figure 12. History textbook events by administration
Japan
Administration
Number of Events by Section
Murayama, SDP
1-Speeches and Pronouncements
Koizumi, LDP
3-Speeches and Pronouncements
10-Response to Challenges
Aso, LDP
Noda, DPJ
Abe, LDP

South Korea
Administration
Kim, Democratic Party
Roh, Uri Party
Lee, SP

Park, SP

2-Speeches and Pronouncements
1-Speeches and Pronouncements
1-Memorials and Offerings
7-Speeches and Pronouncements
2-Response to Challenges

Number of Events by Section
4-Speeches and Pronouncements
1-Response to Challenges
6-Speeches and Pronouncements
1-Response to Challenges
9-Speeches and Pronouncements
3-Response to Challenges
1-Memorial and Offerings
10-Speeches and Pronouncements
1-Response to Challenges
1-Memorial and Offerings

Total Number of Events
1
13

2
2
9

Total Number of Events
5
7
13

12

While Koizumi had the most overall number of events dealing with history
textbooks, Abe had the most events that occurred within Speeches and Pronouncements
due to history textbooks being a part of his election campaign, whereas most of the
history textbook events for Koizumi occurred as Response to Challenges. In South Korea,
Lee had the most number of events while Park had the most events under Speeches and
Pronouncements. Like Abe, history textbooks have become a major point of Park’s
Administration but led by her Education Minister and supported by herself.
Both governments have described textbooks’ similarly with their objective being
to develop a love for the nation within compulsory education. Such rhetoric has increased
under Abe and Park with both using very similar phrases in describing the creation of
educational policies or textbooks with words such as “instilling pride in the past” or
“inspiring pride of being a South Korean” used. The case study suggests that both
governments have maintained objectives of creating a textbook that favors the in-group
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with specific political parties defending such a book by using rhetoric as “pride” and
“love for the nation” to support such a text. While these phrases are not bad, as they also
correspond with the description of patriotism, how the in-group is compared to the outgroup is of the utmost importance to political parties as well as to the development of
patriotism or nationalism.
According to the various news sources describing textbook revision in both
countries, the out-group is portrayed as evil, or corrupt, or even lessoned in importance
compared to the in-group within controversial texts. For South Korea, the Saenuri party
supports the portrayal of North Korea as villainous and the inclusion of details of Japan’s
brutal acts during colonialism and WWII. While the events being described, such as the
division of the Korean peninsula and the atrocities by Japan are true, there fervent
inclusion within history textbooks and the specific verbiage used to describe them is a
form of othering. This othering not only separates the countries by experiences and
population but also separates them through a sense of evil. The in-group encapsulates the
good victims while the out-group are inherently evil villains. This love of the in-group
coupled with viewing others as evil is a form of nationalism that is promoted by the
Saenuri party.
Likewise, within Japan’s controversial texts, the out-group’s experience during
pivotal events, such as colonialism and WWII is downplayed. Such a moderate portrayal
of experiences lessens the importance such a population has on the in-group. This
lessening of events ignores the out-group as a way of othering. The in-group is promoted
by focusing on their own actions and losses while the out-group is forgotten. This form of
nationalism has been supported by the LDP.
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All of the administrations involved with the production of textbooks, except for a
few policies under Roh in South Korea, have claimed to “straighten facts” or in some
way present an idea of true history while achieving its goal of instilling pride within the
reader. However, every administration has failed to promote the idea of intellectual
freedom when producing textbooks. Civil society in both countries, has at some point,
protested the government involvement in history textbook writing. But the lack of
governmental support of intellectual freedom within the publication of history textbooks
through government objectives like growing the love of the nation and rigorous policies
that follow administrations, empowers both governments to present a manipulated and
controlled version of history within the educational system. South Korea’s return to a
state issued textbook increases the state’s ability to manipulate historical information for
specific objectives.
The control of educational material, with intellectual freedom or not, is a point of
national sovereignty in how a nation choses to educate its youth. Japan and South Korea
have stated such a belief in response to challenges throughout the case study (South
Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001; Cho, 2012; Prusher, 2001).
Specifically, South Korea’s MOFAT stated in 2012 that textbooks have the power to
influence a country’s future either positively or negatively (Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Spokesperson, 2012). This potential influence of a nation’s future that could
negatively impact the region or neighboring countries has seemingly been cited as a
security concern by South Korea. As such, the government of South Korea has responded
to Japanese textbooks aggressively through the publication of its own educational
material as well as texts for the general public. The administrations of Lee and Park have
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used textbooks almost as a weapon. In response to the MEXT approval of conservative
texts, South Korea has also increased its approval of controversial texts. With the issue of
the Dokdo islands, where Japan has begun to increase education on Japanese ownership,
so has South Korea in an effort to lay claim counter to Japan. Since textbooks are a point
of national sovereignty, the South Korean government under Lee and Park have chosen to
combat the future threat by creating a population that is opposite of Japan and the
potential external security concern through the development of nationalism by
manipulating the historical memory of the population. This work of influencing the future
populations moves the potential losses such as monetary losses through trade embargos
as well as losses related to war, to the next generation and bolsters their political party as
they are seen as champions for the South Korean population against Japan.
The publication of texts for the general public has been prominent in South Korea
through the work of the Commission. Whereas the Japanese government has not been
involved with the publication of texts for the general public beyond approving
educational texts that are also sold privately by the third party publishers, the
Commission has published 15 texts of testimony concerning Japanese atrocity since
2004. The book, Can You Hear Us? The UnTold Narratives of Comfort Women provides
a unique opportunity to examine the Commission’s publication since this was the first
copy produced in English.
Upon review, the text clearly presents political motives with statements of support
from South Korean and U.S. officials and has an additional purpose of influencing
Korean-Americans and the American public’s interpretation of the Comfort Women
history since it was freely given to public libraries and U.S. politicians (The Commission
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on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese
Colonialism in Korea, 2015). The timing of the publication of the Comfort Women text is
suspect as the testimonials were collected between 2005-2006, and one testimony in
2012. Prior to the book, three fact finding survey results and six research studies were
published on Comfort Women as well as 14 other books produced by the Commission on
the topics of forced labor and military service. The Commission only addresses the nine
year time span in testimonial and research collection to publication with the statement, “It
is our regret that we could not publish this earlier…” (The Commission on Verification
and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in
Korea, 2015, 6). The Korean language version was published in 2013 as Park came into
office. Interestingly, at the onset of her tenure in office, Park has made the issue of
Comfort Women central to her Administration (Choe, 2015 b.).
The text presents background information on the history of Comfort Women that
is widely agreed upon within the academic community and sets up the text as a case study
with mythology and limitations on research. Questions were asked by the interviewer to
the survivor in an effort to gain an overall portrayal of her time in servitude. However,
due to their varied experiences, not all the questions are similar and some questions were
leading in their effort to gain a depiction of events. Such leading examples include asking
for specific nationalities of the traffickers and persons who visited comfort stations such
as, “Have you seen a Korean?” (referring to servicing Korean soldiers as a comfort
Woman) (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced
Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015, 71). Additionally, out of place
questions were at times asked by the interviewer such as, “Have you ever learned to sing
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a Japanese war song?” (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015 p. 170). While this
question may give a view into life at the comfort station, learning a war song may have
also been a part of life within the education system in Korea and in factories as well
during colonialism, no information was presented demonstrating that learning a war song
was unique to the comfort station. Moreover, the question, “Don’t you hate Koreans
because it was a Korean who took you away?” (The Commission on Verification and
Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea,
2015, 174) led to an opinionated paragraph of how much the woman hated the Japanese
because of their orchestrated violence which caused her pain. While the book does
provide valuable testimonies from surviving Comfort Women, it is filled with biases as
well as the issue of contending with an older population with fading memories.
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I.

Analysis of Case Studies and Final Conclusions
Historical memory is a powerful influence within populations. Its basis of shared

remembrances within the collective helps shape identity and provides elites with sensitive
material in which to mobilize persons for a specific cause. The instrumentally directed
selective remembering (and forgetting) of past events gives this concept a very distinct
attribute when compared to collective memories. Both concepts place awareness and
certain significance on specific events of the past, without holding to their accurate
retelling. Every population develops and maintains collective memories that define who
the population is and where they came from (Langenbacher, 2003; Toshechenko, 2011;
Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Since every population holds collective memories, elites have
the opportunity to exploit these remembrances for specific purposes as historical memory
is the elite manipulation of collective memories.
While historical memory builds into a person’s identity, it also helps to develop
patriotism and nationalism, as well as the concept of nations. Elites have utilized
historical memory for specific ends, such as legitimizing governments and political
parties, legislation, and government programs. Elites who instrumentally influence the
perceptions of a population have come from different forms of government including
authoritarian as well as democracies. With the case of modern China, Wang demonstrated
that authoritarian governments have the ability to manipulate historical memories to
increase the legitimacy of the ruling collective (Wang, 2012). Democracies have entered
the study of historical memory through such events as the fall of the Soviet Union, where
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elites of successor states have utilized historical memory as a tool to aid the transition
from an authoritarian state to a new democracy. Scholars have also relied on the new
states’ use of this concept to gauge the ability of the new democracy to consolidate
(Brewer, 2008; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Pridham, 2014).
While the study of elite manipulation of historical memory has currently provided
a new understanding of legitimacy in authoritarian states and in transitions to democracy,
there is a dearth of information relating to consolidated democracies’ (Diamond, 1999)
use of historical memory in relation to legitimacy. The lack of information raises many
questions, largely centered on whether consolidated democracies manipulate historical
memory for legitimacy.
II.

Revisiting Expected Findings
The two case studies examined in this thesis presented three topics of Comfort

Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks in Japan and South Korea. The four
expected findings that were presented in chapter 1 have provided further focus to this
research in relation to how democracies are impacted by the elite manipulation of
historical memory.
The first expected finding states that elites will use historical memory to
legitimize their term in office when faced with challenges to the state or population. This
expected finding was partially supported by the research. The case studies supported the
hypothesis that elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when
faced with challenges to the state such an economic crisis. Both elites in Japan and South
Korea have been managing the effects of ongoing economic stagnation which began in
the 1990s. The 1998 Asian financial crisis dealt a harsh blow to both Japan and South
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Korea’s economy (Seth, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 1998). The 2008 recession
also negatively impacted the small, positive changes that had been occurring since the
1998 economic decline (The Economist, 2008; Seth, 2011). Other challenges both states
endured between 1988 to 2015 included corruption of political officials and the loss of
political power for the dominant political party.
South Korean President Lee came into office with the promise of reviving the
economy, which had made some gains through his proposed government initiatives
(Onishi, 2008; The Economist, 2011). Along with new initiatives, Lee maintains the
highest number of memory events out of all the South Korean Presidents, with a total of
22 occurrences. Likewise, Abe is nearing the most memory events out of all of Japan’s
Prime Ministers with 21 events. He has also prominently addressed the economic
stagnation within his own government programs for the economy.
South Korean Presidents have all had to contend with the image of corruption as it
has become a trait of South Korean politics, most notably in regards to relationships with
big business (Choe, 2012). President Roh had been suspected of corruption during his
time in office and later committed suicide as he was being investigated on charges soon
after he left office (Sohn, 2009). Additionally, Lee came into office under suspicion of
corruption as a leading business executive (Onishi, 2008) and exited with renewed
scrutiny when his political aids as well as his brother were charged with crimes of
embezzlement and bribery (Choe, 2012). Both of these Presidents had been involved in
more than ten events related to history. In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) had
been facing issues with corruption before Koizumi was in office. During his
Administration, Koizumi lead a series of political reforms targeted at corruption within
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the LDP (The Economist, 2006), his Administration also holds one of the highest number
of historical memory events out of all of the Japanese Prime Ministers with 21 events.
The LDP has been the dominant political power within Japan since the end of
occupation in 1952. The LDP has lost power only twice since 1952, with the first loss
beginning in 1994 to 1996. In 1996, the LDP regained power but had transitions in Prime
Minister about every two years until Koizumi entered office in 2001. Koizumi entered
office with a clear interpretation of history, particularly on the topic of Yasukuni Shrine
and remained in office for six years. The LDP lost power again in 2009 to the Democratic
Party of Japan (DJP) and returned to power in 2012. Abe entered office as Prime Minister
in 2012 also with a distinct understanding of history, specifically on Comfort Women and
has currently served for four years.
The Grand National Party (GNP), now known as the Saenuri Party (SP), is the
dominant political party in South Korea with three out of six Presidents identified as
members. The South Korean President is limited to one five year term. As such, the
number of years in office was not a significant factor in this analysis. However, the GNP
first came to power in 1993 with Kim Young-sam who had two events of historical
memory during his tenure. The South Korean GNP lost power from 1998 to 2008 to the
most popular minority party, the Democratic Party (DP), as well as the short lived Uri
Party who supported Roh (BBC World News, 2009). The GNP regained power in 2008
with Lee and again in 2012 with Park, even though it suffered a split and rebranding
under Park’s Administration (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012). Lee and Park had the highest
amounts of historical memory events compared to the other South Korean Presidents,
with Lee having 22 memory events and Park having 21.
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The case studies demonstrate that elites in democratic governments will use
historical memory to legitimize their term or political party for office when faced with
challenges to the party. Correlating evidence was not found to support the claim that
elites would utilize historical memory when the population was faced with challenges.
The second expected finding states that historical memory is used in similar ways
during elections in South Korea and Japan, even though both countries hold a different
type of democracy. This expected finding was supported by the case studies. Both
governments are mature, consolidated democracies with multiple successful public
elections and transitions of power. These democracies also provide two different
structures of democratic government for review. Japan maintains a parliamentary
(constitutional monarchy) democracy while South Korea is a presidential republic. The
case studies illustrate that both countries’ governments manipulate historical memory in
many similar ways.
In the campaigns of President Park and Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, there
were limited differences in how historical memory was portrayed during the campaign.
Each presented an interpretation of history that crafted an image of elites championing
the in-group (the governments’ respective population) and promised a specific resolution
to a perceived historical injustice or actions that ignored the shame of the past. The
specific resolution includes the South Korean acceptable form of apology from the
Japanese government with compensation for the South Korean Comfort Women in
regards to the Comfort Women history. These campaign promises also played upon the
nationalist sentiments of the population in that not only was an image crafted of the elites
but pride for the in-group was promoted. Further, historical memory was manipulated
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through the same avenues and for similar purposes throughout the three topics under
review.
The similarities between Japan and South Korea continued even though there are
differences in the process of elections. South Korean political parties are generally driven
by personalities. The use of personalities within election campaigns has been a trait of
South Korean politics since the transition to democracy in 1988 and has led to the quick
creation and dissolution of political parties due to their often centered nature on one
particular candidate. Candidates are often selected by political parties to run for office
due to the amount of votes they are expected to gain. The estimated number of votes
takes into account the political regionalism that is prominent in South Korea. The
selection of candidates have leveraged support from specific regions to garner votes. At
times, the candidates are also constrained by regionalism due to stereo-types and an
internal mentality of an in-group, out-group idea based on the region a person is from
(Lee, 2014). The use of historical memory may bolster the broad appeal of a particular
candidate on a national level to balance the strong reliance on personalities and
regionalism. This concept may also aid in helping to reframe and unite internal in-group,
out-group identities into a broader understanding of a national in-group versus a national
out-group such as Japan.
The elections in Japan are not as personality driven as in South Korea. Political
parties’ platform and position on issues such as the economy and nuclear power, hold a
greater influence in gaining votes than necessarily the person running for office. As
Martin Fackler claimed that during the 2012 parliamentary elections, the exit polls
described voters’ decision was in part due to the view of success or failure of the policies
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implemented by the incumbent party, which at the time was the DJP (Fackler, 2012).
Historical memory provides political parties in Japan with the ability to bolster party
platforms through the idea of historical support. Additionally, the political parties are able
to focus an internal in-group, out-group mentality within the election by promoting their
own support of the population while ostracizing the opposition party through manipulated
selective remembering. The LDP has a long history of successful time in power to draw
from within the population’s collective memory due to the nearly consecutive rule since
1952. The research purports that democracies will use historical memory similarly during
elections no matter the different structural forms democracy may take.
The third expected finding states that when historical memory is promoted by
elites, public protests against the out-group will increase. This expected finding is
partially supported by the case studies. In South Korea, every historical memory action
such as Prime Minister visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the approval of controversial history
textbooks, doubting Comfort Women history and denouncing reparations ignited public
protests. The elite perpetuated the intense mood of the public through publicly
responding to every action related to historical memory by Prime Ministers, such as
Park’s inclusion of offerings in her rhetoric of reproach towards the Yasukuni Shrine.
Additionally, the rebuke of Japan from multiple governmental agencies for the same
cause also aided in strongly motivating the public to action.
In Japan, there was limited evidence of public protests on each topic. Japanese
protests against Prime Ministers’ attendance at Yasukuni Shrine were small, the approval
of history textbooks saw one large protest against the MEXT (Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) sanction of the New History Textbook,
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additionally, and there was no mention of public protests against Prime Ministers action
within the issue of Comfort Women beyond that of a few criticisms from Japanese
scholars. Albeit, newspapers’ accounts may have overlooked Japanese protests against
governmental action in favor of covering the international response on Comfort Women.
The limited public protests throughout Japan in relation to historical memory may
stem from how the out-group is portrayed within Japan’s historical memory. The elites’
message within historical memory has consistently been regaining pride in their own past
through manipulated interpretations of memories that promote a nationalistic love for the
nation. The out-group to the Japanese in-group has been downplayed as exemplified in
the New History Textbook, the Yasukuni Shrine where the purpose was to remember
Japanese sacrifices and not necessarily the sacrifices of colonial citizens, as well as
diminishing Japan’s role in the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery even against its
own citizens. The out-group, relating to regional neighbors, has been lessoned in
importance to the Japanese in-group. In comparison, the South Korean elites have
identified Japan as the sole perpetrator and thus the villainous out-group. Where the
Japanese public has had limited response to the out- group as they focus more on their
own history, the South Korean public has directed all of their anger from the contentious
history to their out-group of Japan. This leads to the finding that when historical memory
is promoted by elites against a specific out-group, public protests against that group will
increase.
Within this thesis, the in-group has referred to the country’s own population. This
is understood as South Korea’s in-group is the South Korean population where as Japan’s
in-group is the Japanese population. The term out-group has been used to denote
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populations not within the country’s in-group on an international scale such as the outgroup to South Korea’s in-group is Japan. This in-group, out-group relationship is only
one way in which an in-group out-group mentality can be used. Domestically, elites are
able to frame the idea of an in-group against an out-group in terms of political parties
such as during an election. In an election, a political party can portray themselves as a
party for the in group or as supporting the in-group against the other political party who is
portrayed as the out-group. The designation of in-group or out-group can be facilitated by
the use of historical memory to highlight specific historical understandings to support
their framed image. Within the case studies of Japan and South Korea, both conservative
parties, the LDP and the SP, had the most rhetoric that bolstered the framed
understanding of supporting the in-group through the use of historical memory as they
crafted an image for themselves as being the champion for the nation in the resolution of
the perceived unresolved history like that of Comfort Women and thus the best supporter
of the in-group.
III.

Comparison of Japan and South Korea within Historical Memory
The democracies of Japan (post-1945) and South Korea (post-1987) have

demonstrated government involvement in historical memories through the previous three
topics within the case studies. Both governments influence historical memory through
speeches and pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorials and offerings
which are similar to the ways in which the People’s Republic of China, in Wang’s study,
also manipulated historical memory. This observation supports the fourth expected
finding which states; similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will
manipulate historical memory through textbooks, political speeches, and monuments.
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In all three topics within the case studies, speeches and pronouncements were the
most used where the elites addressed historical memory, followed closely by response to
challenges, and finally memorials and offerings. Speeches and pronouncements are
straightforward ways for both governments to present their interpretation of memories as
part of the required and traditional duties of elected officials which involve speeches as
well as issuing pronouncements on a regular basis. This has been exemplified with in the
case studies by the key note address in South Korea on National Liberation Day and
addressing the Diet during the plenary session in Japan. Both governments unashamedly
included the issue of history in both these addresses, as well as in many others.
While the Japanese and South Korean governments have many similarities with in
speeches and pronouncements there were differences in how they were used. In Japan,
speeches and pronouncements were commonly used within the topics of Comfort Women
and Yasukuni Shrine to justify actions or to offer regrets for past events with nine out of
thirteen speeches and pronouncements doing so. This majority is most likely due to the
South Korean elites’ criticism against Japan. The South Korean elite used speeches and
pronouncements as a means to criticize Japan for past and present actions as evidenced
by 29 out of 30 speeches and pronouncements on the topics of Comfort Women and
Yasukuni Shrine. History textbooks were different for both Japan and South Korea in that
the Japanese elite focused speeches and pronouncements on issues specifically of interest
to the Japanese population, such as educational programs and textbook approval, which at
times also offended the South Korean elite. There was only one out of 15 speeches and
pronouncements that justified or apologized on behalf of Japanese officials. Such a
difference of history textbooks between Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine could be
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related to the notion of national sovereignty in educating the nation’s youth through
textbooks. In South Korea, while the amount of speeches and pronouncements related to
the South Korean population increase on history textbooks compared to Comfort Woman
and Yasukuni Shrine with 10 out of 26 given, the number of speeches and
pronouncements against Japan also increased with 16 out of 26 made. The actions of
including a perspective of history within governmental duties illustrates that elites can act
with historical memory in the boundaries of democracy.
Japan and South Korea have used responses to challenges as a means to bolster
the image of the person in office, and their respective political party, as a champion for
the in-group. For South Korea, responding to challenges became the central opportunity
for addressing historical grievances since Japan is depicted as the sole aggressor within
the historical memory. The elite metaphorically stand ready to respond to challenges as
the image that is being crafted is one opposite to victimization. The South Korean elite
evoke power and the idea of champion through strongly responding to Japanese acts that
are contrary to their sanctioned selective remembering.
The response to challenges is different for Japan, compared to South Korea. The
Japanese elite have more of an internal focus in relation to historical memory since there
is emphasis on interpreting the past more positively. South Korean elites have framed
Japanese action in regards to history as initiating events. As such, Japanese elites have
most commonly utilized response to challenges as a means to exercise restraint in
diplomatic relations to lessen the escalation of potential conflict as well as defending
governmental action and thus defending the sovereignty of the Japanese population.
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In South Korea, the elite have currently found a niche with the history of Comfort
Women with which to campaign. This is especially evident beginning with Lee’s
Administration and has continued during Park’s election campaign and Presidential term.
By raising the profile of Comfort Women, the government promoted the idea of
unresolved history by pressuring the Japanese government for a specific resolution. This
pressure aids in crafting an image of the elite as a champion of the nation through its
work to achieve the solution on behalf of the population. Elites utilizing a specific
message of historical memory during a campaign also illustrates politicians navigating
the population’s accepted boundaries of collective memory.
While the issue of Comfort Women was available to Roh and Kim since the
concern came to the forefront of public knowledge in 1991 (Tanaka, 2002), they
leveraged the history of Yasukuni Shrine, in part, due to the media attention that had been
drawn to official visits by Koizumi’s campaign for office (French, 2002). Roh and Kim
influenced the memories of forced labor and conscription in the same way that Lee and
Park have used the remembrances of Comfort Women in that both Administrations
promoted the idea of an unresolved crime with specific terms of resolution required from
Japan. Roh and Kim created an image of the government as being a champion for the
nation as they stood against the “Japanese commemoration” of atrocities committed
against the Korean public. The construction of the image of champion by South Korean
Presidents through selective memories is in contrast to the history of victimization that
has been selected for the population’s remembrance.
Compared to the South Korean government, the Japanese government is molding
an image of defender of the nation by restoring pride in the past, or in Abe’s terms
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“restoring the country’s self” (Fackler, 2013). Many within the LDP have worked for a
more positive remembrance of history through actions such as high profile visits as well
as providing offerings to Yasukuni Shrine (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013). Classifying such
events as a person’s, including government officials’, right to do so also bolsters the
acceptability of not only official visits but pride in the past. As evidenced through history
textbooks, the LDP has worked to approve texts that promote a more positive
interpretation of the past, citing, again, a population’s right to be proud of that nation’s
history. The Japanese elite championing pride in the past is juxtaposed to the memories
of shame that are being selected for remembrance.
Memorials and offerings were the least used of the three mediums to influence
historical memory. Memorials, as well as museums, are powerful influencers of
populations as demonstrated by scholars such as Zheng Wang and Marek Kucia, Marta
Duch-Dyngosz & Mateusz Magierowski. The only two notable memorials and related
offerings were the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul and the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.
South Korea is home to museums dedicated to the history of the Military Mobilization of
Sexual Slavery that were sponsored by the population through individual donations and
non-profit organizations (Jung, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015). By leveraging the
Comfort Women history and the statue that was created and funded by the population
themselves, the government is working within the boundaries of the collective’s historical
memory. Likewise, the Japanese elite utilize the historical memory of Yasukuni Shrine as
a place of commemoration, which reaches back to the Meiji era for Japan (O’Dwyer,
2010). Since the Shrine was once a place of commemoration, the elite are presenting an
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interpretation of history through attendance and offerings at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi,
2013).
However, where the South Korean government had large involvement from the
population in creating statues and museums that the elite were able to leverage, no
evidence was found of the Japanese population being involved with the creation of
statues or museums. The elite have used existing structures that were created by past
elite, such as the Yasukuni Shrine. This difference in public involvement could stem
from the disparity in the collective memories held between the South Korean and
Japanese public. Where the South Korean public holds a clear interpretation of
victimization from past events due to atrocities from colonialization and WWII, the Japan
public collective memory may not be as clear due to the elite control of events within the
20th century and the manipulation of information presented to the public.
Elites in both countries have demonstrated manipulation that is acting within the
constraints of the populations’ collective memories; with such limitations described by
Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (2014). The South Korean public illustrated a collective
memory of Comfort Women through the work of the Women’s Movement and
corresponding organizations. While the Lee and Park Administrations have worked
within the population’s accepted memory boundary of Comfort Women, Roh and Kim’s
involvement with Yasukuni Shrine was also similarly navigated. Both Roh and Kim’s use
of Yasukuni Shrine directed the population’s collective memories of Japanese forced
labor during colonialism towards the Shrine as a remembrance of such atrocities. The
Commission (The Commission on Verifications and Support for the Victims of Forced
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Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea) work on seeking reparations for
Korean forced labors bolstered this selective remembering, most notably under Roh.
Similar to South Korea, Japanese Prime Ministers have also had to navigate the
boundaries of the population’s collective memories. The Japanese Prime Ministers have
had to contend with a difficult history post-World War II (WWII) that is not equally
accepted throughout the Asian region’s population. The controversies surrounding such
events as Prime Ministers attendance at Yasukuni Shrine was met with demonstrations
from regional neighbors. Newspapers also documented outcries from within Japan such
as lawsuits filed on behalf of foreign and Japanese citizens as well as individual
testimonies of criticism. However, despite the turmoil against Prime Ministers attendance
at the Shrine, the longevity of Koizumi’s tenure as Prime Minister as well as the
continued election of LDP party members for office illustrate that the majority of the
population accepts the LDP’s interpretation of history that is continuing to be presented
by the party.
History textbooks often challenge elites and push the limitations of populations’
historical memory. In both Japan and South Korea, protests have erupted within the
population over history textbook content. Both protests citied historical facts related to
the disagreement over textbooks, such as in the 2001 New History Textbook publication
(French, 2001) as well as the 830 state mandated textbook revisions (Nam, 2013). Such
protests exemplify the accepted boundaries of collective memory as well as the
objectiveness of scholars in helping to identify a distortion of history. The upcoming state
issued history textbook in South Korea has created an interesting point of elite use of
historical memory with the SP is promoting the state sponsored text as helping to develop
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pride in the past through selective remembering while the main opposition party, the DP,
is portraying the book to be similar to those created by the state under the authoritarian
rule of Park Chung-hee (Choe, 2015). Both political parties are using different selective
elements of the collective’s memory to justify or denounce this current program.
While it is evident that both governments are operating within the boundaries of
the population’s accepted historical memory, they are also freely maneuvering within the
confines of democracy. Both elites have utilized historical memory within election
campaigns as shown especially by Park, Koizumi, and Abe. The use of selective
remembering has been a tool by elites to bolster the incumbent’s image through the
interpretation of history to justify political programs such as textbook publications.
Interestingly, the most events regarding historical memory throughout the case
studies in Japan occurred during Koizumi and Abe’s Administration; as both
Administrations had 21 events, as of this writing, while the other 16 Prime Ministers
averaged 1.25 events during their time in office. Similarly, in South Korea the most
events relating to memory occurred during Lee’s Administration with 22 events and is
currently closely followed by Park’s with 21 events. President Roh had 12 events while
Kim Dae-jung had ten, and Kim Young-sam had two.
While both Koizumi and Abe are members of the LDP, they have also pushed for
some large changes within Japan. This includes Koizumi’s support for the privatization
of the postal service (Faiolia, 2005) and Abe’s goal of increasing the amount of women in
the workforce through his economic program commonly referred to as “Abe-nomics”
(Rafferty, 2015). Abe has also championed the campaign of revising Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution which currently limits Japan in maintaining a full military with the
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ability to hold offensive capabilities (Japan Today, 2014). Their large amounts of action
within the collective’s memories also correlate with their time in office. Before Koizumi,
the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988 was Takeshita Noboru, who served as
Prime Minister for three years. The following nine Prime Ministers averaged one and a
half years in office. Koizumi is currently the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988
with his six years in office (as of mid-2016). Abe is the second longest serving and is
currently continuing to serve after four consecutive years as Prime Minister.
South Korea has had similar experiences to Japan, as there is a correlation of
historical memory to support while in office. The manipulation of the Comfort Women
history aided Park’s election through the ability to craft an image of champion. While her
campaign developed an image with the use of collective memories, she was also
associated with negative remembrances due to her father’s role as Dictator. Additionally,
it is notable that Park Geun-hye obtained office as she is South Korea’s first female
president. This feat is made more notable give the information presented from the World
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report which rates South Korea’s Global Gender
Gap index at 117 out of 142 total countries rated (World Economic Forum, 2014). Park
was able to utilize historical memory not only to craft an image but to also counter
balance negative attributes and memories associated to her.
Other Presidents also used historical memory to support difficult programs they
were undertaking. Roh had the third most amount of memory events, his Administration
saw the most transparency and liberalization of governmental records regarding tenuous
periods such as the Korean War as well as greater liberalization in education as compared
to his predecessors (Koo, 2015). Kim Dae-jung’s ten memory events also occurred during
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the same time as he implemented a dramatically different engagement plan with North
Korea, known as the Sunshine Policy (Choe, 2009).
Japan and South Korea have displayed many similar actions in the use of
historical memory, however, there are some differences in how the two countries utilize
this concept. Both governments are led by the Executive in a program of addressing
collective memories. As such, it is common for governmental departments to incorporate
the historical memory issues, such as responding to the history of Comfort Women and
creating sanctioned government texts, into their respective duties.
However, in South Korea the elites have created a government that is focused on
the issue of collective memories through the establishment of multiple departments which
includes the Commission, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) which
incorporates the Comfort Women as a major role, and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The centering of government on historical memory illustrates an investment
by the elites in controlling the message being presented. The South Korean government
has been able to compel the population into accepting that it is the elite’s duty to contend
with unresolved history therefore a legitimate government actively works for the specific
resolution promised. Such actions were exemplified through the creation of the
mentioned government bureaus sequentially beginning in 2001 and cumulating into
pressure from the population for continued work by the government on redress through
the 2011 Constitutional Court Ruling (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012).
The South Korean population has also been motivated to support a government
that utilizes more of an assertive recourse such as threats of diplomatic war and ending
military and trade engagements which has been common tactics of Presidents beginning
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in 1988. The history of oppression that the selective remembering emphasizes is a
justification of a more assertive response in that while the previous government failed to
protect its citizens in the past, the current government is utilizing every means possible to
protect those who are alive today, such as the surviving Comfort Women and forced
laborers. These actions of a more assertive government response also continued to bolster
the image of the elites as a champion for the nation.
Whereas the South Korean government has created a structure that is more
focused on collective memories, the Japanese government has leveraged the existing
governmental structure to address collective memories. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as well as the MEXT have been active in addressing the issue of unresolved history, most
notably within response to challenges from South Korea. The Japanese elite maintain a
somewhat passive response to historical memory in comparison in that there were no
threats of repercussion to diplomatic relations issued. Yet, such supposed passivity aligns
with the elite objective of manipulation in that it is leveraging the common order of
government which supports the idea promoted by Abe and the LDP that it is natural for a
country to honor its past. The elites acting with historical memory are following the
common structure as it is the natural order of any government. Thus, responding to
challenges promotes the idea of defending the nation in their right to remember.
In addition to framing collective memory for specific objectives, elites view the
three topics as either internal or external issues which influences how each government
responds to challenge. For Japan, history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine are internal
issues that are related to national sovereignty in the way that a country educates their
youth and worships. Government actions regarding these issues have been largely
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responses to criticism as the elite believe they have the right to freely act within these
topics. The Comfort Woman issue is viewed more as an external issue in that regional
neighbor’s petition for Japanese governmental response whereas the Japanese elite view
the issue as closed through the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement. The majority
of the three topics are viewed as internal issues within Japan which correlates with the
perception of the seemingly passive response.
For South Korea, Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine are external issues. All
three topics require outside involvement from Japan as the sole aggressor for resolution.
While the history of Comfort Women plays a role in internal matters such as in relation to
the identity of the South Korean population and the social services provided to survivors,
the predominate concern and resolution lies outside of the state. Yasukuni Shrine is
wholly an external issue given the location of the Shrine as well as the contention
centered on governmental visits. In the same way, history textbooks are also an external
issue where Japan is being portrayed as a potential threat through misinforming their
youth. The elite have worked to combat the external potential threat through additional
information internally within compulsory education, however, the Park Administration
has also portrayed this topic as being an internal issue through creating a more positive
understanding of history. The majority of the three topics are viewed as external issues
which correlate with a more aggressive response to historical memory, particularly when
coupled with a targeted out-group.
Japan and South Korea have displayed elite use of historical memory to achieve
specific objectives. As use of manipulation by elites has been demonstrated throughout
the case studies, every action concerning the historical issues, like that of Comfort
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Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks, may not all be exploitation but a
governmental response to the population. Democratic governments have a relationship
with their population such as in the form of constituents. In South Korea, the issue of
Comfort Women was first brought before the government by non-profit organizations.
This leads to the understanding that the government could have been initially responding
to requests of the population for the government involvement in pursuit of resolution.
However, the South Korean government has created specific demands of what constitutes
a resolution which has continually been used to continue the ongoing struggle for an
unresolved history. Similarly in Japan, various public criticism against the continued
apologies for ongoing international historical issues as well as public support for
Yasukuni Shrine, may bolster the Japanese government in supporting the idea of pride in
the past as well as elite visits to the Shrine.
IV.

The Importance of Historical Memory and Suggestions for Future Research
The research presented two countries with different structures of democracy and a

shared contentious history. Both governments acted in similar ways in how they
addressed collective memories; both manipulated remembrances to craft an image of the
elite and the dominant political party as a champion of the in-group to win political
power and to advance governmental programs. To advance these goals speeches and
pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorial and offerings were utilized. The
case studies presented three topics in which the elites could react either by manipulating
or ignoring the memories. In this research similar in regards to some authoritarian states,
Japan and South Korea have demonstrated that consolidated democracies will manipulate
historical memories for the purpose of legitimacy.
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Wang’s work (2012) illustrated that authoritarian governments have the ability to
manipulate memories to increase legitimacy. For democracies, the works of Brewer
(2008), Hewer & Roberts (2012), and Pridham (2014) demonstrate that historical
memory is a vital tool in the transition from an authoritarian state and consolidation for
the new democratic government. But democracies’ reliance on historical memory does
not end when the new democratic state is consolidated. Manipulation of historical
memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites within consolidated democracies.
The strategic influence on the collective memories is a powerful motivator of the
population to act in specific ways, such as voting for a particular candidate or supporting
a certain policy.
Authoritarian governments employ similar stimuluses of historical memories to move
a population just as democracies, albeit, for similar as well as different objectives at
times. The research shows that the manipulation of historical memory is not confined to a
specific government type but that it can be utilized by various forms of government as
every population maintains a collective memory, as detailed by Eric Langenbacher and
Ines Gabel. As collective memories build into a person’s identity and the understanding
of the collective, potentially every country has the ability to utilize historical memory for
specific objectives.
This research has shown that historical memory is a powerful concept in that it moves
populations to act for the identifiable objectives of the elite. While this concept offers
descriptive information of what moves a population and how a nation navigates past
atrocities, historical memory also provides information on how consolidated democracies
are working and relating to the masses through the elites’ struggle to maintain power.

174

Historical memory can and has been used similar to the idea of marketing in that elite
utilize this concept to frame political programs and political candidates either positively
or negatively to achieve specific ends. Elites in South Korea have exemplified such
attributes in this study as well as in Norway where the out-group was reframed in a more
positive light through a new textbook (Hovland, 2013).
Historical memory appears to be the strongest when associated with the most
poignant memories and those past events that are the strongest remembered. Some of the
most sensitive memories touch upon a collective’s identity. The memory of Comfort
Women has become nearly a representative icon of the suffering of the whole South
Korean nation during colonialism. Many of the South Korean population have a female
relation, such as a grandmother or great grandmother, who experienced some sort of
repression by Japanese forces during colonialism, and as such the elite as well as the
population have affectionately referred to surviving Comfort Women as grandmothers
(Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012).This selective remembering and the
potential family connection to the past coupled with the collective’s identity of
victimization through multiple traumatic events in the 20th century has produced a
sensitive collective memory that is shaped and manipulated by elites.
Historical memory has the potential of being stronger in South Korea as compared
to Japan. The South Korean population holds an overall generally accepted understanding
of past events stemming from a concrete point of view. Many South Koreans either
directly experienced atrocities during the 20th century such as colonialism and WWII or
have direct relations who did and have heard firsthand accounts and seen suffering
stemming from the oppressive rule of the Japanese. The clear and similar understanding
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of the past events, specifically relating to atrocities, enables the collective memories to be
solid and nearly universally accepted for the South Korean population. The
“concreteness” of South Korea’s collective memories provides elites with a powerful
motivator in which to mobilize the population. In contrast, the Japanese collective
memory is somewhat murky in relation to past events. The incidents that occurred during
the 20th century, notably colonization and WWII, where elite driven with limited input
from the population. The population was directed by government leaders through the
manipulation of history textbooks and propaganda as well as additional indoctrination
tactics. Due to the elite directed actions, the Japanese population has been left with an
unclear remembrance of these past atrocities. Thus, the elites’ use of historical memory
may not be as great as in places such as South Korea given the “murkiness” of the
collective memory.
It is evident by the literature and the case studies under review that post war and
revolutionary societies maintain strong and highly motivational historical memories as
demonstrated through Soviet successor states and the Asian region. Such patterns have
become a trend within the 20th century due to the vast amounts traumatic events during
that period of time. The study of historical memory has centered on this type of state,
such as Japan and South Korea as post war, in part due to their abundance after WWII as
well as Cold War. However, there are numerous studies conducted on states that have
sustained traumatic events, which brings to question the influence of the idea of triumph.
Does a history of triumph hold similar influence over a population, or does trauma have a
longer lasting impact? Future studies may also be interested in the length of time
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historical memory can reach. Do more recent events have a stronger impact on historical
memory or is the manipulation of elites more important to this concept?
Future research should not disregard the influence of historical memory on
governments and people as Japan and South Korea have illustrated that strategic
manipulation of memories can aid in the obtainment of legitimacy and policy. This
concept has descriptive attributes with such abilities to identify what motivates a
population to action and elite goals as well as how a nation navigates the past and defines
itself. Currently, the study of historical memory is dominated by descriptive research, this
provides opportunities for continued study of strategic manipulation and its relationship
to government. As this concept continues to expand with new understanding and
research, it increases the ability to interpret pressures on relations between states and
interactions between elites and the population. Since historical memory is guided and
constrained by typically unspoken believed truths, a cultural understanding and fluency in
the native language serves to enhance research within this area. The ability to potentially
gauge what policy or legislation will be passed due to a memory referenced or
manipulated as well as a political candidate or party’s potential to win office provides
new understanding in the workings of any government.
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APPENDICES
A. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono
on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women" August 4, 1993
The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime
"comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of
that study.
As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in
extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of
comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military
authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in
the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort
women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private
recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has
revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing,
coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in
the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.
As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas,
excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part.
The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment,
transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing,
coercion, etc.
Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of
the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of
Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and
remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and
incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously,
while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading
them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm
determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our
memories through the study and teaching of history.
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As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this
issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this
matter, including private researched related thereto.In a speech to South Korea's National
Assembly, Mr. Miyazawa
“In a speech to South Korea’s National Assembly, Mr. Miyazawa said: ‘Recently,
the issue of ‘comfort women’ in the service of the Imperial Japanese Army has come into
light. I cannot help feeling acutely distressed over this, and I express my sincerest
apology.”
B. Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro to the 127th Session of the
National Diet
August 23, 1993
“Self-awareness as an International State and Contribution to the International
Community”
August, when my Cabinet was formed, is a month that Japan will never forget.
Going back just four turns of the twelve-year cycle, it was with the end of the war in
August 1945 that we realized the great mistake we had made and vowed to start anew,
resolutely determined never to repeat the wrongs of the past.
Forty-eight years later, Japan has now become one of the prime beneficiaries of
world prosperity and peace. Yet we should never forget that this achievement rests upon
the supreme sacrifices made during the war and is the result of the great efforts made by
previous generations. I believe it is important at this juncture that we state clearly before
all the world our remorse at our past history and our renewed determination to do better. I
would thus like to take this opportunity to express anew our profound remorse and
apologies for the fact that past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial rule,
caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people and to state that we will
demonstrate our new determination by contributing more than ever before to world
peace.”
C. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
on the occasion of the establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund"
July 1995
I would like to share with you my sentiments on the occasion of the
establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund."
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, an event that caused many
people, both in Japan and abroad, great suffering and sorrow. During these past 50 years
we have worked hard to cultivate, step by step, friendly relations with our neighboring
Asian countries and others. However, the scars of war still run deep in these countries to
this day.
The problem of the so-called wartime comfort women is one such scar, which,
with the involvement of the Japanese military forces of the time, seriously stained the
honor and dignity of many women. This is entirely inexcusable. I offer my profound
apology to all those who, as wartime comfort women, suffered emotional and physical
wounds that can never be closed.
Established on this occasion and involving the cooperation of the Government and
citizens of Japan, the "Asian Women's Fund" is an expression of atonement on the part of
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the Japanese people toward these women and supports medical, welfare, and other
projects. As articulated in the proponents' Appeal, the Government will do its utmost to
ensure that the goals of the Fund are achieved.
Furthermore, to ensure that this situation is never again repeated, the Government
of Japan will collate historical documents concerning the former wartime comfort
women, to serve as a lesson of history.
Turning from yesterday to today, we still see many women suffering violence and
inhuman treatment in many parts of the world. The "Asian Women's Fund," as I
understand it, will take steps to address these problems facing women today. The
Government of Japan intends to play an active role in this regard.
I am convinced that a sincere effort on the part of Japan to implement these
measures will further strengthen the true relationships of trust we share with our
neighbors in Asia and other nations around the world.
The Government of Japan intends to cooperate, to the greatest extent possible,
with the "Asian Women's Fund," in order that its aims are achieved. I call on each and
every Japanese citizen, asking for your understanding and cooperation.
D. Letter from Prime Minister to the Former Comfort Women

1996

Dear Madam,
On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the
Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the
former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my personal feelings as well.
The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at
that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.
As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse
to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered
incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our
responsibilities for the future.
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with
feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and
accurately convey it to future generations.
Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and
other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.
Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of
your lives.
Respectfully yours,
Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
(Subsequent Prime Ministers who signed the letter are: Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and
Junichiro Koizumi)
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E. Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

August 13, 2001

The day after tomorrow, August 15, is the fifty-sixth anniversary of the end of the
war. Looking back to the last war at the very beginning of the twenty-first century,
solemn feelings fill my heart. During the war, Japan caused tremendous sufferings to
many people of the world including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy
during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and
aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the
neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the
region.
Sincerely facing these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer
my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war.
I believe that Japan must never again proceed a path to war. Every year, before
the souls of those who lost their lives in the battlefield while believing in the future of
Japan in those difficult days, I have recalled that the present peace and prosperity of
Japan are founded on the ultimate sacrifices they made, and renewed my vow for peace. I
had thought that people of Japan and those of the neighboring countries would
understand my belief if it was fully explained, and thus, after my assumption of office as
Prime Minister, I expressed my wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15.
However, as the anniversary of the end of the war came closer, vocal debates have
started at home and abroad as to whether I should visit Yasukuni Shrine. In the course of
these debates, opinions requesting the cancellation of my visit to Yasukuni Shrine were
voiced not only within Japan but also from other countries. It would be totally contrary to
my wish, under these circumstances, if my visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 could,
against my intention, lead people of neighboring countries to cast doubts on the
fundamental policy of Japan of denying war and desiring peace. Taking seriously such
situations both in and outside of Japan, I have made my own decision not to visit
Yasukuni Shrine on that day, and I would like to choose another day for a visit.
As Prime Minister, I deeply regret withdrawing what I have once said. However,
even if I have my own views on a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, I am now in a position to
devote myself to my duty as Prime Minister, and to deal with various challenges, taking
broad national interests into consideration.
If circumstances permit, I would like to have opportunities as soon as possible to have
face-to-face meetings with leaders of China and the Republic of Korea, in order to
exchange views on the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region of the future
and to talk about my belief mentioned above.
Furthermore, as an issue for the future, I think that we need to discuss what could be
done in order for people at home and abroad to pay memorial tribute without discomfort,
while respecting the feelings of the Japanese people toward Yasukuni Shrine and
Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery.
I do sincerely ask the people of Japan to understand my genuine feelings.
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F. Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni
Shrine
April 21, 2002
Today I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
The purpose of my visit was to mourn sincerely all those who lost their lives for
their country, leaving behind their families in spite of themselves, during the course of
our country's history since the Meiji Restoration. I believe that the present peace and
prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost
their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the
resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic
war.
I consider it to be natural for me to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which has
become over the course of many years, a central institution for many people of Japan to
mourn those who sacrificed their lives for the country.
It is not my intention to once again cause anxiety and elevate tension in Japan and
abroad by visiting Yasukuni Shrine on or around the day of anniversary of the end of the
second world war. After careful consideration, I decided I could sincerely express my
honest feelings by visiting the shrine on this day, on the occasion of the Annual Grand
Festival in Spring. I believe that this would be fully understood by the people of Japan.
G.

Speech by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan
April 22, 2005

Honorable Chairs,
Distinguished participants,
It is a distinct pleasure to attend this historic meeting, at which the countries of
Asia and Africa have gathered together for the first time in fifty years. I extend my
deepest appreciation to the honorable co-chairs from Indonesia, our kind host for this
gathering, and South Africa. I have come to this meeting to do two things. One is to look
back upon the road we have traveled together, realizing anew once again the strong ties
that have connected us during these last fifty years. I have come to this meeting also to
participate in frank exchanges of views about what the countries of Asia and Africa must
do to enhance the peace and the prosperity of people around the globe in the 21st century.
Fifty years ago, Japan stood before the Asian and African nations assembled at
Bandung to declare its determination to develop itself as a peaceful nation. That spirit of
fifty years ago remains steadfast to this day. In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule
and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many
countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of
history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology
always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of
World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of
resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force. Japan once
again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future
as well, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with the nations of the world.
Honorable Chairs,
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The development of Japan over these last fifty years has come about as the result
of the untiring efforts of the Japanese people. Yet we were first able to realize
development through the assistance extended to us by the international community. Japan
will not forget this fact. The Japanese people rose from devastation after World War II. I,
as a representative of that generation, hope to walk together with the people of Asia and
Africa, who are striving to improve their lives by the sweat of their brows.
Based on this thinking, Japan has been extending its development assistance to the Asian
and African regions with emphasis on human resource development, infrastructure
building, and health and sanitation measures, including issues of safe water and infectious
diseases. Japan has also been making efforts to improve trade/investment environment.
Today, I would like to focus on three points as to what we should do together
hand in hand from now on: first, economic development, second, peace-building, and
third, promotion of international cooperation.
First, Japan places great emphasis on the strengthening of partnerships in the
areas of poverty reduction and development. To achieve nation-building, the most critical
thing is each nation's determination to bring about development through its own will and
its own efforts. Japan respects and supports such efforts. Japan will continue its efforts
towards the goal of providing official development assistance (ODA) of 0.7% of our
gross national income in order to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals. From
this point of view, Japan will ensure a credible and sufficient level of ODA. In addition,
Japan will be seeking concrete actions to further expand market access to products from
the least developed countries in order to support their self-reliance.
Asia has made great strides forward over these past fifty years. Yet a number of
important challenges remain, including redressing of disparities in levels of development,
promotion of economic partnerships, implementation of disaster prevention and
mitigation measures based on the recent experience of the large-scale earthquake off the
coast of Sumatra and the resulting tsunami, and strengthening of anti-piracy measures.
Japan intends to formulate concrete policies and create new partnerships in Asia. We will
be providing more than 2.5 billion US dollars over the next five years in assistance for
disaster prevention and mitigation, and reconstruction measures in Asia, Africa and other
regions.
This year is the "Year of Africa". Japan has advanced cooperation towards Africa,
based on the solidarity between Africa and the international community, through the
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. I would like
to take this opportunity to announce that Japan will hold TICAD IV in 2008, and that in
the three years to come Japan will double its ODA to Africa, with grant aid continuing to
be its central feature.
Moving on now to the theme of strengthening of cooperation between Asia and
Africa, the one most fitting for this gathering, Japan proposes creating an Asia-Africa
Young Volunteers program, by which Asian young adults would meet, interact with, and
promote human resource development among the youth of Africa. Furthermore, Japan,
through public and private sectors, will provide assistance in applying to Africa the
knowledge garnered through Asia's movement towards higher productivity. I am pleased
to announce that, through such efforts, Japan will foster human resources in ten thousand
Africans over the next four years.
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Second, Japan considers the peace-building to be of great importance. It is,
indeed, peace and security that constitute the requisite basis for economic development.
Japan has been working hard towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the prevention of terrorism. Japan has also been making efforts towards
the peace-building such as in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. Japan will be
actively providing assistance to the Palestinians for the promotion of peace in the Middle
East, and to Africa, which is demonstrating dynamic movement towards peace. We
should all play an active role in preventing disorderly trade in weapons, as well as in
disseminating universal values such as the rule of law, freedom, and democracy.
Third, as the globalized world pursues a new international order, Japan will
promote further international cooperation, enhancing its solidarity with Asia and Africa.
The United Nations should continue to serve in the centermost role in international
cooperation. Yet, in order for it to respond effectively to the various challenges that the
world now faces, the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, needs to be
reformed, so that the organization reflects the realities of the today's world. Japan will
cooperate to the fullest to take a decision on the reform of the Security Council before
September, as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
As we fortify the partnership between Asia and Africa, it will be critical to share our
experiences and our knowledge through dialogues between civilizations, between
cultures, and between individuals. Japan will host the World Civilization Forum in July,
to share the experiences of the countries to preserve tradition while moving to
modernization.
Honorable Chairs,
Last year, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded for the first time to an African
woman, Professor Wangari Maathai, Assistant Minister for the Environment of Kenya.
This great honor reflects recognition of her contributions to sustainable development
through the planting of trees. Professor Maathai was present at the opening ceremony of
the 2005 World Exposition Aichi in Japan, whose theme is "Nature's Wisdom." Citing
the Japanese notion of mottai nai, Professor Maathai emphasized the importance of the
efficient use of resources and environmental conservation. Using things with care, using
them to the full, and reusing things whenever possible-- these are the heart and soul of
these words mottai nai, which Professor Maathai understood completely. Asia and Africa
are blessed with a richness of nature that yields enormous potential. I believe that through
the progress of science and technology, it is possible to create a vibrant and dynamic
society in which environmental conservation and development are both achieved. In
conclusion, I would like to state Japan's resolute determination to spare no effort to create
just such a society.
I thank you for your kind attention.
H. Statement by Prime Minister Abe -Pledge for everlasting peaceDecember 26, 2013
Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences,
paid my respects and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and
made ultimate sacrifices. I also visited Chinreisha, a remembrance memorial to pray for
the souls of all the people regardless of nationalities who lost their lives in the war, but
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not enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. While praying for the souls of the war dead, the
preciousness of peace Japan enjoys today really came home to me.
The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are
living today. The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices
of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their loving
wives and children, and thinking about their fathers and mothers who had raised them.
Today, I have contemplated on this, and paid my deepest respects and gratitudes on my
visit.
Japan must never wage a war again. This is my conviction based on the severe
remorse for the past. I have renewed my determination before the souls of the war dead
to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage a war again.
I have also made a pledge that we must build an age which is free from the sufferings by
the devastation of war; Japan must be a country which joins hands with friends in Asia
and friends around the world to realize peace of the entire world.
For 68 years after the war, Japan created a free and democratic country, and consistently
walked the path of peace. There is no doubt whatsoever that we will continue to pursue
this path. Under the spirit of international cooperation, Japan will discharge its
responsibilities for the peace, stability and prosperity of the world.
Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political
and diplomatic issue. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to
war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my
administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my
administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never
wage a war again.
It is not my intension at all to hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people.
It is my wish to respect each other’s character, protect freedom and democracy, and build
friendship with China and Korea with respect, as did all the previous Prime Ministers
who visited Yasukuni Shrine.
I would like to ask for the kind understanding of all of you.
I. Basic Position of the Government of Japan
Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi's Visits to Yasukuni Shrine
October, 2005
Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan's present peace and
prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the
war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who
had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance
of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan, which those who died in the war
were unable to witness; and to uphold Japan's pledge not to engage in a war. He makes
the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity.
It is erroneous to view that Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine
are an attempt to glorify Japan's past militarism. The Prime Minister has stated clearly
that the purpose of his visits to the shrine is to express respect and gratitude to the many
people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not visit for the sake of the Class-A
war criminals, and that Japan accepted the results of the International Military Tribunal
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for the Far East. He has acknowledged that Japan, "through its colonial rule and
aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries,
particularly to those of Asian nations." The Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that
Japan should squarely face "these facts of history in a spirit of humility, and with feelings
of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind" and asserted Japan's
"resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world, prizing the relationship of
trust it enjoys with the nations of the world." He recently conveyed this message to the
international community in his speech at the Asian-African Summit in April 2005 and
reaffirmed it in his statement on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World
War in August.
East Asia today is increasingly well placed to become one of the most developed
regions in the world. The formation of a future East Asian community is a common goal
for the countries of the region. At this historic turning point, Japan is determined to
contribute constructively to the future of East Asia and, to that end, places great
importance on its friendly relations with neighboring Asian countries, including China
and the Republic of Korea. Japan has demonstrated this spirit through its actions over the
past 60 years. The task of further strengthening its relations with neighboring countries
and contributing to the peace and stability of the East Asian region is one of Japan's most
important policy priorities.
J. Comparison of Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine; full chart
This chart was created by selecting passages from political leaders’ statements
concerning the Yasukuni Shrine. Some statements were taken from larger messages,
while others were short statements themselves. I chose the statements under review based
on their expression of Yasukuni Shrine. The sections within the chart that are italicized
have been identified as especially important to the understanding the portrayal of the
Shrine to each country.
The categories of Official Government Statement and Statement to Newspapers
were chosen to differentiate between how statements and ideas were delivered to the
public. Statements to Newspapers categorize casual comments made to various
newspapers by political leaders. It was found through the review of multiple comments
by Japanese leaders that the dominate medium of delivery were from statements to
newspapers. Often, these statements were gathered by journalists who claimed they stood
outside the Yasukuni Shrine to specifically interview Japanese politicians. While many
statements incorporated the idea of honoring those who “died in the battle for country” or
as a “promise to never wage war again,” which are charted in the summary chart in
Figure 4, these statements did not necessarily impact or sway the message from the
Japanese government who messages were similar to each other in stating that visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine by political leaders were conducted as a private citizen.
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Figure 7 Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine
Japan
Governmental Official
Statement or declaration
PM Koizumi
“Statement of Prime Minister
Junichio Koizumi” Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Aug. 13, 2001

PM Koizumi

“Observation by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit
to Yasukuni Shrine” Japan
Ministry of Foreign April 21,
2002

Yasukuni Descriptors
Medium of delivery
… Sincerely facing these deeply
Official
regrettable historical facts as they
Gov’t
are, here I offer my feelings of
Statement
profound remorse and sincere
mourning to all the victims of the
war… I had thought that people of
Japan and those of the neighboring
countries would understand my
belief if it was fully explained, and
thus, after my assumption of office
as Prime Minister, I expressed my
wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine on
August 15.”
“The purpose of my visit was to
Official
mourn sincerely all those who lost
Gov’t
their lives for their country, leaving
Statement
behind their families in spite of
themselves, during the course of our
country's history since the Meiji
Restoration… I believe that this
would be fully understood by the
people of Japan.
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Japan
Government
Official
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Cabinet Minister
Noda

PM Abe

PM Abe

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Descriptors

“Basic Position of the
Government of Japan
Regarding Prime Minister
Koizumi’s Visits to Yasukuni
Shrine.” Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs October, 2005

“Prime Minister Koizumi is of the
firm conviction that Japan's present
peace and prosperity are founded on
the noble sacrifices made by those
who lost their lives in the war. He
visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and
offer his respect and thanks to those
who had to lay down their lives on the
battlefield against their will; to
reaffirm the importance of ensuring
the present peace and prosperity of
Japan, which those who died in the
war were unable to witness; and to
uphold Japan's pledge not to engage
in a war. He makes the visits as an
individual citizen, not in an official
capacity.”
“Japan Premier Visits Shrine to Visit reconfirmed her belief that “we
War Dead.” The New York
should never have a war. Peace is
Times July 30, 1996 by
not something that naturally exists-it
Kazuaki Nagata
is something that has been built.”
“Japan’s Abe visits shrine for
while there is criticism “I visited to
war, dead, China South Korea
report to the souls of the war dead
angered. Reuters Dec. 26, 2013 on the progress made this year and
by Antonia Slodkowski and
to convey my resolve that people
Linda Sieg
will never again suffer the horrors of
war”
“Statement by Prime Minister
“Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni
Abe –Pledge for everlasting
Shrine and expressed my sincere
peace-“ Japan Ministry of
condolences, paid my respects and
Foreign Affairs Dec. 26, 2013
prayed for the souls of all those who
had fought for the country and made
ultimate sacrifices…. Some people
criticize the visit to Yasukuni as
paying homage to war criminals, but
the purpose of my visit today, on the
anniversary of my administration’s
taking office, is to report before the
souls of the war dead how my
administration has worked for one
year and to renew the pledge that
Japan must never wage a war
again.”
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Medium
of
Delivery
Official
Gov’t
Statement

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Japan
Government
Official
Group lawmakers
statement

Cabinet Minister
Furuya

PM Abe

Cabinet Minister
Furuya

PM Abe

Minister Armura

Osaka District
Court

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Descriptions

“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan
honoring the dead or insulting
the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26,
2013 by Madison Park

“How the war dead are
commemorated is determined
according to each country’s own
culture and tradition. This long
tradition of homage and
commemoration is a matter of
national sovereignty and should
not be subjected to distortion by
outside interference and
propaganda.”
Did not wish to anger regional
neighbors, only to fulfil his duty
as a national Diet member by
praying for peace of Japan and
honoring their heroic fallen
Offering to “extend sincere
condolences to the people who
fought and died for the state and
to pray for eternal peace”
“It’s only natural to extend
sincere condolences to people
who dedicated their lives to their
country. I paid a visit to pray for
peace”
“It is natural for the nation’s
leaders to want to visit Yasukuni
to pay their respects to those who
died for the country. Abe said he
believes Cabinet members should
decide for themselves whether to
go or not”
“I offered my prayers in the hopes
that Japan will continue to make
efforts to contribute to the safety
and peace of the world”

“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan
honoring the dead or insulting
the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26,
2013 by Madison Park
“Three ministers visit Yasukuni
on surrender day anniversary;
Abe refrains.” The Japan Times
Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida
“Three ministers visit Yasukuni
on surrender day anniversary;
Abe refrains.” The Japan Times
Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida
“It’s ‘natural’ for leaders to
visit Yasukuni, Abe says” The
Japan Times Feb. 18, 2015 by
JiJi

“Ministers visit divisive war
shrine on 70th anniversary of
war end.” Japan Times August
15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki
and Reiji Yoshida
“Ministers visit divisive war
shrine on 70th anniversary of
war end.” Japan Times August
15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki
and Reiji Yoshida

Yasukuni Shrine has a different
significance than other shrines
due to its history and that the act
of visiting Yasukuni does not
impair another’s belief or life

Medium
of
delivery
Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

Statement
to
Newspaper

The statements issued by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT) all follow a similar structure. The first paragraph contains a statement of
regret, condemnation or disappointment toward the actions by the leaders of Japan. The
second paragraph provides various details which the negative reaction from the South
Korean government stems from, such as the aggressive militarist past that the Yasukuni
Shrine represents. The third paragraph is typically a recommended action or more
detailed feelings toward the action. Since the MOFA statements vary in length only
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statements that fluctuate from the typical structure have been compiled for review. These
statements have typically been taken from the 3rd paragraph.
The presidential speeches from the National Liberation Day celebration where not
compiled for this figure as they did not expressly address the Yasukuni Shrine.
Figure 7 Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine
South Korea
Governmental
Official
Ambassador to
Japan, Choi Sang
Yong

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Descriptors

“At Japan’s war shrine, wounds
unhealed; Koizumi plans visit
despite condemnation from
Asian neighbors.” The
Washington Post July 28, 2001
by Kathryn Tolbert and Doug
Struck
“Statement by MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime Minister
Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni
Shrine.” August 13, 2001 by
MOFAT

“I can only presume that Prime
Minister Koizumi does not
understand what kind of impact
his visit has on countries in
Asia”

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime Minister
Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni
Shrine.” May 8, 2002 by
MOFAT
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“If Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi is willing to cultivate
genuine friendship and
cooperation with the neighboring
states, we reiterate that he should
respect the positions and
national sentiments of the
countries concerned based on a
correct understanding of
history.”
“We believe that if Japan is to
establish genuine friendly
relations with its neighbors, it
should, on the basis of a true
recognition of history, respect
the national sentiments of
neighboring countries which
have suffered as a result of
Japanese invasion and
imperialism. We therefore call
for a sincere response from
Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and the Japanese
Government”

Medium of
delivery
Statement
to
Newspaper

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

South Korea
Governmental
Official
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Descriptors

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to
Yasukuni Shrine.” May 8,
2002 by MOFAT

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine.” January
14, 2003 by MOFAT

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine.” January
1, 2004 by MOFAT

Governmental
Official

Statement or declaration

“We believe that if Japan is to
establish genuine friendly relations
with its neighbors, it should, on the
basis of a true recognition of
history, respect the national
sentiments of neighboring countries
which have suffered as a result of
Japanese invasion and imperialism.
We therefore call for a sincere
response from Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese
Government”
“The ROK government cannot
understand the logic of paying
homage to war criminals who
destroyed peace while insisting it is
a prayer for peace. We therefore
call for a sensible determination
from Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and the Japanese
Government so as not to damage the
sentiments of the Koreans who
suffered from the Japanese
invasions.”
“…and paid homage even to war
criminals who led the past Japanese
colonial rule and invasion and
thereby destroyed world peace and
inflicted indescribable grief and
pain on the people of Korea.
“…and express much
disappointment and anger that the
national sentiments of the Koreans
have been damaged once again.”
“…We therefore strongly call for
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
to stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine.”
Yasukuni Descriptors
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Medium of
delivery
Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Medium of
delivery

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson on Prime
Minister Koizumi’s Visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine.”
October 17, 2005 by MOFAT

“…we have continued to urge Japan
to halt acts that nullify its apology
and reflection of past wartime
atrocities.”
“…it must show that it is gravely
reflecting on its past as well as take
on corresponding acts. Once again,
we strongly urge the Japanese Prime
Minister as well as other leaders of
Japan to stop paying such tributes.”

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Ministry of

“Statement by the MOFAT
Spokesperson
F
on Prime
Minister
o
Koizumi’s Visit to
the
r Yasukuni Shrine.” August
16,
e 2006 by MOFAT
i
g
n

“…it must first build mutual trust
with its neighboring countries by
facing up to the historical truth and
taking on corresponding acts.”
“Once again, we strongly urge
Japanese leaders in responsible
position not to hinder the
development of friendly relations
between Korea and Japan as well as
the maintenance of peace and
cooperation in Northeast Asia by
paying tribute to the Yasukuni
Shrine.”

Official
Gov’t
Statement

“It is regrettable to hear about the
irresponsible behavior that ignores
the feelings of the people in
neighboring countries, who have
been victimized by Japanese
imperialism in the past”

Statement
to
Newspaper

A
f
f
a
i
r
s
a
n
d

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Cho Tai-young

T
r
a
d
e
“Honoring War Criminals:
China, South Korea Harbor
Bad Feelings For Japan’s
Yasukuni Shrine.”
International Business Times
October 18, 2012 by Michelle
FlorCruz

South Korea
Governmental

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Shrine Descriptors
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Medium of

Official
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade

Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade

Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade

President Park

“1st Vice Foreign Minister
Summons Japanese
Ambassador to the ROK over
the Issue of Japan’s Wrong
Perception of History.” April
25, 2013 by MOFAT

“MOFAT Spokesperson’s
Commentary on Japanese
Prime Minister’s Offering and
Japanese Officials’ Visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22,
2013
“MOFA Spokesperson’s
Commentary: Until When do
Japanese Politicians Intend to
Lock Their Country up in the
Yasukuni Shrine?” Aug. 15,
2013
“China, South Korea angry
after Japanese PMs visit
controversial war shrine.”
Aug. 16, 2013 by Australian
Broadcasting Corp.

“…It is completely
incomprehensible that Japan,
which deeply values honest and
trust, turns a blind eye and a deaf
year to excruciating loss and pain
that Japan inflicted on neighboring
countries through its aggression
and colonial rule.”
“…urged Japanese leaders to
reflect on Japan’s past aggression
and colonial rule in an honest and
humble manner through the mirror
of history, and to correct their
retrograde perceptions, comments,
and behaviors today.”
“…urges the Japanese government
to immediately stop its retrograde
behavior which ignores history,
and to behave responsibly based on
a correct understanding of
history…”
“…urges Japan to work proactively
to win trust from neighboring
countries by facing up to its history
with courage and sincerely
showing remorse for its past
wrongdoings.”
“Japan needs to face up to the
issues of history, I expect the
country to take responsible and
sincere measures to alleviate the
agony of those living in pain, and
scarred by history”

delivery
Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Statement
to
Newspaper

South Korea
Government
Official
Minister of
Culture, Sports,
and Tourism,
Yoo Jinryong

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Shrine Descriptors

“Japanese PM Abe visits
Abe’s visit was an “anachronistic
Yasukuni war shrine, drawing193act” that “hurts not only the ties
sharp rebukes from China and between South Korea and Japan
South Korea.” Dec. 26, 2013
but also fundamentally damages
By Mari Yamaguchi et. al
the stability and co-operation in
Northeast Asia.”

Medium of
delivery
Broadcast
on live
T.V.

South Korea
Government

Statement or declaration

Yasukuni Shrine Descriptors
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Medium of

Official
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“MOFA Spokesperson’s
Commentary on the Japanese
Prime Minister’s Offering to
the Yasukuni Shrine.” Oct. 17,
2014

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“MOFA Spokesperson’s
Commentary on Japanese
Leaders Sending Offerings to
and Paying Tribute at the
Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22,
2015

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“MOFA Spokesperson’s
Commentary on the Japanese
Prime Minister Sending a
Cash Offering to the Yasukuni
Shrine.” August 15, 2015

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
and Trade

“MOFA Spokesperson’s
Commentary on the Japanese
Prime Minister Sending an
Offering to the Yasukuni
Shrine.” October 18, 2015

“…Japan’s political leaders should
be well aware that their paying
respect and homage at such shrine
is nothing less than an action
denying the international order
and nullifying the basis of Japan’s
post-war return to the
international community.
“Japan, instead of confining itself
to its dark past, should take steps
forward into a bright future based
on serious reflections on and deep
remorse for its past wrong doings.”
“…the ROK strongly urges Japan
to show heartfelt remorse and
apologize for its past wrongdoings
and thereby meet the aspiration of
the peoples of the two countries for
the improvement in bilateral
relations.”
“…only when leading figures of
Japan sincerely carry out selfreflection and demonstrate their
remorse through actions, will
Japan be able to win trust from its
neighboring countries and the rest
of the international community.”
“…only when Japan demonstrates
through action its humble
reflection and remorse based on
correct recognition of history with
the ROK-Japan relations move
stably forward.

delivery
Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

Official
Gov’t
Statement

K. Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History
Textbooks
August 26, 1982
The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact
that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the
peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and have
followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must
never be repeated. Japan has recognized, in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique of 1965,
that the "past relations are regrettable, and Japan feels deep remorse," and in the JapanChina Joint Communique, that Japan is "keenly conscious of the responsibility for the
serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and
deeply reproaches itself." These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination
which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day.
This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique and the Japan-China Joint
Communique naturally should also be respected in Japan's school education and textbook
authorization. Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China, and others have been
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criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building
friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these
criticisms and make corrections at the Government's responsibility.
To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will
revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook
Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned
above. Regarding textbooks that have already been authorized, Government will take
steps quickly to the same effect. As measures until then, the Minister of Education,
Sports, Science and Culture will express his views and make sure that the idea mentioned
in 2. Above is duly reflected in the places of education.
Japan intends to continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop
friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the
peace and stability of Asia and, in turn, of the world.
L.

Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of
the 50th anniversary of the war's end"
August 15,1995

The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I
remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is
overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.
The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to
arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of
which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom
and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again
my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by
the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also
delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today
with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the
countries of Europe.
Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the
pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the
horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join
hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the
Asia-Pacific region -indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else,
that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided
by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange
Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into
relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and
elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will
continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from
the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those
countries.
Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, we
should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history,
and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human
society in the future.
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During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a
fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage
and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In
the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and
state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.
Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international
coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby,
advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to
have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in
areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my
conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of
those who perished.
It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of
remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make
good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.
M.

Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda on the
history textbooks to be used in junior high schools from 2002
April 3, 2001

With respect to the history textbooks that are to be used in junior high schools
from 2002, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has
recently decided to officially authorize a total of eight books which were submitted.
Japan's textbook authorization system is founded on the basic principle that a
diverse range of textbooks employing the creativity and originality of private sector
authors and editors will be published, and without the Government defining specific
historical perspectives or outlooks. Historical perspectives or outlooks represented in
textbooks should not be identified as those of the Japanese Government. The standards to
be applied are, first and foremost, whether the book to be authorized is appropriate as a
textbook in accordance with the Regulations of Textbook Authorization. What the text
approval system considers fundamental is to ensure that flaws, such as obvious mistake
or a lack of balance, to be eliminated and remedied in light of objective academic
research and appropriate reference material at the time of authorization.
During the process of the recent authorization of textbooks, various concerns have
been expressed from neighboring countries. However, the authorization was carried out
impartially based on the Regulations of Textbook Authorization, including the Course of
Study and the "Provision Concerning Neighboring Countries."
In this connection, the Japanese Government's basic recognition of its history is
reflected entirely in the Prime Minister's statement issued on 15 August 1995
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan humbly
accepts that for a period in the not too distant past, it caused tremendous damage and
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suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, through
its colonial rule and aggression, and expresses its deep remorse and heartfelt apology for
this. Such recognition has been succeeded by subsequent Cabinets and there is no change
regarding this point in the present Cabinet.
Japan would like to endeavor to promote mutual understanding and trust with its
neighboring countries and contribute to peace and prosperity not only in Asia, but in the
rest of the world too.
N. Statement by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
of Japan on the October 12 International New York Times article "Japan's
Divided Education Strategy"
October 13, 2014
An October 12 International New York Times article criticized Japan’s education
strategy for being “divided.” The article claims that, “Japan’s simultaneous embrace of
nationalism and cosmopolitanism is generating ambiguous signals from its education
policy makers. They are rewriting textbooks along what they call ‘patriotic’ lines,
alienating their Asian neighbors in the process.” This is completely counter to our
understanding.
A dramatic change in the direction of education is underway in Japan in order to
respond to globalization – not to promote nationalism. The reforms we are undertaking
center on three main areas: foreign language education, the internationalization of
Japanese universities, and the teaching of Japan’s traditions, culture, and history to
strengthen students’ sense of identity.
Regarding foreign language education, we intend to have elementary school
students begin learning foreign languages at an earlier age – starting at the third grade
from the current fifth – and to raise the level of English language education in middle and
high school.
Although reading, listening, writing, and speaking are the four necessary
competencies for English language education, the university entrance exams administered
by the National Center for University Entrance Exams to over half a million students
around the country each year focus almost exclusively on reading, with slight coverage of
listening and almost nothing on writing and speaking.
Many Japanese people cannot speak English despite receiving six years of
English language education in middle and high school. The reason is the problem with
Japanese school education. This is why we are moving ahead with reform not only to
start English language education earlier, but also to introduce university entrance exams
that balance the four competencies mentioned above.
At the same time, we are promoting the internationalization of high schools and
universities in order to develop human resources that can compete on the global stage.
Through our Top Global University Project, which provides financial support to 37
universities, we intend to promote the internationalization of Japanese universities with a
specific target of seeing ten Japanese universities placed in the top 100 in global
university rankings within a decade.
Japan has sent a large number of students overseas, but the number has
unfortunately declined to around 60,000 in 2011 after peaking at 83,000 in 2004. In
particular, the number of students studying in the United States fell from a peak of about
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50,000 in 1999 to around 20,000 (or 40% of the peak) in 2011. To address this trend and
the risk of becoming overly inward-looking, the government intends to double the
number of students studying abroad from 60,000 to 120,000 by 2020. We also plan to
increase the number of foreigners studying in Japan from the current 140,000 to 300,000
by 2020, by financially supporting students and universities.
To succeed as a truly globalized person, however, requires a sense of one’s own
identity. To nurture that identity, the learning of Japanese traditions, culture, and history
– the elements that make up the Japanese identity – is essential. Without this knowledge,
we cannot discuss many matters of substance concerning Japan, including our traditions,
culture, and history. Indeed, a commonly cited problem is that many Japanese students
cannot explain aspects of their own country while overseas. Inadequate foreign language
ability is one part of the problem, but the weak sense of identity many young students
possess is also a factor. Unfortunately, Japanese young people often come up against this
problem.
I do not believe that it is a problem with Japanese students individually, but rather
that Japanese schools have not properly taught Japanese traditions, culture, and history.
There naturally exists differences between various nations and ethnicities, and it is
important to respect such differences. To nurture such an attitude of respect for
differences, it is surely indispensable to teach one’s own country’s values.
The International New York Times criticized Japanese education for becoming
“nationalistic” and undergoing a “rightward shift.” However, teaching Japan’s traditions,
culture, and history, which are the foundation of the Japanese identity, is intended only to
foster an attitude of love for one’s country and native environment; it is not meant to
promote nationalism or education that evokes contempt for other countries, especially our
neighbors. In the 7th century, Prince Shotoku instituted the Seventeen-Article
Constitution, one of the earlier constitutions in the world. The foundation of that
Constitution is Japan’s long-held “spirit of harmony.” It is this value that underpins much
of our educational reforms.
I believe the people of the world recognize that bonds among people,
thoughtfulness, and a spirit of harmony are at the core of the Japanese spirit, as
exemplified by the actions of the victims in the aftermath of the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake.
That is to say, the Japanese traditions, culture, and history taught at schools are
not synonymous with the idea of “nationalism.” There is no contradiction between Japan
placing great value on its traditions, culture, and history on the one hand, while
coexisting in the international community on the other. We believe rather that providing
education that deepens the understanding of Japan is important for Japanese to succeed in
a globalized world.
The role that Japan and the Japanese people must serve in the international
community in the 21st century is based on the “spirit of harmony” and the “spirt of
hospitality” that have been cultivated in Japan since ancient times. We intend for the
2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games to show this spirit to the people of the
world. We wish to promote reforms through the education I have described, so that the
direction of Japanese education will provide greater alignment with the people of the
world.
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Hakubun Shimomura
Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
October 31, 2014
O.

Revision of History Curriculum Press release on May 12, 2010 National
Curriculum Planning Division
May 12, 2010

Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) announced the final
version of the revised history curriculum, which put more emphasis on the historical fact
about Dokdo, on May 12, 2010.
According to the Revised National Curriculum 2009, history subject is mandatory
for primary and middle school students, and is elective for all high school students. In the
course of the revision, the need for reinforcing the content on several historical facts
including the Dokdo islets has been raised.
Accordingly, MEST decided to revise the history curriculum as follows:
①

The basic framework of history curriculum of the Revised National Curriculum
2007 and 2009 will remain unchanged, except the following:

②

History curriculum for the middle school students will be focused on nurturing the
basic history literacy that is required for all Korean citizens.

③

With the subject name changed from history to Korean history, the curriculum for
high school students has been restructured so that the content would be suited to the
new title of the subject.

④

The content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the
wrongfulness of Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise
students’ awareness on Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an
informed view of history.

MEST commissioned the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation to
conduct the research on the draft for the revised history curriculum between January and
April in 2010.
And then, on April 9, a seminar was held to hear advice of the outside experts on
the draft. The revision was finalized after going through the deliberation of the council on
national curriculum.
The revised history curriculum will start to be incorporated into high school
textbooks from March 2011 and middle school textbooks from March 2012.
P.

Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in Japanese History
Textbooks
May 8, 2001
1. Mr. Han Seung-soo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea
conveyed an aide memoire to the Government of Japan on May 8, which contains the
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Korean Government's item-by-item demand for correction in the controversial
Japanese history textbooks. The demand is the latest in the series of effort made by the
Korean Government regarding the Japanese history textbooks, following the
statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman on April 3 and the expression of
profound disappointment by Minister Han to the Japanese Ambassador to Korea on
April 4.
2. The Korean Government's demand is based upon a thorough and in-depth analysis
of the textbooks by a team of history researchers. The team's report was then
evaluated by the National Institute of Korean History and reviewed by an advisory
council of experts in the related area. Although the analysis found
the Japanese history textbooks to contain numerous problems, the Korean Government
has limited its demand for correction to only the parts which are clearly false,
obscuring, distorting and/or
misleading. The list of the Korean Government's
demand is composed of 35 items: 25 in Fusosha textbook, ten in seven
other textbooks.
3. In conveying the aide-memoire to the Japanese Ambassador in Korea, Minister Han
pointed out that the problematic contents in the textbooks are out of step with historic
1998 Joint Declaration on a new Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century as well
as with the pledges Japan has made before the international community such as the
1995 Statement by Prime Minister Murayama and the 1982 Statement by the Minister
of Education on history textbooks. Furthermore, the textbooks in question go against
the fundamental stance of the international community on history education, as
enshrined in the 1995 UNESCO Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on
Human Rights and Democracy Education for Peace. Minister Han urged the Japanese
Government to take prompt and effective actions in the spirit of these international
pledges and agreements to correct and prevent the distortion of history.
4. In making the demand for corrections, the Korean Government has no intention to
interfere with the education of history in Japan. The demand is made of the concern
that textbooks in question may reopen the wound incurred upon the Korean people by
the unfortunate past in the relationship between Korea and Japan, damage the
amicable ties that have developed between the two countries and negatively affect the
regional situation in Northeast Asia.
5. In the belief that an objective understanding of history is the cornerstone of friendly
and cooperative relations between Korea and Japan, the Korean Government will
continue with the multi-faceted and steadfast diplomatic efforts in the international
arena in parallel with bilateral efforts toward Japan, so as to clear the textbooks of the
problematic contents.
6. In addition, the Korean Government will demise mid-to-long-term measures to
prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer the world an accurate
and objective understanding of Korea's history. As part of such efforts, the Korean
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Government will consider reinforcing history education in the schools
and establishing a permanent body within the Government to promote the exchange of
historians between Korea and Japan, to prevent future misunderstanding of history and
to strengthen the understanding of Korean history in the international community.
Spokesperson of MOFAT
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